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This thesis is a critical examination of the boundaries of recklessness and negligence in 
English and Welsh criminal law and of the extent to which these mentes reae terms reflect the 
leading theories of culpability.  The general principle requiring mens rea to be established 
before criminal liability is justified stems from the maxim ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit 
rea’, and the historical foundations of this concept will be analysed to assess whether there 
can be criminal liability for inadvertent conduct whilst still upholding this tenet.  The 
interpretation of recklessness and negligence has proven to be problematic as both have 
included inadvertent actions and subjective and objective labels have been employed 
inconsistently, exacerbating an already difficult situation.  What becomes clear is that the 
recent judicial pronouncements that have given rise this state of affairs is the result of a desire 
for flexibility so that justice can be done in a particular case, but this has culminated in a lack 
of transparency and some confusion. 
 
The aim of this work is to determine appropriate limits for criminal recklessness and 
negligence with regard to serious offences.  Over the last century recklessness has had three 
main interpretations, none of which are satisfactory as will be demonstrated.  This is partly 
because they cannot be adequately underpinned by the theories of choice and character, the 
leading theories of culpability.  Further, the objective/subjective labels attached to the three 
interpretations are inaccurate and misleading, with the potential for injustice.  Accordingly, 
other culpability theories are scrutinised and a new interpretation of recklessness is advocated 
in an attempt to provide a more consistent philosophical and practical approach to 









1.1 Introduction to the thesis: aims and objectives 
 
The aim of this work is to recommend the appropriate limits of the mens rea concepts of 
recklessness and negligence in the criminal law of England and Wales1with regard to serious 
crimes.  In order to do this, a detailed critical examination will be made of the extent to which 
judicial statements have blurred the distinction between the mentes reae of intention, 
recklessness and negligence.  A critical exposition of recklessness results in the submission 
that the current definition of recklessness in the Draft Criminal Code is a form of ideal 
subjectivism.  As such, it could be interpreted as requiring that a defendant should not only 
foresee the risk of harm resulting from his actions, but that he should also appreciate that the 
risk is an unjustifiable one to take in the circumstances.  This is an interpretation that would 
not have been intended by the Law Commission and would be an unwarranted restriction on 
establishing liability.  A capacity based approach to recklessness will be advocated, coupled 
with the abolition of criminal liability for negligent conduct with regard to serious crimes.2  
What is propounded is that recklessness with regard to serious offences should encompass 
both advertent and inadvertent conduct.3  As will be demonstrated, ‘gross’ negligence and 
recklessness are treated as synonymous by the courts and it is argued that recklessness is the 
more appropriate term where gross negligence is found.   
                                            
1 Any reference to ‘English’ criminal law in this work should be taken to mean ‘English and Welsh’ criminal 
law.  
2 Strict liability for regulatory offences is necessary for public safety; here no mens rea is required as 
commission of the prohibited act alone is sufficient. 
3 Currently, recklessness generally requires that the defendant adverted to the risk that his conduct could cause 
harm of a particular kind but continued to act. 
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There has been much debate over the use of the labels ‘subjective’ and objective’ with regard 
to the interpretation of mentes reae, with some finding these labels unhelpful.4  What will 
become clear from the analysis of judicial and academic opinion is that these terms operate 
along a continuum and are not consistently used in the same way.  As a result, without further 
explanation accompanying their inclusion, they can be misleading. 
 
The relationship in current law between mens rea and moral blameworthiness will be 
explored and the leading theories of culpability will be examined to ascertain which theory, if 
any, underpins the current approaches to these mens rea terms and which would best 
accommodate the ambit for recklessness proposed here.  The result of this examination of the 
theories of culpability will demonstrate that only Gardner’s5 ‘role’6 theory can truly fit with 
criminal liability for negligence and this theory would be more appropriately utilised if 
restricted to strict liability offences.7  Elements of more than one theory currently underpin 
intention and recklessness and a synthesis of aspects of two theories8 will form the basis of 
the new approach to recklessness advocated. 
   
To date, there has been much debate surrounding the theories of culpability.  Whereas others 
have explored these theories in the context of exculpation (the criminal defences, justification 
and excuse) here they are analysed with regard to inculpation.  Some authors have examined 
the link between one or more of the theories of culpability and mens rea, but this area still 
                                            
4 See, for example, Lord Diplock in MPC v Caldwell [1982] AC 341 at 352-354. 
5 J. Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ (1998) 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 575; and Offences and Defences 
Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) Chapter 6. 
6 Gardner’s theory is referred to as ‘role’ theory in this thesis.  Here, criminal liability is founded upon a failure 
to meet the standard required for the role you were performing, be that doctor, parent, or simply human being. 
7 Discussion of strict liability offences, and of penology, is beyond the scope of this work. 
8 ‘Role’ theory and Character theory.  The latter theory grounds liability upon the ‘bad’ character of the 
defendant as demonstrated by his actions. 
3 
 
remains relatively unexplored.9  Although some invaluable insight has been provided on the 
development of the subjective approach to recklessness,10 to the author’s knowledge no work 
has focussed on linking culpability and the mens rea terms under scrutiny here with a view to 
determining the limits of criminal recklessness and negligence proposed.  The author hopes to 
make an original contribution by this examination, noting that the current definition of 
recklessness is ideal subjectivism and advocating a new approach to establishing reckless 
conduct that will obviate the need for liability in negligence for serious crimes.11   
 
It will be argued that a capacity based approach to recklessness is actually in operation 
despite a subjective definition.  As such, the formal introduction of a more objective capacity 
based definition will better reflect current practice, enabling the courts to secure convictions 
where purely subjective foresight of risk cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt.  The 
current practice of finding that a defendant, (D), must have foreseen a risk in circumstances 
where this is highly questionable,12 or declaring that he had ‘closed his mind to it’,13 can then 
be dispensed with. 
  
                                            
9 R.A. Duff, ‘Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); Criminal Attempts, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996); ‘Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an Aristotelian Criminal Law.’ 
(2002) 6 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 147;  J. Horder, ‘Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens 
Rea’ [1997] 113 Law Quarterly Review 95; M.D. Bayles in ‘Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility’ 
(1982) 1 Law and Philosophy 5; H. Gross,  A Theory of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979); C. Finkelstein ‘The Inefficiency of Mens Rea’ (2000) 88 California  Law Review  895; J. Gardner, J and 
H. Jung, ‘Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony Duff’s Account’ (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 559; 
J.A. Laing, ‘The Prospects of a Theory of Criminal Culpability: Mens Rea and Methodological Doubt’ (1994) 
14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 57; L. Alexander, ‘Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal 
Culpability’ (2000) 88 California  Law Review 931; J. Dressler, ‘Does One Mens Rea Fit All? Thoughts on 
Alexander’s Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability’, (2000) 88 California  Law Review 955; E. Pincoffs, 
‘Legal Responsibility and Moral Character’, [1973] 19 Wayne Law Review 905; H.L.A. Hart, ‘Negligence, 
Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility,’ in Punishment and Responsibility Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968). 
10 A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History, 2nd Edn, (London: Butterworths, 2001). 
11 The modified interpretation of recklessness proposed will encompass both acts of commission and omission. 
12Booth v CPS [2006] EWHC. 
13 R v Parker [1977] 1 WLR 600. 
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1.2 Defining Mens Rea - intention, oblique intention, recklessness, and criminal 
negligence 
 
1.2.1 Mens Rea 
 
When a person is convicted of a criminal offence the message conveyed to society is that the 
person deserves blame.  It should follow that where blameworthiness is absent criminality 
should not be established.  Consequently, there should be no conviction without fault and the 
element within the definition of a criminal offence that reflects the necessary culpability 
required is the mens rea, the mental element specified for the particular offence.  Whether 
mens rea now reflects moral fault or purely legal fault will be examined in Chapter Two and 
it will be demonstrated that none of the main culpability theories alone provide an adequate 
rationale for mens rea.14   In relation to choice theory,15 there is nothing to explain the 
relevance of how harm was caused in determining the degree of culpability,16 and character 
theory has been adjudged irrelevant to mens rea and explaining culpability.17  However it will 
be argued that a combination of the theories underpin the mentes reae terms of intention and 
recklessness in their current forms.   Criminal liability for negligence is problematic for all 
but one of the theories examined and it will be proposed that criminalising negligent conduct 
per se for serious offences is inappropriate and that having a cognitive, capacity based test for 
recklessness would make such criminalisation unnecessary. 
 
1.2.1.1 Subjective and objective approaches to mens rea 
 
Any examination of intention, recklessness and criminal negligence needs to scrutinize the 
role of subjective and objective approaches to mens rea, which will inevitably include an 
                                            
14 J. Horder, ‘Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory’(1993) 12 Law and Philosophy 193 
15 Here, criminal liability is grounded in the agent’s conscious choice to break the law. See, for example, M. 
Moore, ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’ (1990) 7 Social Philosophy and Policy 29.  
16 Ibid. at 203. 
17 Ibid. at 208. 
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analysis of the adjectives “subjective” and “objective”.  This is not quite as straightforward as 
it first appears as the labels operate along a continuum, from purely subjective through to 
ideal objectivism.  Often a compromise between the two approaches is used in practice.  
Although ‘subjective’ approaches18 to establishing fault elements have gained dominance in 
the courts recently, it will be argued here, that there is scope for more objectivity in the 
criminal law with regard to determining recklessness as traditionally a synthesis of both 
subjective and objective elements have been successfully utilised.19  
(i) Subjectivism 
 
Subjectivists would argue that there should be no liability incurred unless D intended to 
commit the offence or foresaw there was a risk of committing the particular harm but 
nonetheless continued to act.20  Subjectivist theory is morally justified on the basis that 
foresight results in the defendant making a ‘reprehensible choice’ to continue to act. 21  On 
this view, the interpretation of a ‘guilty mind’ (mens rea) is demonstrated by a requirement of 
intention or reckless conduct with foresight.  Here, moral wrongdoing is easily established as 
a matter of fact, as once it is proven that the D made such a choice, it is unnecessary to delve 
further into his motive or attitude.  Consequently, D is equally reckless whether he is 




Objectivists propose that liability should be expanded to include those whose conduct causes 
harm to others regardless of whether they foresaw a risk of harm occurring, but where the 
                                            
18 See, for example, R v G & R [2004] 4 All ER 765; with the exception with regard to the defence of 
provocation, see Holley [2005] UKPC 23. This has now been replaced by the loss of control defence, Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009. 
19 J. Horder, ‘Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens Rea’ [1997] 113 Law Quarterly Review 95. 
20 See, for example, the work of Professors J.C. Smith and Glanville Williams. 
21 D.J. Birch, ‘The Foresight Saga: The Biggest Mistake of All?’ [1988] Criminal Law Review 4. 
22 Ibid. at 6. 
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reasonable person would have foreseen such a risk.23  This is a much broader extension of 
liability which includes inadvertent conduct.  It focuses on ‘moral arguments about powers of 
cognition’24 in determining culpability and it can hold culpable those who should have done 
better.25  Controversially, in its purest form, it can impose liability on those who could not 




Although the focus of this work is primarily on recklessness and negligence, the development 
of the former has historically been intertwined with the development of intention, or more 
precisely, with the concept of ‘oblique’ intention.  Intention, regarded as the most 
blameworthy state of mind,26 is where D aims to bring about a consequence because he wants 
and desires a particular outcome; it is his purpose to cause a desired result.27   The concept of 
intention also incorporates ‘oblique intention’, whereby D may be found to have intended the 
proscribed act where he foresaw its occurrence as a virtually certain consequence of his 




The development of this mens rea term has been invaluably investigated by Norrie,29 who 
traces its oscillation from an objective approach to a subjective view at the hands of the 
                                            
23 See, for example, Lord Diplock in Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Caldwell [1982] AC 341, and R A. 
Duff who argues for a broader approach to constructing liability than subjectivists permit, Intention, Agency and 
Criminal Liability (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990)  
24 J. Horder, ‘Cognition, Emotion, and Criminal Culpability’ [1990] 106 Law Quarterly Review 469. 
25 Criminal liability is based upon what the reasonable person would have foreseen, not what the particular 
defendant intended or foresaw. 
26 This is generally accepted, however cases of reckless mass endangerment could be considered to be on a par. 
27 A.P. Simester and G.R. Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine 3rd Edn., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2007) 120. 
28 R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82.  
29 A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History, (n 10).  
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Victorian Law Commissioners.  The case of R v Cunningham30  maintained this subjective 
position holding that recklessness is established where ‘the accused has foreseen that the 
particular kind of harm might be done, and yet has gone on to take the risk of it.’31   A second 
interpretation of recklessness was adopted by the House of Lords in Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner v Caldwell,32 producing a more objective definition.  This became known as 
Lord Diplock’s ‘Model Direction.’  An accused could now be reckless for offences under the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971 if he either foresaw some risk of damage or destruction to 
property or, where there was an obvious risk of damage or destruction, he gave no thought to 
the possibility of any risk existing and continued to act.  In R v Lawrence,33 significantly 
decided on the same day, the ‘obvious risk’ was amended to an ‘obvious and serious risk’ for 
offences of reckless driving.  In 2004, the decision of the House of Lords in R v G & R34 
departed from Caldwell recklessness35 resulting in a third approach to recklessness.36  It 
heralded a return to a subjective definition of recklessness.37  A critical analysis of these cases 
and the definitions employed are provided in Chapter Three where it is argued that the 
current definition could be interpreted as a purely subjective test which would represent a 
departure from all previous forms of criminal recklessness, and, it is submitted, would 
consequently be unacceptable as securing convictions would require proof that D knew the 
risk was an unreasonable one to take in the circumstances.   
 
                                            
30 [1957] 2 All ER 412. 
31 Ibid. per Byrne J. 
32 [1982] AC 341. 
33 [1982] AC 510. 
34 [2004] 4 All ER 765. 
35 [1982] AC 341 This departure was only in relation to the definition of ‘reckless’ for the purpose of the CDA 
1971, G & R [2004] 4 All ER 765, per Lord Bingham at 783, para.(j); but see Attorney-General’s Reference (No 
3 of 2003) 2 Cr App R 367.  
36 Lord Rodger states G&R overrules Caldwell; Lords Bingham and Steyn “depart” from it which, as Kimel 
observes, is more technically correct given that the facts in Caldwell concerned self induced intoxication and the 
case would still be decided the same way, see D. Kimel, (2004) 120 Law Quarterly Review 548. 
37 The judgment essentially restricted its application to criminal damage but it has since been held to cover all 
offences unless otherwise specified in statute.  However, this definition differs from the subjective test from 





While Cunningham recklessness prevailed there was a clear distinction between reckless 
conduct and negligent conduct:  recklessness required foresight of risk whereas negligence 
covered inadvertent conduct.  Whether this distinction was ever so clear cut is questionable as 
analysed in Chapters Three and Four of this work.  However, the decision in Caldwell38 
blurred any such demarcation as D could be reckless where he failed to give any thought to a 
risk.  Following the decisions in Caldwell and Lawrence, in R v Seymour39 it was held that 
the law applicable to manslaughter was the same as that for the offence of reckless driving.  
The Court of Appeal in Seymour had found it unnecessary to refer to negligence because the 
Lawrence direction on recklessness was comprehensive and of general application to all 
offences.’40    It seemed that gross negligence manslaughter had been subsumed within the 
more objective test for recklessness, a position supported with some important modifications 
in this work.  However, R v Adomako 41 reaffirmed the existence of gross negligence 
manslaughter, overruling Seymour, and when G&R heralded the resurgence of a subjective 
interpretation of recklessness, unless statute declared otherwise,42 the distinction between 
advertent and inadvertent fault terms was reinstated.    
 
Negligence as a threshold of liability has always been seen as anomalous because of the lack 
of a conscious perception of the risk entailed by the conduct.  For those who support 
subjective theories of culpability, punishment is justified only where D chose to engage in 
activity that risked breaking the law, either by acting intentionally or with foresight of the 
                                            
38 [1982] AC 341 
39 [1983] 2 All ER 1058 at 1064.               
40 (1983) 76 Cr App Rep 211 at 216, per Watkins LJ. 
41 [1993] 4 All ER 935. 
42 Once again requiring foresight of the risk by D. 
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kind of harm that might be caused.43  On this basis, negligence is not seen as an appropriate 
member of the mentes reae family and is said to fall outside the Latin maxim, ‘actus non facit 
reum nisi mens sit rea,’44 viz an act alone does not make a man guilty unless his mind is also 
guilty.45  The merits of this argument are critically evaluated in Chapters Two and Four.  For 
others, to automatically exclude criminal liability for inadvertence would be to unduly shield 
a morally culpable agent at the expense of his victim, and would not accord with society’s 
perception of justice.   
 
1.2.5 Culpability Theories 
 
The theories of culpability that will be examined in this work are ‘choice theory,’ ‘character 
theory,’ ‘role’ theory and the ‘agency theory,’ of criminal culpability, to determine which 
theory/theories underpin current law and which would accommodate the scope of liability for 
recklessness and negligence advocated in this work.  Choice theorists hold that a defendant is 
culpable only where D has made a choice to break the law when he/she had the capacity and 
a fair opportunity to act otherwise.46  Character theory bases culpability on the ‘bad 
character’ of the defendant and generally makes no allowance for a defendant’s particular 
weaknesses with regard to character flaws.47  Agency theory48  judges ‘conduct… by 
reference to its relative (lack of) success,’49 and attempts to relate the theory to the different 
                                            
43 For example, L. Alexander, K. Ferzan, with S. Morse, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
44 E. Coke, Third Institute (1641)107; an adaptation of ‘reum non facit nisi mens rea’ found in the context of 
perjury in Leges Henrici Primi c.5, § 28. cited in Simester and Sullivan,  (n 27) 27 but traced back to St. 
Augustine, G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd Edn., (London: Stevens, 1983) 70. 
45 Statutory law has not been based on the same maxim although there is a presumption that mens rea is required 
which can be rebutted, see Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132, cf.  the Sexual Offences Act 2003 ss5-8. 
46 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility,’ in Punishment and Responsibility Essays 
in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968) 136-157. 
47 D. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888). 
48 J. Horder, ‘Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory’ (n 14). 
Horder attributes the inspiration for this theory to the work of Antony Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal 
Liability (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) Chapter 5. 
49 Ibid. Horder, ‘Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory’ at 210. 
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levels of culpability reflected in the degrees of mens rea.  Finally, the ‘role’ model of 
culpability50 relates to the role we are fulfilling, for example a specific role such as doctor or 
parent, or a non-specific role i.e. a human being, and we fall below an idealised standard of a 
reasonable person in the role we are fulfilling.  A synthesis of aspects of ‘role’ and character 
theory will be advocated to provide a theoretical rationale for the approach to recklessness 




This study is both philosophical and doctrinal.  It is qualitative research which focuses on the 
link between moral blameworthiness, the theories of culpability and the mentes reae terms of 
intention, recklessness and negligence in English criminal law.  The research adopts a library 
based methodology, using both primary and secondary sources.  Critics of this methodology 
argue that this traditional51 method52 of legal research is too narrow and purely doctrinal 
analysis has been viewed as ‘intellectually rigid, inflexible and inward-looking’.53  This is 
because law does not exist in a vacuum54 and these critics suggest that socio-legal 
methodologies are more appropriate.55  This work does acknowledge socio-legal perspectives 
in its examination of moral blameworthiness and policy considerations are analysed, where 
appropriate.  Most influential with regard to attributing moral blame and its links with 
                                            
50 J. Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ (1998) 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 575; Offences and Defences 
Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law, (n.5). 
51 C. Morris and C. Murphy, Getting a PhD in Law (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 30 
52 “One of the assumptions is that ‘the character of legal scholarship is derived from the law itself,’” E.L. Rubin, 
Law and the Methodology of Law (1997) Wisconsin Law Review 525 cited in Research Methods for Law, M. 
McConville and W.H. Chui (eds) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 
53 D.W. Wick, ‘Interdisciplinary and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 164 in 
Research Methods for Law, M. McConville and W.H. Chui (eds) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2007) 4. 
54 W. Twining observes that by focussing as it does on rules of law, doctrinal research’s central weakness is that 
it can lack reference to the context of problems the law is set to resolve, the purpose for which it was intended 
and its effect on society; (1976) Taylor Lectures 1975 Academic Law and Legal Development, Lagos: 
University of Lagos Faculty of Law, 20. 




criminal responsibility were the works of Antony Duff56 and Victor Tadros57 and it is clear 
that both historically and in terms of society’s perceptions of justice, this link is still 
important.  Where relevant, reference is also made to the law in other jurisdictions although 
conducting a comparative study as an alternative was rejected in favour of a study which 
would determine whether the current interpretations of recklessness and negligence could be 
theoretically justified and if not, to devise an alternative theoretical rationale that would 
support a new model of attributing criminal liability.  In essence, the research began as 
doctrinal but then identified issues with the existing law, philosophy and the policies 
underpinning the law, leading to the formulation of appropriate reform.58  The central aim 
was to critically analyse the concepts of recklessness and negligence to determine what the 
approach to recklessness should be for the future.  Originally, the intention was to begin with 
an examination of the underlying rationale for the criminal law to ascertain whether the 
current definition of recklessness satisfied these theoretical principles in practice.  This was to 
be followed in the next chapter by an examination of theories of culpability and moral 
blameworthiness, including character and choice theories and utilitarianism. Subsequent 
chapters were going to analyse the mens rea requirement and its historical development, and 
analyse intention, recklessness, and negligence with strict liability, respectively.  Finally the 
work would conclude with a recommendation for a new approach to recklessness. 
 
At an early stage in the research, it had become clear that the thesis needed a much narrower 
focus.  What was emerging from the literature was a common underlying theme – the 
                                            
56 R.A. Duff, ‘Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); Criminal Attempts, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996); ‘Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an Aristotelian Criminal Law.’ 
(2002) 6 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 147; Answering For Crime Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal 
Law (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
57 V. Tadros, ‘The Characters of Excuse’ (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 495; Criminal 
Responsibility (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005)  
58To this extent it is seen to refute the criticisms of this method of research; I. Dobinson and F. Johns, 
Qualitative Legal Research, in Research Methods for Law, M. McConville and W.H. Chui (eds) (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 
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historical prerequisite for moral blameworthiness for serious criminal offences.  The research 
became honed; whereas the earlier work had provided a commentary on the development of 
the criminal law in this area, the new objective was a comprehensive critique of the historical 
development of the mentes reae of recklessness and negligence to make recommendation for 
the future ambit of these terms with an appropriate theoretical rationale.  Alan Norrie’s 
authoritative work on the history of recklessness was invaluable;59 the work of Herbert 
Hart,60 Michael Moore,61 Peter Arenella,62 Jeremy Horder63 and John Gardner64 were also 
extremely influential with regard to culpability and establishing an appropriate basis for 
reform.  Francis Sayre’s65 and Albert Lévitt’s66 studies of the development of the requirement 
for mens rea were also illuminating.   
 
With the underlying theme of moral blameworthiness, additional culpability theories were 
examined in the search for a hybrid theory to justify the recommendations made, but the 
relevance of culture to moral blameworthiness and criminal responsibility was omitted in 
order to accommodate this, given the word limit.  Any meaningful discussion of strict 
liability was excluded as there is no mental element in such offences and generally no moral 
fault is required for these crimes. In a similar vein, the theory of utilitarianism is restricted in 
the discussion.  Although it is said to have a role in providing the theoretical rationale for 
criminal negligence, and is considered in this context but found to be of limited value, as the 
                                            
59 Crime, Reason and History, (n 10). 
60 ‘Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility,’ in Punishment and Responsibility Essays in the 
Philosophy of Law (n 46). 
61 ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’ (1990) 7 Social Philosophy and Policy 29. 
62 ‘Character, Choice and Moral Agency: the Relevance of Character to our Moral Culpability Judgments’ 
(1990) 7 Social Philosophy and Policy 59. 
63 J. Horder, ‘Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory’ (n 14). 
64 J. Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ (1998) 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 575; Offences and Defences 
Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law, (n.5). 
65 ‘Mens Rea’ (1931-1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 974. 




theory is not grounded in morality as it focusses on the promotion of the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number of members of a given society.   
 
1.4 Overview of the thesis 
 
Following on from the Introductory Chapter, Chapter Two examines in more depth the 
meaning of mens rea demonstrating that there has been a judicial departure from the 
traditional view that mens rea must signify moral blameworthiness.  The discussion will then 
consider objective and subjective approaches to mens rea and what is understood by these 
labels, advocating a consistent interpretation.  Finally the theories of culpability will be 
critically examined to identify which theories provide the most appropriate philosophical 
explanation of our current mentes reae terms of intention, recklessness and negligence, and it 
is submitted that none of the theories can apply independently without reliance on aspects of 
other theories.  However, a synthesis of character and role theory would support both the 
current position and the proposals advocated in this thesis in subsequent chapters.  Ultimately 
it will be demonstrated that whilst mens rea may equate to criminal responsibility, it is only 
one of a number of factors relevant to the degree of culpability of the agent. 
 
Chapter Three considers the interpretation and development of recklessness in the criminal 
law, noting that the development of the concept of oblique intention has employed the 
language of recklessness and this usage blurred the distinction between the two mental 
elements.  The historical link between intention and foresight of consequences underlies this 
movement, combined with judicial creativity to make the concepts of intention and 
recklessness sufficiently flexible to do justice in particular circumstances.  The extent to 
which justice has been achieved is questionable.  An analysis of the various attempts to 
define recklessness will be undertaken and a new interpretation of the current definition is 
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advanced and linked to the theories of culpability.  The wording of the definition that is 
currently employed is technically capable of being purely subjective which would mean that 
it no longer requires that D takes an objectively unjustifiable risk.  Where there is doubt in the 
interpretation of law in a criminal case the courts should give the benefit of doubt to the 
defendant.  This would mean that securing convictions would be more difficult as D could 
argue either that he did not foresee a risk, or that he thought it was a reasonable risk to run.  
Such an interpretation would be more unacceptable than the earlier subjective test in 
Cunningham that left it to the judge or jury to determine whether running the risk was 
justifiable.  An approach to determining recklessness that synthesises objective and subjective 
viewpoints will be advocated as it will provide a true reflection of current practice.  
 
Chapter Four considers criminal liability for negligence and how the courts have used the 
language of recklessness and negligence interchangeably in their attempts to define one or 
other of these terms.  A further examination of the meaning of mens rea in relation to 
inadvertent conduct is undertaken which reveals that a mental state constituted by lack of 
thought can properly be included in the family of mentes reae.  The appropriateness of 
imposing criminal liability for negligence/inadvertence is questioned where stigmatic 
offences are concerned as most theories of culpability fail to show how such liability can be 
justified.67  A person can be negligent where their conduct falls short of a reasonable standard 
of behaviour in the circumstances.  Where a person is held to be criminally liable without any 
of their personal characteristics being taken into consideration it can be difficult to suggest 
that D necessarily deserves blame.  The theory of culpability that reflects such  
                                            
67 The composite of certain aspects of character theory and ‘role’ theory advocated in this thesis will provide a 
theoretical rationale for liability for inadvertence in the right circumstances. 
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disregard is Gardner’s ‘role theory,’68 and it is submitted that this theory could not be 
universally applied without causing injustice in cases where a person could not possibly meet 
the standard of the reasonable person.69  Any reasonable person test needs to be partly 
subjective to respond to situations where D’s conduct does not reflect fault on his part.  Moral 
blaming practices can support the ascription of criminal responsibility where serious harm is 
caused and proposals are made to both extend liability for inadvertence by expanding the 
interpretation of recklessness but also restricting liability by requiring further factors to be 
considered in order to better reflect the culpability of the potentially broad range of 
inadvertent defendants.  It is proposed that liability for negligence should be abolished with 
regard to stigmatic (mala in se) offences.  If the approach to recklessness advocated in 
Chapter Three was adopted, such liability would be otiose anyway.  Additionally, in Chapter 
Four, the test advocated in Chapter Three for recklessness will be adapted to encompass 
liability for omissions.  Some of those currently caught by the test for gross negligence will 
still be found liable but others will not be deserving of criminal liability. 
 
The final Chapter will recall the aims and objectives of this work and will provide a summary 
of the position taken in this thesis.  It will be noted that the distinctions between the mental 
states of intention and recklessness need to be maintained to reflect different degrees of moral 
censure.  A unified all-encompassing form of recklessness replacing all other mental states is 
not advocated for this reason.  In particular, it will be proposed that recklessness as a state of 
mind should be determined by a synthesis and modification of the subjective and objective 
approaches previously employed so that D would be presumed to be reckless either where he 
foresaw the risk of harm, or where the risk was serious and obvious and D had the general 
                                            
68 J. Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ (1998) 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 575; Offences and Defences 
Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law, Chapter 6, (n 5).  However, the theory is propounded in the 
context of current criminal defences and therefore may not have been intended to be applied literally to 
offences. 
69 Perhaps for reasons of age or other mental incapacity. 
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capacity to foresee it.  It will then be up to the defence to show why D should not be deemed 
reckless; D would be excused where he lacked the specific capacity to perceive the risk in the 
circumstances but not where his attitude manifested a wanton disregard for the welfare of 
others.  
 
It will be recalled that it has been submitted that criminal liability for negligence is 
inappropriate for serious offences.  Whilst some defendants currently found to be criminally 
negligent may alternatively be deemed reckless under the proposed definition, others will 
escape criminal censure altogether.  The defendant who fails to foresee a risk that is not an 
obvious one may only be subject to civil liability.  Similarly, where D fails to advert to a 
serious risk or where a risk is foreseen but D believes he has eliminated it before acting, an 
assessment of both his general and specific capacity at the time of acting will determine 
whether he was reckless and deserving of criminal punishment or merely negligent and 




2.1 Introduction to Chapter Two 
 
This chapter will seek to explore the link between the criminal law’s general requirement of 
mens rea before imposing criminal liability and its link to moral blameworthiness.  The 
common law has always relied on the maxim: ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea,’1 viz an 
act alone does not make a man guilty unless his mind is also guilty.2  It will be established 
that there have been two different interpretations of the term mens rea and the analysis will 
show that this term is no longer necessarily indicative of moral blameworthiness.   
 
Following this, there will be an examination and analysis of the leading theories of 
culpability which are argued to be the basis of justifying criminal punishment to determine 
whether, and to what extent, they can theoretically underpin the most common mens rea 
terms of intention, recklessness and negligence.  It will be argued that although some 
theoretical rationale can be found between these theories and the currently accepted 
definitions of intention, recklessness and negligence, no single theory of culpability is 
universally applicable to all the definitions.  It is only by synthesising the theories that an 
adequate theoretical rationale can be provided and it will be advanced that culpability can be 
grounded in the character of our actions to the extent that they reflect on our characters, 
employing a synthesis of aspects of character and ‘role’ theory.  Furthermore, the presence of 
mens rea is only generally relevant in determining innocence or guilt, as other supplementary 
factors need also to be taken into account to distinguish between the different levels of moral 
                                            
1 E. Coke, Third Institute (1641) 6, 107; an adaptation of ‘reum non facit nisi mens rea’ found in the context of 
perjury in Leges Henrici Primi c.5, § 28. cited in A.P. Simester and G.R. Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and 
Doctrine 3rd Edn., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 8; but traced back to St. Augustine, G. Williams, Textbook 
of Criminal Law 2nd Edn., (London: Stevens, 1983) 70. 
2 Statutory law has not been based on the same maxim although there is a presumption that mens rea is required 
which can be rebutted, see Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132, cf.  Sexual Offences Act 2003 ss5-8. 
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and legal culpability that the law seeks to recognise. This is despite the fact that the different 
mens rea terms examined in this work are intended to reflect this distinction themselves.  
Finally, the proposal for a unified concept of mens rea will be considered, but rejected on the 
ground that it would not adequately reflect important moral culpability distinctions. 
 
2.2 Mens Rea 
 
Mens Rea is an abstract principle3 which links criminal liability with the mental ‘guilt’ of the 
actor.4  Crime has ‘always been regarded as a moral wrong’ and deserving of public 
condemnation and retribution.5  Accidental harms may arise but lack the necessary moral 
fault or blameworthiness that the criminal law generally requires before imposing criminal 
sanctions.  Proscribed acts can now arise for ‘social expediency’ and not because the 
forbidden conduct is immoral.6  For this reason, mens rea has been described as a 
‘misleading’ term as ‘it suggests moral guilt is a necessary condition of criminal 
responsibility.’7   
 
Historically8 mens rea has been regarded as the requirement of a ‘guilty mind’,9 which was 
seen as a necessary condition to establish the defendant’s moral blameworthiness and this 
justified his punishment.  The maxim, actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea was founded 
upon a sermon delivered by St Augustine on the Epistle of St James, the original wording 
                                            
3 An earlier draft of some of the material in this chapter can be found in C. Crosby, ‘Culpability, Kingston and 
the Law Commission’ (2010) 74(5) Journal of Criminal Law 434. 
4J. Horder, ‘Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens Rea’[1997] 113 Law Quarterly Review 95. 
5 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law 11th Edn., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 4. 
6 Ibid. at 13. 
7 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1968) 14. 
8 W. Wilson, Criminal Law Doctrine and Theory 2nd Edn., (Essex: Longman, 2003) 119. 




being: ‘Ream linguam non facit nisi mens sit rea’.10  It was used in the context of perjury11 
where a man could not be guilty of perjury unless he thought what he was saying was untrue.  
For Augustine, men should aspire to be close to God and, if they behaved badly, the only way 
to be reconciled to God was through penance (punishment) for their sins.  It seems that the 
later fusion of Christian theology with Anglo-Saxon law led to the mental element in crime 
becoming increasingly important in finding the moral blameworthiness necessary to establish 
guilt and justify punishment.12   The most influential penitential books were those by 
‘Vinnian, of the Irish church, and of Theodore of Tarsus, Archbishop of Canterbury’.13  It 
was the ‘evil thought’ which constituted the sin, whether it was acted upon or not.14  From 
Theodore’s writing it is clear that ‘the guilty mind is punished more severely than the non-
guilty mind’,15 but it must be remembered that under Anglo-Saxon law, if you were 
responsible for causing harm to someone you had to compensate them, even if the harm was 
accidental.  At this time, mens rea was used to determine the extent of the punishment to be 
meted out.16  Fortunately, English law has not adopted the teachings of the penitential books 
literally as bad thought alone will not suffice for conviction, an act or in some cases an 
omission, is also required.  By the twelfth century, church law had become the dominant 
influence and the canonists’ held a fundamental belief that the mental element was the 
determinant of guilt.17  Under canon law, the penance for various sins outlined in the 
penitential books was intrinsically dependent upon the mental state of the sinner, as the 
                                            
10 A. Lévitt, ‘The Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea’ (1922) 17 Illinois Law Review 117. 
11 The reference to the maxim in Leges Henrici Primi, written about 1118, is also made in this context, F. Sayre, 
‘Mens Rea’ (1931) 45 Harvard Law Review 974 at 983. 
12 Ibid. Sayre at 974.  Note Sayre and Lévitt disagree about the extent to which Roman Law was influential in 
this evolution of mens rea. Lévitt,‘The Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea’ (1922) (n 10). 
13 A. Lévitt, ‘The Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea’ (n 10) at 132. 
14 Ibid. at 133. 
15 Ibid. at 134. 
16 Ibid. at 136. 
17 F. Sayre, ‘Mens Rea’ (n 12) at 980. 
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essence of moral guilt.18  At this time, the clergy were both the educators of the day and those 
who conducted the trials by ordeal, extending their influence.   
 
Later authoritative works followed this trend of equating mens rea to moral blameworthiness, 
ingraining it into the fabric of English law.19    Yet it has been argued that the focus had 
perhaps shifted in Coke’s writing from moral guilt towards ‘a precise intent at a given time’20 
and generally referring to the mental element required for an offence.  It has been suggested 
that mens rea has evolved as a reaction to changing objectives in the administration of 
criminal justice: first to facilitate the shift away from the blood feud, then to its use to punish 
moral wrongdoing, and finally to the modern aim of protecting social and public interests.21  
This is true to some extent and is a point that can be illustrated by the example of failing to 
summon medical assistance for a dying child.  When mens rea equated to moral wrongdoing 
and just deserts, conviction for homicide could not occur if the reason for the failure was an 
honest belief that prayer was the answer.  Now parents would be prosecuted for manslaughter 
because society requires protection from those with ‘dangerous and peculiar idiosyncrasies’22 
as well as those who act with a bad intent.  Where serious crimes are concerned, it remains 
the general rule that a finding of moral blameworthiness should be a precursor to punishment.  
 
It is worth noting that the function of mens rea is not restricted to establishing culpability23 
although it usually forms part of attributing criminal responsibility.  Mens rea may be 
established yet D may not be deemed culpable, for example where he has a defence.  
Similarly, as will be demonstrated, D may lack moral culpability and yet have the necessary 
                                            
18 Ibid. at 988. 
19 For example, Bracton’s  mid-13th century De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, and Coke’s Third Institute 
(1641), cited in F. Sayre, ‘Mens Rea’ at 985 and 988. 
20 Ibid. at 1000. 
21 Ibid. at 1017. 
22 Ibid. at 1018. 
23 W. Chan and A.P. Simester, ‘Four Functions of Mens Rea’ [2011] Cambridge Law Journal 381. 
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mens rea for the offence and be convicted.24   On some occasions, without a specific state of 
mind D’s actions can be lawful; it is only the presence of the requisite mens rea that may turn 
an otherwise lawful act into a criminal one.25  In this respect, mens rea helps to constitute the 
morally wrongful act.26   
 
Mens rea also serves to provide citizens with fair warning of the extent of criminal 
prohibitions, which Hart saw as its basic function, rather than fault.27  This proposition links 
well with Hart’s version of choice theory discussed below, as where the law is clear and D is 
shown to act with intention or subjective recklessness he has chosen to engage in criminality 
and is deserving of punishment.28  It has been argued29 that Gardner goes further than this, as 
he stated that the ‘mens rea principle’ requires ‘criminal wrongs to have certain constituents, 
namely the wrongdoer’s intending or being aware of at least some of the (other) wrong-
making features of her action.’30  Gardner’s claim is made in the context of strict liability 
where he combines it with the ‘fault principle,’ namely that criminal liability should only be 
imposed for wrongs faultily committed.  Fault is important in the criminal law even where ‘it 
is not a constituent of the wrongdoer’s wrong.’31  Certainly, Gardner’s ‘role’ theory of 
culpability, discussed below,32 has no such mental restrictions.33   
 
Finally, it is important to realise that mens rea can limit or extend the scope of any criminal 
prohibition.  Some offences can only be committed where D is proven to have intended the 
                                            
24 See the analysis of Kingston [1994] 3 All ER 353, below at 2.5.3. 
25 An example is the presence of dishonesty and the intention to permanently deprive under s.1Theft Act 1968. 
26 W. Chan and A.P. Simester, ‘Four Functions of Mens Rea’ (n 23) at 386. 
27 Ibid. at 390. 
28 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility Essays in the Philosophy of Law (n 7) 181-2. 
29 W. Chan and A.P. Simester, ‘Four Functions of Mens Rea’ (n 23) at 391-2. 
30 J. Gardner, ‘Wrongs and Faults’ in A.P. Simester (ed) Appraising Strict Liability (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005) 51 at 69. 
31 Ibid. at 70-71. 
32 At 2.7.1. 
33 However, his propositions are made in the context of current criminal defences, not offences per se, and no 
assumption should be made that his proposals were meant to have such universal applicability. 
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proscribed act.  This restricts those who will be caught by the offence and maximises 
autonomy.  If the mental element specified is negligence, the individual needs to take more 
care to avoid breaking the law, making it more intrusive upon society and requiring 
justification.34 
 
2.2.1 Mens Rea and Moral Blameworthiness 
 
Culpability is often referred to as a requirement for moral blameworthiness, but there is 
uncertainty as to what is meant by the use of the word “moral” in this context: whether 
criminal culpability requires doing something that is seen as inherently morally wrongful 
(such as murder or rape) or simply connotes a legal fault, with law breaking itself deemed to 
be morally wrongful.  Although traditionally there were few criminal offences and all were 
easily recognisable as morally wrongful conduct in themselves,35 for example rape, murder 
and theft, the number of criminal offences now exceeds 8 00036 and most of these are 
regulatory offences37 which are often morally neutral.  From this it would appear that 
criminal culpability can now arise without conduct being judged as morally wrongful per se 
and without requiring moral blameworthiness to be shown even for more serious offences.38  
This stance has been a fairly recent legal development as in 1990 it was acknowledged that:  
while utilitarian theorists do not insist on any necessary link between criminal 
liability and moral culpability, they do assume that the law’s moral responsibility 
                                            
34 W. Chan and A. P. Simester, ‘Four Functions of Mens Rea’ (n 23) at 394-5. 
35 See A. Lévitt, ‘The Origins of the Doctrine of Mens Rea’ ( n 10) and F.B. Sayre, ‘Mens Rea’ (n 12) for a 
detailed exposition of the development of English criminal law, moral blameworthiness and mens rea. 
36 A. Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 225. 
37 Gardner makes the point that such offences govern our specific activities in relation to the roles we assume, 
such as motorist, parent, shopkeeper, etc.; J. Gardner, Offences and Defences Selected Essays in the Philosophy 
of Criminal Law (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2007) Chapter 6. 
38 G. R. Sullivan notes that in Kingston [1995] 2 AC 355, Lord Mustill’s view was that ‘conviction for a serious 
offence need not entail descriptively or prescriptively that the defendant was in any sense at fault,’ in ‘Making 




requirement will reassure the public that the criminal actor deserves moral blame 
when he is convicted of a serious non-regulatory offense.39 
 
There is no doubt that for practical purposes criminal liability for stigmatic offences will 
generally arise only when D would also be morally responsible as without some 
incorporation of society’s moral principles the aims of the criminal law could not be 
achieved.40  Although it is a fundamental moral principle that moral blameworthiness is a 
prerequisite to punishment, it is not an absolute principle, ceteris paribus; it can be subject to 
derogation where it is outweighed by other principles or by a ‘substantial gain in utility.’41  
Whether such derogation should ever apply in the case of stigmatic offences is open to 
question, although it must be recognised that for serious offences, if there was an absence of 
moral blameworthiness there could be a defence available.  If this was not the case a 
conviction could be controversial and subject to criticism.42  Such criticism is often levelled 
at imposing criminal liability for negligence/inadvertence, especially for serious offences, and 
also at crimes of strict liability.43 
 
The distinction between legal guilt and moral guilt is one that has often been blurred44 and 
choice theorists have been criticised for this flaw in their propositions.45  If mala in se crimes 
are under consideration this is not an issue as D would be both legally and morally guilty, but 
many crimes are merely mala prohibita and breach of such regulatory crimes will not 
                                            
39 P. Arenella, ‘Character, Choice and Moral Agency: the Relevance of Character to our Moral Culpability 
Judgments’ (1990) 7 Social Philosophy and Policy 59 at 63. 
40 G. Vuoso, ‘Background, Responsibility, and Excuse’ (1986-1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1661at 1663. 
41 Ibid. at 1664. 
42 See, for example, R v Kingston [1994] 3 All ER 353.  Here, the defendant had been drugged to loosen his 
inhibitions and, for the purposes of blackmail, was video recorded sexually assaulting a 15 year old boy.  
43 Such offences require neither mens rea nor moral blameworthiness. 
44 Kant clearly distinguished between the two, I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Part 1 of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Ladd, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); see text to note 56. 
45 P. Arenella, ‘Character, Choice and Moral Agency: the Relevance of Character to our Moral Culpability 
Judgments’ (n 39) at 60. 
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necessarily attract moral guilt, unless it could be argued that D is morally guilty for law 
breaking per se.46  This could be on the basis that regulatory offences are there to protect the 
public good and if D commits such an offence he is gaining an unfair advantage over his 
fellow citizens who are law abiding.  It is submitted that this argument only works if D is 
consciously flouting the law however.  Even strict liability offences have been said to be 
justified on the basis that D is choosing to undertake an activity subject to regulation and 
must therefore ensure he is aware of the regulations and observes them.47   In many instances 
where the offences are merely regulatory this can be justified where there is a due diligence 
defence available.48  It will be argued here that the ‘role’ theory of culpability links well with 
objective recklessness and negligence, as well as strict liability offences. 49  
 
It has been suggested50 that categorising the criminal defences as justifications or excuses is 
the way in which the criminal law now recognizes what is morally right or wrong and such 
categorisation provides moral guidance to citizens.51  Yet some offences do have concepts of 
morality in their very definitions, for example ‘dishonesty’ for the purposes of the Theft Act 
1968, as defined in R v Ghosh.52  It has also been observed53 that when moral issues are 
brought into the definitional elements of an offence it can cause uproar, an example being 
MPC v Caldwell.54  Having noted that criticism, it is submitted in this thesis that the ‘uproar’ 
                                            
46 E. Pincoffs, ‘Legal Responsibility and Moral Character’ (1973) Wayne Law Review 905. 
47 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility Essays in the Philosophy of Law ( n 7). 
48 However, there are some serious offences such as those under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where strict 
liability is imposed because the protection of children is given paramountcy.   Here, culpability without moral 
fault can be imposed to uphold the State’s moral duty to protect the vulnerable. 
49 See below at 2.7.1 Discussion of offences of strict liability are beyond the scope of this work. 
50 G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston Toronto : Little, Brown and Co., 1978) Chapter 10. 
51 Further discussion of this treatment of the criminal defences is beyond the scope of this work. 
52 [1982] 2 All ER 689. 
53 J. Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ (1998) 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 575 at 597; Offences and Defences 
Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (n 37). 
54 [1982] AC 341, a case seen to introduce a capacity-independent standard for recklessness, discussed in 
Chapter 3 below. 
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referred to, arising from this decision, was in consequence of its ambiguity and the potential 
for unfairness if it was rigidly applied without adaptation to different circumstances.55 
 
Kant,56 to whom the choice theory of culpability is attributed, is one of the rare theorists to 
have distinguished between legal and moral guilt, identifying ‘two distinct ways of being 
bound to do one’s duty,’ one external and the other internal.  The external, to which he also 
refers as ‘juridical’ legislation, entails the use of external coercion and incentives to motivate 
the citizen to behave in the required manner.  Alternatively, if a person fulfils their duty 
purely because it is their duty, this is internal coercion, or as he calls it ‘ethical’ legislation.  
In this latter example, the act would be termed as ‘moral’ whereas if the motivation is 
external the act is merely ‘legal.’  Kant believed ‘moral laws...are valid as laws only insofar 
as they can be seen to have an a priori basis and to be necessary’ and ‘the instructions of 
morality...command everyone...solely because and insofar as he is free and has practical 
reason’57 as ‘reason commands how one ought to act.’58 
 
For Hampton, another choice theorist, culpability is based on the choice to defy moral norms 
and grades of immorality can be distinguished by the degrees of rebellion.  These are 
represented by the degrees of mens rea denoting the ‘the severity of the offense’ and the 
‘emotional and intellectual attitudes attending its performance’.59  For her, mens rea 
establishes the ‘signs of a defiant mind’, for example knowledge, purposiveness and 
recklessness, whereas the excuses and justifications that the law recognises in its permitted 
defences show a lack of defiance.  Recklessness here includes not only subjective 
                                            
55 An analysis of this judgment is in Chapter 3. 
56 I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Part 1 of the Metaphysics of Morals, (n. 44) at xiv. 
57 Ibid. at 15. 
58 Ibid. at 16. 
59 J. Hampton, ‘Mens Rea’ (1990) 7 Law and Philosophy 1at 19-25. 
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recklessness, but also those who ‘had to know’60 they were risk-taking even though they may 
not have meant to cause harm; D is morally and legally culpable because he ‘wanted to do 
that which entailed risking the kind of harm ruled out by legal and moral imperatives.’61 
 
2.2.2 Mens Rea as Legal Fault  
 
The second and more modern interpretation of mens rea is illustrated in Kingston.62  Here, 
Lord Mustill stated that mens rea is purely a technical term which specifies the mental 
element of the particular offence.63  It is suggested that in legal use, this is now more 
technically correct.  Moral blameworthiness is no longer a precondition of criminal liability, 
although it will be argued that it should generally be a precondition with regard to serious 
offences.   His Lordship found that the Court of Appeal’s decision in this case had been 
founded on the assumption that ‘if blame is absent the necessary mens rea must also be 
absent’,64 but that no such general principle exists in the criminal law.  In the majority of 
cases proof of the mental element will attract disapproval and will be appropriately labelled a 
‘guilty mind’ but this, he stated, is not always so: ‘In respect of some offences the mind of the 
defendant, and still less his moral judgment, may not be engaged at all’.65  Furthermore: 
to assume that contemporary moral judgments affect the criminality of the act, as 
distinct from the punishment appropriate to the crime once proved, is to be misled by 
the expression “mens rea,” the ambiguity of which has been the subject of complaint 
for more than a century.  Certainly the “mens” of the defendant must usually be 
                                            
60 Ibid. at 25. 
61 Ibid. at 25. 
62 [1994] 3 All ER 353. 
63 C. Wells, ‘Swatting the Subjectivist Bug’ [1982] Criminal Law Review 209 at 210. 




involved in the offence; but the epithet “rea” refers to the criminality of the act in 
which the mind is engaged, not to its moral character.66 
 
If this second interpretation is accepted it appears that “guilt” is not used in the sense of its 
everyday meaning, i.e. that it must necessarily involve moral wrongdoing.  Immorality is not 
an essential ingredient as an offence can be committed when acting ‘with a good motive, or 
for conscientious reasons.’67  Similarly, immoral behaviour is not always criminalised, for 
example adultery is not a criminal offence,68 however, it is conceded that the more immoral 
the conduct, the more likely it is that the court will interpret mens rea as being equivalent to 
moral mental guilt.  It is a general principle of English criminal law69 that no one should be 
convicted of a crime unless there is some fault70 attributable to the accused, with the 
exception perhaps71 of crimes of strict liability.72  It is apparent that in modern times it can be 
purely legal fault, and not necessarily moral or mental guilt, that is the key, even though 
moral blameworthiness may also be present.   
 
It has been argued that an analysis of the judgments in Kingston reveal that Lord Mustill’s 
view was that ‘conviction for a serious offence need not entail descriptively or prescriptively 
that the defendant was in any sense at fault.’73  This led to the criticism that ‘a conviction for 
a stigmatic offence is a sanction in its own right and that sanctions should only be confined to 
                                            
66 Ibid. at 365. 
67 G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, (n 9) 72. 
68 It is noted that society’s morality is a fluid concept as the decriminalisation of homosexuality demonstrates. 
69 This is a common law principle, not necessarily a statutory one. 
70 Celia Wells suggests mens rea could also be widely defined as ‘the determinant of culpability’ in ‘Swatting 
the Subjectivist Bug’ (n 63) at 210. 
71 Some such offences have a ‘no negligence’ defence. 
72 See, for example, Larsonneur (1933) 149 LT 542.  However, on closer inspection of the facts even here there 
was moral fault much earlier that her arrest upon deportation from Ireland.  D.J. Lanham, ‘Larsonneur 
Revisited’ [1976] Criminal Law Review 276.  
73G.R. Sullivan, ‘Making Excuses’ in A.P.Simester and A.T.H.Smith (eds), Harm &Culpability (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996) 131 at 135. 
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the blameworthy,’74 limited only where there are issues of consistency and forensic 
practicability.  Certainly Lord Mustill’s view seems to conflict with that of Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill who said in R v G & R75 that conviction for a serious crime required proof of a 
culpable state of mind and that the problem could not simply be solved by conviction and a 
nominal penalty.  Whilst the argument is a forceful one and a lack of any fault should prevent 
the imposition of criminal liability, the defendant in Kingston was not perhaps totally 
faultless as he was still found to have some control over his actions; mens rea could still be 
established.  It follows from the discussion above, that mens rea equates to a ‘guilty’ mind 
only in the sense of legal guilt: ‘the word ‘rea’ refers to the criminality of the act, not its 
moral quality.’76  Whilst acknowledging this, it will generally be the case that moral 
blameworthiness will also be a precondition for criminal responsibility and that departures 
from this general principle should be rare in the interests of justice. 
 
2.2.3 Should mens rea be subjective or objective? 
 
As criminal behaviour is identified by the coincidence of the actus reus and mens rea77 of the 
offence, there are different viewpoints as to what should be the minimum mens rea for 
criminal liability to arise.  Wilson cites intention, recklessness, wilfulness, knowledge and 
malice as relevant states of mind78 but distinguishes negligence on the basis that it is not a 
state of mind but an unacceptable standard of conduct which is included in mens rea79 
because it signifies fault. 80    
                                            
74Ibid. 
75 R v G & R [2004] 4 All ER 765, discussed in Chapter 3. 
76 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan  Criminal Law (n 5) 92. 
77 There are two views to note here: either the actus reus includes the absence of a defence, or alternatively that 
defences are taken into account separately. 
78 Gardner and Jung include ‘dishonestly’ and ‘without due care and attention’ and add actus reus terms 
implying mens rea: ‘possessing’ and ‘permitting’; J. Gardner and H. Jung, ‘Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony 
Duff’s Account’ (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 559 at 562. 
79 See further discussion of the suitability of negligence as a mens rea term in chapter 4 below at 4.4.1. 
80 W. Wilson, Criminal Law Doctrine and Theory (n 8) 119. 
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There have been both subjective and objective interpretations of the main mens rea terms and 
these different approaches to determining criminal liability are reflected to different degrees 
by the theories of culpability, which will be discussed later in this chapter.   For example, 
where there is an intention to cause harm or where an offender can foresee harm will arise 
from his actions, it is easy to argue that he possessed a ‘guilty’ mind, but where a person does 
not intend harm and does not even foresee a risk of harm resulting from his conduct it 
becomes more difficult to justify criminal responsibility.  That is not to say that the 
inadvertent should always be excused for any harm they cause.  A failure to consider the 
welfare of others should attract censure where D has the cognitive capacity to be aware of the 
risk of harm had he stopped to think, in circumstances where he also displays an indifference 




Subjectivists81 would argue that there should be no liability unless the defendant intended to 
commit the offence or foresaw there was a risk of committing the offence, but nonetheless 
continued to act.  Subjectivist theory is morally justified on the basis that foresight results in 
the defendant making a “reprehensible choice” to continue to act. 82  This reasoning would 
hold the interpretation of ‘guilty mind’ to mean a requirement of intention or reckless conduct 
with foresight.  Using this approach moral wrongdoing is easily established as a matter of 
fact.  Once it is established that such a choice has been made it is unnecessary to delve further 
into D’s motive or attitude.83  
 
                                            
81 For example, Glanville Williams and John C. Smith. 
82 D.J. Birch, ‘The Foresight Saga: The Biggest Mistake of All?’ [1988] Criminal Law Review 4. 
83 Ibid. at 6. 
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Subjectivist theory also supports the argument from “inexorable logic” propounded by Lord 
Hailsham in DPP v Morgan,84 applied in Williams85 and Beckford.86  In all three of these 
cases the defendants argued that they believed they were acting lawfully or were unaware of 
the risk of their conduct causing harm to others.  In such circumstances subjectivism (and the 
argument from logic) would result in acquittal.  This could be seen as encouraging people to 
close their minds to what they were doing in the face of the blindingly obvious.  Accordingly, 
cases like Morgan clearly illustrate that it is not possible to simply limit moral culpability to 
situations of intention, knowledge or foresight, and for this reason the argument from logic 
has been rejected as a pivotal determinant of criminal liability.87  Often incidents may occur 
in a split second and it is unrealistic to ask whether D thought about certain results88 or 
circumstances before acting.  Subjectivists also have problems with voluntarily intoxicated 
defendants so that securing a conviction in such circumstances is based on the argument that 
where D recklessly gets into such a state of intoxication that he cannot form the requisite 





Objectivists propose that liability should be expanded to include those whose conduct causes 
harm to others regardless of whether they foresaw a risk of harm occurring, but where the 
reasonable person would have foreseen such a risk.  This is a much broader extension of 
liability which includes inadvertent conduct.  It focuses on ‘moral arguments about powers of 
                                            
84 [1976] AC 182.  Here, D invited 3 men to have sex with his wife telling them if she resisted or screamed she 
was merely enjoying sexual intercourse.  The men forced her to have sexual intercourse without her consent but 
would have had a defence if they honestly believed she consented. 
85 (1987) Cr.App.R.276 D believed someone was being attacked when actually they were being lawfully 
arrested by X and D assaulted X. 
86 [1988] 1 AC 130 (P.C.) D was an armed policeman who thought X was armed and terrorising his family.  He 
thought X was shooting at him and returned fire killing him.  X was unarmed. 
87 J. Horder, ‘Cognition, Emotion, and Criminal Culpability’ [1990] 106 Law Quarterly Review 469. 
88 R. Cross, ‘The Mental Element in Crime’ (1967) 88 Law Quarterly Review 215 at 226. 
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cognition’89 in determining culpability and can hold culpable those who should have done 
better.  It can cope easily with the intoxicated agent as the reasonable person does not get 
intoxicated and commit crimes and it is the standard of behaviour of such a prudent and 
responsible person that D will be judged against.  An objective standard has strong 
correlations with everyday blaming practices as we judge others by comparison with our 
reasonable expectations of how people should behave.90 
 
If a defendant makes a mistake but had reasonable grounds for believing he was acting 
lawfully then he must be acquitted as it is not reasonable to expect more than that we should 
take reasonable care.  Even this extension of culpability has its failings, one being that it fails 
to distinguish sufficiently between different kinds of mistaken action in that it cannot 
differentiate between the defendants in Morgan and the defendant in Williams, the former it 
has been suggested being morally culpable and the latter not.91   
 
The objective approach also assumes that all people are capable of always acting in a rational 
manner.  This is simply not possible as some people may only be capable of what appears to 
be ‘irrational’ behaviour to others and even the most rational of us act irrationally at times by 
virtue of the fact that we are human.  We are not legal individuals in the abstract, one of the 
criticisms of any ‘reasonable man’ test and also a flaw in the subjective approach and 
‘choice’ theory.  The main criticism of objectivism is that in its pure form, it can hold 
someone criminally responsible where they lacked the cognitive capacity to foresee the risk 
that their actions might cause harm to others.  Punishing a person who lacks the capacity to 
ever achieve the standard of the reasonable man is hard to justify although Gardner’s ‘role’ 
                                            
89 J. Horder, ‘Cognition, Emotion, and Criminal Culpability’ (n 87). 




theory, discussed below,92 would support such a position.  It is contended here that the 
criminal law should not be used in these circumstances as to do so would lack any moral 
justification.  Criminal sanctions could not act as a deterrent and criminal punishment can not 
be solely grounded on the protection of society at the expense of the individual, and this 
should be especially so in the case of mala in se crimes.  
 
2.2.3.3 Beyond subjectivism and objectivism -taking account of emotions and desires 
 
It has been proposed that a further dimension should be considered when devising principles 
of culpability, that account should be taken of ‘the evaluation of actions stemming from 
desires associated with emotions.’93  This would then allow distinctions to be made ‘by 
reference to what we (morally) expect of people experiencing the desires associated with the 
emotions that they experienced at the time of the alleged offences.’94  In consequence, those 
acting negligently through great fear or through compassion would be morally excused by 
‘ethically well-disposed agents’ from any wrongdoing whereas those acting negligently 
through a desire for sexual satisfaction would not.  It is submitted that this suggestion is 
problematic as people respond differently to emotions, and it could be difficult to determine 
beyond reasonable doubt whether D was indeed very afraid or compassionate.  Such a 
proposal would still need to be supported by a general requirement of reasonableness and 
each case would need to be judged on its own facts, which might result in differing results on 
similar facts and a lack of certainty as to what possible outcomes may occur. 
 
  
                                            
92 At 2.7.1. 




2.2.3.4 The subjective/objective debate within recklessness 
 
Nowhere in the criminal law has the subjective / objective debate been more apparent than in 
the context of the definition of recklessness.  Gardner and Jung argue that this is because 
there are inherent difficulties with the term as “recklessness” ‘is a vice or personal fault’ and 
as such is identified to some extent by the ‘ends or motives’ and perhaps the emotions of the 
agent.95  They submit that legal culpability standards should be both motive and emotion-
independent.  The difficulty that the ‘subjectivists’ and ‘objectivists’ have with recklessness 
as a concept of mens rea has been in trying to incorporate the moral concept and culpability 
of recklessness into a legal motive-independent construct which, some have argued, is not 
possible.96  One of the main reasons for the legislature choosing to use the term “reckless” 
instead of “malice” was that in law, “malice” no longer had any similarities with its moral 
counterpart.97   In attempting to link morality with recklessness the same problem was 
perhaps predictable but removing moral concepts altogether would be problematic as the law 
needs to reflect the community’s moral values and blaming practices to some extent so that 
public confidence in the criminal justice system is maintained. 
 
As will be discussed in Chapter Three below,98 it has been argued that a blank mind is not a 
state of mind, whereas the contrary view had the support of the House of Lords in R v Reid.99  
If inadvertence is accepted as sufficient to qualify, it is submitted that ‘guilty mind’ is 
possibly better interpreted simply as a requirement that the accused acted in a blameworthy 
manner in circumstances where society would judge culpability to be appropriate.  This 
reasoning is the cause of much of the debate surrounding issues of moral blameworthiness, 
criminal culpability and the interpretation of mens rea terms.  It has resulted in courts trying 
                                            
95 J. Gardner, and H. Jung, ‘Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony Duff’s Account’ (n 78) at 574. 
96 Ibid. at 575. 
97 Ibid. 
98 At 3.3.3.6. 
99 [1992] 3 All ER 673. 
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to use ordinary language or to create legal fictions to give themselves the moral elbow room 
needed to negotiate through the minefield of the great variety of criminal behaviour and its 
contexts. 
 
Whether D is advertent or inadvertent to a risk of harm is only one factor that may be relevant 
to determining the degree of culpability.  Generally, inadvertence can only be a mitigating 
factor when D: 
has attenuated cognitive capacities, and even then it does not normally entail that her 
fault is converted from recklessness to something else, like carelessness, but only that 
her recklessness is diminished in scale.  The quality of the motive is an essential part 
of what distinguishes a reckless person from a careless person in moral evaluations, 
and that distinction cannot be replicated by relying on any other factor instead, such 
as advertence to the risk.100   
  
2.2.3.5 Interpreting the ‘subjective’/’objective’ labels 
 
In MPC v Caldwell, Lord Diplock stated that analysis of judicial use of the term ‘reckless’ 
showed that its use ‘was not easily assignable to one of those categories rather than the 
other.’101  Believing ‘reckless’ not to be a term of ‘legal art’ any interpretation would surely 
include, in his Lordship’s opinion, not only deciding to ignore a foreseen risk of harmful 
consequences resulting from one’s acts, but also:  
failing to give any thought to whether or not there is any such risk in circumstances 
where, if any thought were given to the matter, it would be obvious that there was.  If 
                                            
100 J. Gardner, and H. Jung, ‘Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony Duff’s Account’ (n 78) at 575-576. 
101 [1982] AC 341 at 353. 
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one is attaching labels, the latter state of mind is neither more nor less “subjective” 
than the first.102   
 
This is an understandable argument given that in each case account is being taken of the state 
of mind of the particular defendant.  It is therefore important when applying these labels that 
everyone has the same understanding of what the terms mean in the particular context in 
which they are used.   
 
 It will be argued in the next chapter that the scope of recklessness could usefully be 
expanded from the subjective approach currently adopted to a more objective stance which 
would take into account the cognitive capacity of the agent.  As a result of the subjective and 
objective approaches and their deficiencies, it is submitted that it is not possible to adopt only 
one such approach to mens rea and determining culpability if the aim is to achieve a system 
of criminal justice that has public support.  An inflexible adherence to subjectivism can result 
in a gap between the legal test of mens rea and the community’s sense of moral 
wrongdoing.103  Clearly, if the criminal law: 
earns a reputation as a reliable statement of what the community perceives as 
condemnable and not condemnable, people are more likely to defer to its commands 
as morally authoritative…A distribution of liability that the community perceives as 
doing justice enhances the criminal law’s moral credibility; a distribution of liability 
that deviates from community perceptions of justice undermines it.104   
 
                                            
102 [1982] AC 341 at 354. 
103 K. Amirthalingam, ‘Caldwell Recklessness is Dead, Long Live Mens Rea’s Fecklessness’ (2004) 67 Modern 
Law Review 491. 
104P. Robinson, ‘The Criminal - Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert’ (1996) 76 Boston University Law 
Review 201, 212-213. 
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That is not to say that the criminal law should simply mirror and be determined by public 
perception as this can change, often quicker that the law can, and can sometimes be difficult 
to ascertain.  In the pursuit of a fair system of justice one option would be to abandon 
consistency and apply an appropriate test dependent on the offence or defence under 
consideration.105  Such a solution is not without practical consequences; where an agent is 
charged with more than one offence juries could then have to apply different tests.  For this 
reason it is submitted that consistency is preferable, if at all possible.  Whereas the subjective 
approach to determining recklessness produces a simple formula which has triumphed over 
the need for a comprehensive one,106 an objective test that fails to recognise the capacity of 
the particular defendant is also liable to cause injustice.  A hybrid test, a synthesis of the 
subjective and objective positions, is a better alternative and this will be discussed and 
advocated in the next chapter. 
 
Having now examined the relationship between moral blameworthiness and mens rea it is 
important to determine how well the mens rea terms under scrutiny in this work fit with the 
leading theories of culpability.  The theories claim to be the basis for justifying criminal 
punishment and moral censure.  It will be shown that none of the theories alone can 
universally support all these mentes reae.   Moreover, although proof of the requisite mens 
rea establishes guilt for legal purposes, in the absence of a defence, and may ground 
culpability in isolation, it does not represent the degree of culpability of the accused. 
  
                                            
105 See the approach to the defence of provocation taken by the majority in Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146. 
106 D.J. Birch, ‘The Foresight Saga: The Biggest Mistake of All?’ (n 82). 
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2.3 Theories of culpability - an overview 
 
Three general theories of blame and excuses have been identified107 which have been 
attributed mainly to Bentham,108 Kant109 and Hume,110 although others will be addressed.  
Bentham’s utilitarian rationale was based on the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
and his rationale for excuses was that punishment of the individual by the State would not act 
as a deterrent in the circumstances where the excuses are allowed.  For example, when acting 
under duress, the threat of criminal liability is subsumed by considerations that are 
temporarily more important to the actor.  A similar argument could be advanced against 
imposing criminal liability for negligence as it could be said that inadvertence to risk could 
not be deterred by imposition of criminal sanctions for a failure to think.  This approach has 
been rejected by some111 upon the ground that punishment can act as a general deterrence 
rather than at an individual level.   
 
As far as criminal liability for serious offences is concerned, it is submitted that Kant112 is 
correct in so far as he rejected any form of utilitarian theory as it conflicted with his own 
theory founded on the rights of the individual.113  As such, any approach based upon the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number has to be dismissed no matter how much overall 
good Bentham’s theory would produce.114  Judicial punishment could never be justified 
solely as a way of advancing some other good for the criminal himself or for society at large 
but only on the basis that a person had committed a crime.  
                                            
107 M.D. Bayles, ‘Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility’ (1982) 1 Law and Philosophy 5. 
108 J. Bentham,  An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation  (New York: Hafner Publishing 
Co., 1948). 
109 I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Part 1 of the Metaphysics of Morals, (n 44). 
110 D. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888). 
111 M.D. Bayles, ‘Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility’ (n 107). 
112 I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Part 1 of the Metaphysics of Morals, (n 44) xi. 
113 This work provides qualified support for Kant in his rejection of utilitarianism and further, retributivism 
based on moral desert, but the thesis does not support choice theory. 
114 Further discussion of Bentham’s theory falls outside the scope of this work. 
38 
 
He must be deserving of punishment before any consideration is given to the utility of 
this punishment for himself or his fellow citizens.  The law concerning punishment is a 
categorical imperative, and woe to him who rummages around in the winding path of 
a theory of happiness... in keeping with the Pharisaic motto “It is better that one man 
should die than that the whole people should perish.115 
 
The modern, predominant theories are based upon Kantian theory: that people should not be 
punished if they could not have avoided doing a criminal act; and Humean116 or Aristotelian 
theory,117 based upon the character traits of the individual.  These are the two main theories 
of excuses or culpability which claim to establish the proper basis of criminal liability and to 
which particular consideration will be given, before more marginal theories are examined.   
Although the choice and character theories are generally treated as theories of excuses, for 
the purposes of this thesis they will critically analysed from the alternative inculpatory 
viewpoint, that is as theories of culpability.  Both theories are deemed to be subjective in 
nature in that they do not focus on the actual impact of someone’s actions upon the world, but 
instead focus either on the individual choices a person makes or alternatively on a person’s 
character.  It is submitted that character theory is to an extent objective in that good/bad 
character is judged against an external objective standard of what can be expected from a 
reasonable person, whereas choice is focussed on the individual’s reason and belief. 
  
                                            
115 I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Part 1 of the Metaphysics of Morals, (n 44) 101. 
116 Bayles (n 107) attributes character theory to David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (n 110). 
117 Wilson credits the origin of character theory to Aristotle; W. Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 342. 
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2.4 Choice Theory 
 
‘Choice’ theory is an adaptation of Kantian retributivism118 and the principle of desert which 
underpin justification for punishment.  The essence of Kant’s moral and political philosophy 
was the ‘dignity of the individual’ whereby morality and law should only be founded on the 
rights of individual man to autonomy.   Choice is important because of the need to respect 
autonomy and, on Kantian principles; a person should only be criminally liable for harm that 
he is responsible and culpable for bringing about.  It is only matters over which a person has 
control that he can be responsible for, and he only controls what he chooses to do or causes to 
happen.119  This approach restricts influences of chance and luck over which we have no 
control and which should be irrelevant to culpability and criminal liability.120   
 
In Kant’s view, ‘it is no business of the state or ...of other individuals to try to make men 
moral; only an individual can do that for himself’ as otherwise he would lose his 
autonomy.121  He regarded the law as ‘primarily instrumental, promoting moral autonomy in 
general rather than respecting it in the case of the accused.’122  The moral authority of the law 
is achieved by striking the right balance between the rights of the individual and those of 
society so that its rules can be ‘experienced as fair from the (reasonable) subject’s point of 
view although adverse to him’.123  Kant believed that each man was his own sovereign moral 
legislator as ‘every man knows in his heart what is right and what is wrong.’124  If this is 
                                            
118 ‘Only the Law of retribution (jus talionis) can determine exactly the kind and degree of punishment,’ 
applying the ‘retributive principle of returning like for like.’ I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Part 
1 of the Metaphysics of Morals (n 44) 101. 
119 R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) Chapter 6. 
120 Ibid. at 148. 
121 I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Part 1 of the Metaphysics of Morals, (n 44) at x. 
122 J. Gardner, and H.  Jung, ‘Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony Duff’s Account’ (n 78) at 584, citing Kant, 
The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (n 44) 18-21. 
123 W. Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (n 117) 325. 
124 I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Part 1 of the Metaphysics of Morals (n 44) at xi. 
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correct then it follows that if a person chooses to break the law and he knows he is doing 
wrong then he is deserving of punishment.   
 
To what extent it is true that each man knows what is right and wrong is now more open to 
debate than it was in Kant’s time.125  Furthermore, the extent to which a person appreciates 
that something is right or wrong may also have relevance to his responsibility and 
blameworthiness.  Some choice theorists prefer the term ‘defiance’ to ‘choice’ suggesting 
that only those who consciously choose to act in defiance of legal norms deserve 
punishment.126  This defiance or choice demonstrates the necessary expression of ‘an attitude 
towards the [legal] rule itself rather than the values underpinning it’.127  Although in some 
instances it may well be an indifference to both. 
 
Hart and Moore128 are the two leading modern proponents of the ‘choice’ theory, although it 
has been suggested that in extending ‘choice’ to include capacity and opportunity as 
necessary elements dilutes the focus on actual choice and their stance would be more 
appropriately labelled ‘capacity theory’.129  The intention here is to use ‘choice’ to encompass 
both the original and extended versions.  The basis of this theory is that an agent should not 
be punished unless he had both the capacity and a fair opportunity to abide by the law.130   An 
                                            
125 See for example Arenella’s discussion on the capacity for moral responsiveness as a prerequisite for criminal 
liability, discussed below at 2.5.7. 
126 J. Hampton, ‘Mens rea’ (n 59). 
127 W. Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (n 117) 333. 
128 M. Moore notes that what he calls ‘choice theory’ has also been given other labels, including the “capacity 
conception of responsibility” by Nicola Lacey, State Punishment  (London:Routledge, 1988) 62; the 
“responsibility principle” by Hyman Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979) 137; the “Kantian theory of Responsibility” by Michael Bayles, ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’ (1982) 
11 Law and  Philosophy 5 at 6; and his own earlier label, the “disturbed practical reason” theory of excuse in 
Moore, ‘Causation and Excuse’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 1148-1149 and Law and Psychiatry: 
Rethinking the Relationship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)  85-90. 
129 J. Horder, ‘Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory’ (1993) 12 Law and Philosophy 193 at 
198-199. 
130 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility Essays in the Philosophy of Law (n 7). 
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early reference to this theory131 has been traced back to Blackstone132 who considered legal 
excuses were founded on:  
the want or defect of will.  An involuntary act, as it has no claim to merit, so neither 
can it induce any guilt: the concurrence of the will, when it has its choice either to do 
or avoid the act in question, being the only thing that renders human actions 
praiseworthy or culpable. 
 
The ‘choice’ theorists maintain that a person should only be held criminally liable for actions 
that he freely chooses to do.  Therefore ‘one is responsible if he could have done 
otherwise,’133 “could” in this context meaning ‘could have done otherwise if he had chosen 
to.’134  This choice was not made impossible by external factors beyond the control of the 
agent.  Surprisingly, Moore at one point excludes from the ambit of free choice situations 
where a choice is also made ‘very difficult’ by such external factors, but this extension 
appears only once in his argument135 and whether it could include a temporary lack of 
capacity to control oneself is unclear but unlikely.136     
 
2.4.1 The meaning of ‘choice’ 
 
As ‘choice’ underpins culpability it is necessary to determine what ‘choice’ actually means.  
For example, it could be said that where a person acts under duress or while suffering from a 
mental disorder, he is still making a choice to engage in prohibited conduct.   Choice theorists 
would argue that making a choice requires the exercise of ‘free will’ and thus someone acting 
                                            
131 M. Moore, ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’ (1990) 7 Social Philosophy and Policy 29 at 31. 
132 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Chitty ed., vol. IV (London, 1826) 20 cited 
in M. Moore, ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’ (n 131) at 32. 
133 Ibid. Moore at 34. 
134Ibid. at 35. 
135Ibid. 
136  See, for example, the defendant in R v Kingston[1995] 2 AC 355.  In this case, as already noted, D had been 
given drinks laced with intoxicants and, for the purposes of blackmail, was video recorded indecently assaulting 
a 15 year-old boy, something that would not have occurred without the disinhibiting effects of the drugs. 
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under duress would be exculpated as the expression of free will is absent in such 
circumstances.  This concept of ‘free will’ needs to consist of ‘the capacity for choice…and 
of choice as a rational capacity which manifests our freedom as responsible agents.’137  If this 
approach is taken the mentally disordered offender is appropriately exculpated if he lacked 
such rational capacity at the time he did the act.  Similarly, it is submitted the person who 
lacks the cognitive capacity to rationally consider the situation before acting should also be 
exculpated. 
 
Hart did not examine what attributes D would need in order to be capable of behaving in a 
reasonable manner but such an account was propounded by Moore who stated that D would 
need: 
those qualities of character that we think persons should possess, and those capacities 
of mind that we think all persons do possess….He is …capable of calculating what 
actions are likely to lead to what results and even to assign relative probabilities to 
each.  He is, in other words, a pre-eminent practical reasoner, finding the morally 
and legally correct major premises…and forming the accurate means/end beliefs…for 
his minor premises…It is because people have the capacity to reason this way that 
they can be said to be culpable when they do not do so.138 
 
There are factors that have been acknowledged to make choices impossible or difficult.  Hart 
advances that these are ‘either an incapacity in the agent’ (an internal factor of the agent) ‘or 
the lack of fair opportunity to use a non-defective capacity’139 (an external factor, the 
situation the agent finds himself in).  Two internal factors identified were ‘extreme emotion 
                                            
137 R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts (n 119) 150. 
138 M. Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship, cited in P. Arenella ‘Character, Choice and 
Moral Agency: the Relevance of Character to our Moral Culpability Judgments’ (n 39) at 70. 
139 M. Moore, ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’ (n 131) at 35. 
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or cravings.’140  Most choice theorists would reject an ‘internal disability’ capacity based 
excuse like hatred because ‘recognizing fears, cravings, instinctual desires, strong passions, 
or other internal states as excuses unduly reduces one’s true responsibility.’141  This argument 
has merit with regard to most of the examples listed but there could clearly be an argument 
for acknowledging fears provided there was evidence that it was truly incapacitating and a 
low cognitive capacity should also be accommodated here.  One choice theorist had 
originally included ‘extreme emotion and cravings,’ as noted above,142 but again it is possible 
to distinguish between the two, the former perhaps meritorious in the right circumstances, the 
latter not so.   
 
It has been said that for a claim of lack of a ‘fair opportunity’ to succeed there ‘must be some 
(objectively regarded) evil that one is avoiding.’143  Our opportunities ‘are not unfairly 
diminished simply because they are diminished… ‘[F]air opportunity is not measured by 
…psychological difficulties, but rather by the objective facts of the matter.’144  It is only 
where D acts to prevent a substantial harm that the diminished opportunity defence will 
operate.  It is not relevant that subjectively the choice may be hard.  This is quite a draconian 
view and it is contended here that there could be scope for exculpation where the choice is so 
hard that it is almost non-existent.  Even if exculpation was not granted it would certainly be 
a mitigating factor in sentencing.  If the harder line is followed, it is submitted that the 
defendant in Kingston145 would be correctly convicted and the suggestion146 that perhaps a 
‘destabilisation’ defence could apply in such circumstances would not find favour, even 
                                            
140 M. Moore, ‘Causation and the Excuses’ 1985) 73 California Law Review 1091 at 1130. 
141 M. Moore, ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’ (n 131) at 37. 
142Ibid. 
143 P. Arenella, ‘Character, Choice and Moral Agency: the Relevance of Character to our Moral Culpability 
Judgments’ (n 39) at 78; M. Moore ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’ (n 131) at 37. 
144 Ibid.  Moore, ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’ (n 131) at 40. 
145 [1994] QB 81 (CA); [1995] 2 AC 355 (HL).  
146 G.R. Sullivan, ‘Making Excuses’ (n 73) at 145. 
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though the possibility of the creation of a new defence would have been acceptable to some 
members of the judiciary in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in this case.147 
 
The requirement that opportunity be measured by objective fact could allow us to make a 
‘character-based moral judgment’ about D’s failure to act in a morally responsible manner.148   
This has led to the recognition that defining the ‘moral self’ purely in terms of conscious will 
is too narrow and that ‘some’ emotions must be considered.149  Moore is criticised for failing 
to address the implications of broadening his view of the moral self whilst still maintaining 
the capacity for rational choice as the sole determinant of moral culpability.150  Furthermore 
‘it is not clear that we choose some of the strongest emotions that motivate our choices, nor is 
it clear that we can simply choose not to feel or act on the basis of such emotions.’151  It is 
accepted that our strongest emotions are not always a matter of choice and that we might not 
be able to control what we feel when affected by them, but that is not to say that emotions 
should be given free reign.  Clearly, there are certain emotions that can impair D’s capacity to 
make rational choices that the law could, and in some circumstances does make allowance 
for, for example fear, compassion and grief.   Other less deserving strong emotions like 
jealousy and anger we are rightly expected to control. 
 
2.4.2 The role of luck or chance and choice theory 
 
Elements of luck or chance have also been considered by choice theorists.  It has been argued 
that although ‘outcome-luck’ is irrelevant, ‘constitutive’ luck is relevant because it has 
                                            
147 [1994] QB 81 (CA) per Lord Taylor of Gosforth, and  [1995] 2 AC 355 (HL) Lord Mustill at 375-378 could 
see serious practical difficulties with the recognition of a new defence and suggested the Law Commission’s 
examination of intoxication should be enlarged to consider the questions raised by this appeal. 
148 P. Arenella ‘Character, Choice and Moral Agency: the Relevance of Character to our Moral Culpability 
Judgments’ (n 39) at 78. 
149 Ibid at 80; M. Moore ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’ (n 131) at 33-34. 
150 P. Arenella ‘Character, Choice and Moral Agency: the Relevance of Character to our Moral Culpability 
Judgments’ (n 39) at 78-80. 
151 Ibid. at 81. 
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resulted in me being the person that I am and influences the free choices that I make when I 
decide whether to engage in criminal conduct. 152   Additionally, choice theorists assume that 
every individual is a rational moral agent, free to make their own choices without addressing 
what attributes one needs to become a fully developed moral agent and how such attributes 
are acquired.153  But elements of luck and chance can be relevant in this respect too. 
 
One aspect for examination is the extent to which we have control over our ‘constitutive’ 
luck, if any.  Some individuals may never develop into moral agents because of ‘bad 
constitutive luck.’154  Although determinists would argue that we are what we are and we 
have no control at all, if this is the case it would be difficult justifying state punishment for 
any criminal offences because defendants simply could not help being what they are and 
acting the way they did, they were just unlucky to have been ‘made that way.’155  There is a 
difficulty in resolving the extent to which D’s actions can be ‘freely’ chosen ‘despite the 
unchosen influence of genetics, environment, and chance.’156  The accepted rationale is that 
despite such factors, as humans we still have a limited autonomy and control, we are not 
robots.  Our genetic makeup and background may make some of our choices harder for us 
than they are for others, but generally speaking we do still make a free choice.  This is, of 
course, dependent on possession of sufficient mental capacity to be aware of our situation and 
the opportunities available.   
 
                                            
152 R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts, (n 119) Chapter 6. 
153 P. Arenella, ‘Character, Choice and Moral Agency: the Relevance of Character to our Moral Culpability 
Judgments’ (n 39), see below under flaws in choice theory at 2.4.6. 
154 Ibid. at 69. 
155 M. Moore, ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’ (n 131) at 35. 
156 S.H. Pillsbury, ‘The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibility’ 
(1992) 67 Indiana Law Journal 719 at 720. 
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‘Situational’ luck is also relevant because it places a person in a position where he can be 
exposed to temptation or have the opportunity to commit crime.157  Although this affords no 
excuse, it perhaps explains why people with previously good characters can suddenly act in a 
manner that is inconsistent with their previous conduct and it can be a mitigating factor in 
sentencing.  Whether such uncharacteristic conduct can be said to be ‘out of character’ is an 
issue that will be discussed below.158 
 
2.4.3 Choice Theory, intention and recklessness 
 
Accordingly, only intention and recklessness where the defendant foresaw a risk of harm and 
went on to take the risk of it would suffice as mens rea; negligence, for the majority of choice 
theorists, would not be sufficient.159  Subjectivists follow this rationale maintaining that a 
lack of awareness of the risk of harm makes it impossible for D to make a ‘rational and 
voluntary choice’ to act in a manner that risks breaking the law.160  The other important 
principle for choice theorists is belief; a person should only be responsible for what they 
believed they were doing in the circumstances they believed to exist at the time rather than 
for what actually did happen or what the actual circumstances turned out to be.161  Any 
actions that fall outside of these principles should not attract criminal liability as we cannot 
be responsible for matters of chance or luck162 that are beyond our control.   
 
Only chosen conduct, therefore, attracts responsibility and culpability so that even if a 
person’s actions create an obvious risk of harm to others and that harm results, the person 
                                            
157 R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts (n 119) 150. 
158 Below at 2.5.3 and 2.5.5. 
159 R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts, (n 119) 149. 
160 P. Arenella, ‘Character, Choice and Moral Agency: the Relevance of Character to our Moral Culpability 
Judgments’ (n 39) at 70. 
161 Such a principle appears to be reflected in the definition of recklessness found in the Draft Criminal Code for 
England and Wales, cl. 18(c) of the Criminal Code Bill (1989), discussed in Chapter Three below. 
162 R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts (n 119) Chapter 6. 
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will not be liable unless they were aware of the risk themselves.  The advantage of this 
approach to culpability is that it recognises and respects individual autonomy.  The citizen is 
able to exercise control over his own life knowing that he will only be liable to criminal 
sanctions if he chooses to break the law and he has the power to determine for himself 
whether or not to do so.  The features within the criminal justice system that are supportive of 
this ‘choice-based’ theory of criminal responsibility are the fact that most mens rea terms for 
offences concerned with moral wrongdoing are cognition- based, and criminal defences 
generally apply where D’s act could be seen as non-voluntary to some extent.163   Purely 
objective recklessness, negligence and crimes of strict liability are problematic as they can all 
be committed inadvertently, without a conscious choice to break the law. 
 
2.4.4 Choice theory and negligence 
 
Hart164 justified including negligence within choice theory by arguing that negligent 
behaviour could be encompassed where D had the capacity to act like a reasonable person.  
He believed that D would be culpable where he possessed both the physical and moral 
capacity to abide by the law and had a fair opportunity to avoid criminal behaviour.165  This 
more sophisticated and complex version of choice theory overlaps substantially with 
character theory by including moral incapacity.  Elsewhere, the suggestion that a person can 
in any real sense ‘choose’ to behave in a negligent manner166 has been refuted, as negligence 
connotes inadvertent action and if no thought is being given before acting in a particular way 
how can the subsequent act be ‘chosen’?167  If criminal liability should only lie where D is 
both responsible and culpable, this arises only where D has control which is limited to those 
                                            
163 W. Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (n 117) 333. 
164 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility,’ in Punishment and Responsibility Essays 
in the Philosophy of Law (n 7) 136-157. 
165 Ibid. 
166 M. Moore, ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’ (n 131) at 56. 
167 R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts (n 119)149. 
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things he chooses to do or causes to happen.  This subjective view limits the influence of 
chance and luck that should be irrelevant to criminal liability.168  It is submitted that a person 
can in a sense ‘choose’ to behave negligently in that he can consciously choose not to do a 
risk assessment before he acts.  It is accepted that there is merit in the argument that usually 
one does not truly ‘choose’ to be inadvertent, but if we accept that we can control our actions 
then we must accept that we can normally choose to take care to avoid harming others.  This 
is even more important when we are engaging in activities that we know have the potential to 
cause harm, especially when serious harm may occur.  This is not to suggest that on 
occasions when we do not consciously stop to consider possible risks that we are necessarily 
choosing not to do so.  In fact such instances will probably be rare, especially where the 
proposed activity is inherently risky. 
 
Hampton169 acknowledges difficulty in reconciling choice or defiance theory with negligence 
as it is implausible to argue that an inadvertent person has chosen to defy the law.  She tries 
to justify criminal liability for negligence by proposing that the act of defiance arises not at 
the time of the actus reus of the offence but much earlier in the process of that person’s 
character formation.  D developed an irresponsible character in defiance of what he knew to 
be an acceptable standard of responsibility.170  This is lapsing into character theory (discussed 
below).  It is submitted that this argument is flawed as it fails to consider the many instances 
where responsible people behave negligently because of momentary lapses in concentration 
and also because of the assumption that people can choose their characters and the 
dispositions they want to possess.171  Even if someone had opted to become a careless person, 
                                            
168 Ibid. at 147-149. 
169 J. Hampton, ‘Mens Rea’ (n 59). 
170 Ibid. at 27. 
171 J. Horder, ‘Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory’ (n 129) at 197. 
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it would not necessarily mean that on a particular occasion when they had acted carelessly it 
was as a consequence of their chosen disposition.   
 
On a traditional Kantian view, liability for negligence would only lie where D had an 
opportunity to become aware of the risk.  Moore, an original supporter of Hart’s 
accommodation of negligence within choice theory, has now rejected his approach on the 
basis that ‘it shifts the touchstone of responsibility from choice to capacity’ …‘relegating 
choice to a subsidiary role.’172  This is because giving capacity such prominence would mean 
that there were two ways responsibility could be grounded based upon the agent’s capacity: 
he could choose to do wrong or be inadvertent.  As an alternative, Moore argues that ‘what 
makes the intentional or reckless wrongdoer so culpable is not unexercised capacity’ but his 
choice not to exercise it.173  Horder questions the inclusion of the word “so” before 
“culpable” querying whether Moore is saying that choosing not to exercise this capacity 
grounds culpability or whether such a choice makes D more culpable than he would be if he 
had not made such a choice and had simply been careless.174  Furthermore, he sees Moore’s 
criticism of Hart’s approach to negligence as an inconsistency in Moore’s own argument 
because ‘the moral capacity to avoid wrongdoing, which ... Moore regards as an essential 
prerequisite for a culpability judgment, is the very basis...’ of liability for negligence as Hart 
realised.175  This second criticism is clearly correct.  
 
  
                                            
172 M. Moore, ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’ (n 131) at 57. 
173 Ibid. 
174 J. Horder, ‘Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory’ (n129) at 199. 
175 Ibid. at 200. 
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2.4.5 Choice theory and ‘stupidity’  
 
As stupidity was expressly referred to in the case of R v G & R176  it is necessary to consider 
whether stupidity177 would be sufficient to exculpate under choice theory.  Where the 
stupidity in question arises from a lack of cognitive capacity generally then the individual 
cannot make a rational choice at the time of acting nor have a fair opportunity to appreciate 
the alternative courses of action available.  If a person has sufficient cognitive capacity but 
acts stupidly on a particular occasion he should be held culpable for any harm that results.  
Stupidity in this context should not be taken to mean intellectually ‘stupid,’ but would 
certainly encompass the ‘practical joker’ who caused serious harm whilst acting in a way that 
had no social utility whatsoever.  An example is the defendant in Brady178 who had to be 
deemed subjectively reckless in order to secure a conviction, even though it is highly unlikely 
that he consciously appreciated the risk involved in balancing on the rail of a balcony above a 
dance floor.179   
 
2.4.6 Flaws in the choice theorists approach 
 
As noted above, many mens rea terms are cognition-based, a feature supportive of choice 
theory, however not all mens rea terms are subjective and most offences are crimes of strict 
liability.  It has been said that it is ‘only where punishment is an expression of moral criticism 
                                            
176 [2004] 4 All ER 765 at 784, per Lord Bingham. This case will be examined in Chapter 3 as it provides the 
current definition of recklessness. 
177 Gardner sees stupidity as a vice and not as an excuse, J. Gardner Offences and Defences Selected Essays in 
the Philosophy of Criminal Law (n 37) 26; Victor Tadros identifies it as a reprehensible character flaw but not a 
proper target of the criminal law, ‘The Characters of Excuse’ (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 495. 
178 [2007] EWCA Crim 2413.   
179 Brady fell, injuring a woman on the dance floor below and causing her serious injury.  Note that Brady was, 
perhaps fortunately for the court, intoxicated at the time and his recklessness in getting into that state was 
sufficient to constitute the mens rea of the offence.  Had he not been voluntarily intoxicated it could have been 
difficult to establish he foresaw the risk of harm and he could have escaped criminal liability. The offences 
under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 do not encompass negligence and the victim did not die to 
enable a charge of gross negligence manslaughter to apply.  This kind of action poses problems for choice 
theorists if they want to establish culpability as it may be difficult to argue that D made a conscious choice. 
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involving stigmatic penalties that fairness in punishment requires conscious rule flouting.’180  
On this basis, liability for negligence or inadvertent recklessness would still remain a 
problem, unless Hart’s rationale is accepted and the focus is moved from ‘choice’ to 
‘capacity’, a shift Moore opposes.181  Making conscious rule flouting a precondition for 
punishment for stigmatic offences is drawing the principle too narrowly as there are 
circumstances where punishment without consciously flouting the law can be justified.  
Choice theory can even accommodate strict liability on the basis that such offences are 
generally regulatory offences and, in consequence, the sanctions attached to them are 
preventative.  This argument only works to a limited extent as although the regulated activity 
is one that the agent has chosen to engage in, he can still be held criminally accountable when 
he may not be personally at fault, for example, an employee might have ignored or forgotten 
the relevant rule. 
 
One of the inherent flaws in the choice theory is its capacity to inculpate a person who would 
otherwise not be criminally liable in relation to criminal attempts.  If criminal liability is 
rightly attached to those who intend to engage in criminal activity, then the person who 
attempts to commit a crime and fails should be punished in the same way as the person who 
completes the offence; there is no difference in culpability.182  Similarly, there are problems 
where a person believes that he is committing a criminal offence when in fact he is not.  
Using the example of a person recklessly starting a bonfire aware that it might damage a 
neighbour’s fence, a subjectivist would have to accept that this person would be equally 
subject to conviction if the fence was damaged, if the fence was actually not the neighbour’s 
                                            
180 W. Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (n 117) 334. 
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but the person’s own fence, and even if the fence was not damaged at all.183  If a man is to be 
liable for what he intends or believes this result is a natural consequence. 
 
An even more disturbing consequence, it is submitted, is in relation to the ‘defence’ of 
mistake.  If the choice theory is accepted as the appropriate test for culpability, a person who 
believes that a woman is consenting to sex should be acquitted of rape as long as he can show 
that he honestly believed she was consenting.  His belief would not have to be on reasonable 
grounds.184  Similarly, if D mistakenly but genuinely believes he is about to be attacked and 
attacks an innocent person in ‘self-defence,’ then under choice theory his belief would negate 
the mens rea for an offence under the Offences against the Person Act 1861.  Alternatively, if 
he was justified in acting in self-defence but used objectively ‘unreasonable force,’ the 
defence, on the choice theorists view, should still be available to him as long as he believed 
the force used was necessary.  Under the current law the defence would fail.  
 
2.4.7 Self-induced intoxication 
 
Self-induced intoxication also poses problems for choice theorists185 as it is open to a 
defendant to argue that he was so drunk that he lacked the capacity to make an informed and 
rational choice and therefore he should not be found culpable for acts committed whilst in 
this state.  As is known, many intoxicants can remove inhibitions and increase the risk of 
criminal behaviour.186  Although it is possible to argue that the agent makes a free choice to 
become intoxicated earlier, prior to the actus reus of the offence, and the effects of alcohol 
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(and drugs) are well publicised, the law on self-induced intoxication still leaves us with two 
issues.   
 
The first issue is the obvious criticism that with founding liability on an earlier free choice 
there is not the usual coincidence of the actus reus and mens rea that is normally a 
prerequisite for liability.  In these circumstances for public safety reasons, the intention to 
drink without regard to its possible effects is substituted for the relevant mens rea and the 
intent to drink is transferred to the commission of the offence.  This is because being 
advertently reckless in becoming intoxicated can be morally equated with the fault element of 
subjective recklessness that is often sufficient for criminal liability.187  As Lord Mustill 
opined in Kingston,188 for crimes of basic intent, it is not possible to rely on an absence of 
mens rea when that is caused by D’s voluntary acts.  His Lordship’s assertion that self-
induced intoxication is a substitute for mens rea is not correct as it would not take into 
account the slightly intoxicated defendant whose defence would be that he would have acted 
in exactly the same way and with the identical state of mind if he had been completely sober, 
he would have still failed to see the risk of harm.189  
 
The second issue to consider is whether it would be appropriate to blame someone who had 
never been intoxicated through drugs or alcohol before and who would therefore have no idea 
of the effect of the intoxicants upon him?  The circumstance envisaged here is where 
someone consumes a very small amount of an intoxicant, but experiences an unusual reaction 
to it.  It could be argued that such an individual is not making a free and rational choice, if he 
does not realise the effects the intoxicants will have upon him, being unaware of how the 
intoxicant will affect his personal capacity to make a rational choice. 
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2.4.8 ‘Fair opportunity’ 
 
One major difficulty with the choice theorists’ requirement of a ‘fair opportunity’ is that the 
theory is ambiguous on this requirement as a failure to avoid wrongdoing can vary from a 
cognitive failure in the case of a negligent act to a failure to meet the standard of the 
reasonable man for the defence of duress.  Such ‘fundamental differences’ between the two 
failures are ‘hidden behind the all-embracing notion of “fair” or “unfair” opportunity.’190  In 
what circumstances does D have a fair opportunity to avoid law breaking?  The theory 
answers this by using the ‘yardstick’ of the ‘reasonable man’ and as a result ‘[R]ule breakers 
are [often] punished without regard to their real capacities and opportunities to conform’.   191   
 
For some this is not an insurmountable problem, even if D could not have been expected to 
do any better than he actually did because of the kind of person he has become, he still 
deserves punishment because he ‘chose to attack our basic moral values.’192  In short, it is 
only where an external crisis occurs that D can usually be excused, providing he behaved as a 
reasonable person would have done in his situation.  This is too hard a line where conviction 
for a serious offence may result, although it could be arguably justified on public safety 
grounds for minor offences.  Another issue is the practical difficulty of determining whether 
in any given situation, D was actually deprived of the capacity/fair opportunity, given that 
this may come down to the disputed evidence of expert witnesses.193   
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2.4.9 Moral agency and the capacity for moral responsiveness 
 
Perhaps the biggest flaw of all in the choice theory is that there is an insufficient account of 
what preconditions are necessary for an individual to make a free and rational choice.194  It 
fails to provide an ‘adequate account of what it is to be a responsible agent, or of what makes 
an action ‘mine’ as its responsible agent.’195  The choice theorists’ assumption that everyone 
is a moral agent is one of the major flaws in their theory, because they have paid insufficient 
attention to two of the three fundamental conditions on which the theory is based.196  Moral 
theorists generally agree that three requirements must be satisfied before moral 
blameworthiness can be attributed, namely: ‘(1) a moral agent (2) must breach some 
governing moral norm (3) under circumstances …that give the moral agent a fair opportunity 
to avoid its breach.’197  Choice theorists stand accused of failing to pay sufficient attention to 
the first and second of these prerequisites and should explore the link between ‘moral address 
and evaluation’ and the ‘special attributes’ D needs ‘to understand and use moral norms as a 
reason for his action.’198  These attributes have been identified as the ‘abilities to react to 
moral norms in thought, feeling, perception and behaviour.’199  Where these attributes are 
absent, or where D fails to ‘exercise them competently’200 then we need to determine whether 
D can control the aspects of his character that govern his capacity for moral responsiveness.  
In consequence only a ‘character based conception of a moral agent’s necessary attributes can 
explain how this capacity for moral responsiveness is developed’ and why it may sometimes 
be appropriate to blame those who fail to exercise it.201  
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Both retributivism and utilitarianism rely on choice theory as the rationale for moral 
responsibility and the theory is also compatible with a ‘soft determinist’ view which assumes 
that sane adults are free to act in accordance with their reasoned choices, a limited autonomy 
as they cannot ‘revise their will.’202  On a ‘hard determinist’ view both choice and character 
theories would be rejected as both our actions and characters would be predetermined.  For 
choice theory to be accepted, it needs to explore whether it is fair to hold someone morally 
accountable for the ‘goals, desires, values, and emotions that motivate his rational choices.’203  
Choice theory would inculpate psychopaths and the brainwashed and yet could exculpate 
those who would be currently liable; for example negligent offenders and those unable to rely 
on a criminal defence because they failed to live up to the standard of the ‘reasonable 
man.’204 
 
Focussing on psychopaths, there are two faults with the choice theorists’ assertion that moral 
blameworthiness can be grounded where there is both capacity and opportunity to abide by 
the law, as it would equally apply where the law in question was morally neutral and also 
where it was morally bad when disobedience would be meritorious.  Secondly, there is the 
‘assumption that the capacity to be moved by moral reasons for action is not a necessary 
condition of moral agency.’205  It is questionable whether a person should be deemed to be a 
moral agent if he ‘lacks the capacity to deliberate about whether he should have acted 
differently.’206  If we accept that such moral responsiveness is a precondition for criminal 
liability this would raise several other issues, including how such a capacity would be 
determined.   Would it need to be determined in every case unless D was either very young or 
insane?  For those found to be morally unresponsive, there would be further issues of how to 
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deal with them as, if they were simply allowed to walk away from any harm they had caused, 
they could be a danger to themselves or the public.  In theory, we would need to try to 
distinguish between those who lacked the capacity and those who had capacity but failed to 
exercise it competently as the latter may be helped by education. 
 
2.4.10 The relevance of emotions to choice 
 
Moore has accepted that choice theorists did not demonstrate how the ability to be a practical 
reasoner could explain how a person developed moral responsiveness and his position has 
now altered.207  Recognising this issue and focussing on the capacity element in his 
hypothetical duress problem he questions whether the responsible self is to be identified 
solely in terms of conscious will or whether some emotions should be included.  If emotions 
are included then it is possible that character based judgments are being incorporated.208  This 
second difficulty leads him to examine whether our emotions and our ‘choosing agency, the 
will’ are inextricably linked?209  Although it is possible that our emotions need not 
necessarily control our choice processes, choice theorists must accept that some emotions 
have a role to play in the formation of our intentions and beliefs and in any plan of action, 
‘emotions are both products and causes of the judgments we make as we decide what to 
do’210 but Moore submits that they are not ‘invaders of our processes of reasoned 
deliberation.’211  It is submitted here that generally this is correct, but it is not a universally 
applicable principle.   
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If it is accepted that emotions do not incapacitate choice, the effect on his hypothetical duress 
problem would be that where someone is genuinely acting under duress out of fear for his 
own safety or that of others, he would only be able to rely upon the second limb of choice 
theory, diminished opportunity, which could not be correct when considered in the wider 
context of defences.212  This would be fatal for those claiming other defences such as 
provocation where the second limb is not available.  Moore considers the psychological view 
that some emotions “short circuit” choice and questions whether such emotions can ever 
continue without the choice to give them free reign but he offers no answer to this 
conundrum.213  
 
2.4.11 Spontaneity and the way harm is caused 
 
Moore stands accused of misunderstanding the nature of choice when he sees intentional and 
reckless wrongdoing as ‘paradigm examples of chosen wrongdoing’ because it ‘presupposes 
a comparison between alternative courses of action’ which may not occur.214  Often the 
intentional or reckless actor may act spontaneously without considering other options and as 
such, Moore’s analysis of the relationship between mens rea and culpability is flawed 
because it cannot accommodate those who act impulsively.  They have made no choice and 
yet are still culpable.  This point can also be extended to include the negligent actor who, as 
already discussed, is not really making a choice. It is submitted that it might be better to treat 
spontaneous and instinctive acts as ‘reactions’ rather than ‘actions’ and acknowledge that 
punishment for such acts cannot be justified by choice theory.    
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When considering ‘choice’ from a ‘defiance’ stance215 the grounding of criminal culpability 
lies in D’s defiance of the law in causing harm, as D makes a choice to defy an authoritative 
moral command in order to satisfy personal desires, knowing obedience is expected.216  It is 
important to acknowledge that this is not the sole consideration.   An example to illustrate 
this point is where D intentionally rapes or kills.  In such cases ‘the nature of the harm and 
the way in which it is caused to the victim are naturally thought of as central to an 
explanation of culpability, ...  not just a manifestation of defiance.’217  This is the final flaw: 
choice theory misses any consideration of the way harm is caused, a crucial feature of 
determining degrees of culpability.218 
 
2.5 Character Theory 
 
The main proponents of character theory are Aristotle,219 Hume,220 and more recently 
Bayles,221 Pincoffs222 and Arenella.223  The basis of founding criminal liability on character is 
appealing as it reflects a general communitarian principle that only ‘bad people’ should be  
punished.224  This approach ‘seems to follow our standard moral intuitions.’225   It permits 
punishment of those who may be unable to resist non-compliance with the law, avoiding the 
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issue of whether D possessed the normal capacities to behave in a reasonable way.226    In 
fact, it should make us aware that D can be punished for acts that “we” might also have done 
in D’s position,227 for example if we had had D’s abusive family background.  Having a weak 
character is no excuse.   
 
Character theory is still a subjective theory because it founds culpability on the subjective 
character traits of the individual agent.  For Hudson, ‘[m]oral virtues and vices...are traits 
which received opinion holds to be traits of character; they are time-tested.’228  Hume 
proposed that ‘[b]lame and punishment are not directly for acts but for character traits...’and 
such traits are not restricted to ones which an individual can voluntarily control,229 as 
considered by Aristotle, but ‘any socially desirable or undesirable disposition.’230  As such, 
criminal liability is properly grounded where D’s action manifests an undesirable character 
trait, an enduring mental quality231 that requires correction.  Furthermore, in Hume’s Treatise, 
the term ‘mental qualities’ includes ‘character, passions, and affections.’232  Non-
voluntariness is not an excuse it its own right, it only affords an excuse because it fails to 
demonstrate possession of an undesirable enduring mental quality.  It is Hume’s view that 
while some mental qualities can be changed by hard work, others may not be.  Accordingly, 
although mental qualities do not have to be voluntary to be blameworthy, punishment 
requires their voluntary manifestation.233 
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If an act does not indicate an undesirable character trait blame would be inappropriate and a 
person would be excused on Hume’s account.234  Yet preventative measures could still be 
taken to avoid future unwanted consequences.  Bayles fails to expand upon this point but he 
may be considering civil detention for the mentally disordered or perhaps education and 
training.235  Although the foremost of these preventative measures can be achieved by 
compulsion, without criminal liability it is difficult to see how individuals could be 
compelled to undertake education or training currently.  Hume is clear that the role for 
punishment is only where its intended use is to alter a person’s conduct.236   
 
Hume argued that mental qualities could sometimes be indicated better by how a person did 
something rather than by what he did and even if acts are manifestations of mental qualities, 
‘it is only classes of actions which are so, not particular ones.’237  This is because an action 
can be the result of differing motives which shows that there is not necessarily a direct link 
between possession of a certain character trait and actions of a certain type.238  This point is 
also raised by Moore239 in relation to a bad character trait which the agent tries to hide.   An 
alternative example could be where D, through no fault of his own, has to resort to stealing 
food to survive.  Here the cause of the stealing is not a bad character flaw, but the fact that the 
instinct for survival is paramount.240  
 
There is a certain attraction to the view that a person’s actions are representative of their good 
or bad character, that people are ‘moved to perform certain actions’241 providing a 
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‘motivational pattern’ which might be strongly linked to desires and aversions.  Traditional 
character theorists such as Plato, Aristotle and Brandt, pay insufficient attention to the 
‘interrelationships between desires, emotions, the will and various competencies and 
abilities.’242  For Aristotle, a person should aspire to develop good character traits, which he 
terms human virtues or excellences, but such excellences are only achieved when certain 
conditions are satisfied.  For an individual to possess a trait deemed to be a human 
excellence, an act apparently demonstrating such a trait is insufficient in itself.  What is 
required is that the individual must be in the right state when he does the act: 
First, he must know [that he is doing virtuous actions]; second, he must decide on 
them, and decide on them for themselves; and third, he must do them from a firm and 
unchanging state.243 
 
Such a human excellence could be acquired by habituation. Plato, Aristotle and Hume 
believed that character traits were linked to desires, and possession of a particular virtue or 
vice could motivate someone to act in a certain way.  Following on from this, a direct link 
could be made between motivation and desires.244  Furthermore, both Plato and Aristotle 
‘thought that human excellences applied primarily to persons and only secondarily to 
actions’,245 hence Aristotle’s three preconditions quoted above. 
 
Character traits have also been defined as ‘relatively stable patterns of thought, emotion, and 
action… dispositions to act in certain ways, to be motivated or affected by certain kinds of 
consideration, to think in certain ways.’246  The law demands of its citizens ‘certain 
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dispositions: of obedience to its rules and of respect for the values it protects,’247 which 
requires us to have or develop particular character traits which will enable us to be law 
abiding members of society.  It could be argued that it should not be within the ambit of the 
criminal law to interfere in the moral character of its citizens.  Character theorists can counter 
such arguments by restricting criminal liability only to undesirable moral character traits that 
are likely to lead to or produce obviously harmful conduct.  Such harmful conduct is rightly 
the concern of the criminal law.  This raises further questions, discussed below.  
  
2.5.1 Responsibility for character 
 
The first issue is the extent to which we are responsible for our characters.  There are the 
opposing opinions of Robert Owen248 who believed that a man’s character is formed 
independently of himself and Aristotle’s view that people can be rightly blamed for having 
acquired a bad character if they have failed to live how they should and have been negligent 
in developing their character.249  Aristotle did not advocate punishment for bad character 
alone, just that possessing a bad character could not be available as an excuse for breaking 
the law.  A common misconception of Aristotle’s view is that in firmly believing that 
everyone had the capacity to develop human excellences, Aristotle did not accept that if a 
person lacked such a capacity he could be excused for his bad actions.250  Such actions 
themselves were sufficient to ground culpability.  In support of this stance, where incapacity 
to abide by the law is attributable to some negligence on the agent’s part in striving to 
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develop a stronger and better character, he should not be excused from his wrongdoing.  
There should be a presumption that our characters are our own responsibilities.251 
 
2.5.1.1 Determinate and determinable dispositions 
 
Pincoffs describes character traits generally as a ‘subclass of personality traits’ which are 
‘generally approved or disapproved’ by society and he focuses on ‘moral character traits 
which we have a moral right to demand or expect of one another.’252  Such character 
dispositions are then subdivided into two separate categories, determinate and determinable 
dispositions and he argues that both are needed for a just society. Determinate dispositions he 
states, are ones that can be enshrined in law and tell us precisely what we must or must not do 
to qualify as having the disposition, the examples given are ‘you must not steal’ or be 
‘incestuous’.253  Determinable dispositions, such as fairness, honesty and concern for others 
need to be cultivated too.  But the converse of these determinable dispositions, e.g. 
unfairness, dishonesty, indifference to others, can be manifested in so many different ways 
that if we have the right to expect that individuals should cultivate their characters so that 
they develop good determinable dispositions we have a problem.  How are such good 
dispositions cultivated, and is everyone in possession of an innate ability to cultivate them or 
is it something that can be acquired?  
 
The example of fairness is used to illustrate how difficult it would be to explain what we 
mean if we want people to be fair.  Even with an interminably long set of instructions which 
could be followed, the ‘individual might still be blindly following the instructions…without 
any sense that what he is doing is right or wrong because [sic] fair or unfair.  The sense of 
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fairness is essential; it is this that we have a right to demand.’254  But can we demand a sense 
of fairness from an agent who may be incapable of meeting such a demand?  This raises 
questions about how a sense of fairness develops in an individual and to what extent the 
individual would have control over its development.  If these positive attributes are not 
automatically developed and an individual has not been helped to develop them, by having 
good role models, experience, education, religious moral instruction, to what extent can we 
blame agents for acting immorally?255  One answer would be that the agent could be blamed 
and punished not because he chose to become a bad person but because of his chosen bad 
action.256   
 
Arenella examines this issue from another perspective in his criticism of choice theory, 
questioning whether it is appropriate to hold an agent to be blameworthy when he cannot 
appreciate the moral significance of legal norms on the sole basis that he has the capacity to 
comply with the law for non-moral reasons.257  If an agent is incapable of empathy and views 
‘moral norms as arbitrary restraints’ on his autonomy should he be morally blameworthy 
where he makes a purely rational choice and commits an offence?  This question can be 
addressed by arguing that many theorists have blurred the distinction between legal and 
moral norms; breaching the criminal law does not necessarily involve moral fault.258  
Furthermore, an individual needs certain attributes to ‘understand and use moral norms as a 
reason for his action’ and where an individual lacks ‘such attributes or fails to exercise them 
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competently’ we should determine whether the individual had control over the character 
aspects that impair his capacity to conform before finding blameworthiness.259  
 
Choice theorists would argue that simply having the capacity to make a choice to abide by the 
law would be sufficient to ground culpability but it must at least be acknowledged that the 
majority of citizens have moral as well as legal reasons for conforming,260 making it easier 
for them to be law abiding.261  Where it is more difficult for an individual to comply with the 
law because of a lack of moral development should allowances be made?  Choice theory is 
inadequate here on the basis that it defines ‘the moral agent’s capacities for rational and 
uncompelled action in the abstract without tying those capacities to the unique character of 
the individual possessing them.’262  In consequence, most criminal defendants can be held 
morally blameworthy without consideration of the factors that may have impacted upon their 
ability to conform because they are capable of rational self-determined action.  This would 
only exempt young children and the insane from culpability unless defendants could rely on 
an excuse of ‘lack of a fair opportunity’ to act otherwise.  Even then, in cases like 
Kingston,263 being judged to have retained some control would be fatal to a defence.  
 
It is submitted that morally, we can demand desirable character traits from members of our 
community because they are demands that are universal for the common good.  To fail to 
criticise those who fail to live up to our universal standard is to encourage ‘characterological 
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free enterprise’ but by finding fault ‘the element of justice enters in’.264  Moreover, as 
questions of fairness are moral and an agent is less inhibited without a well developed moral 
character, no one should be permitted an unfair advantage over others by being allowed to 
build the wrong kind of character.265  Although it is appropriate to criticise and to condemn 
bad acts, it is important to note that justice does not necessarily demand punishment or the 
stigma of a criminal conviction, which can be viewed as a punishment in its own right.     
 
Character theorists recognise that character formation is not attributable to one thing or one 
person alone, ‘being a matter of circumstances and of degree.’266  Many things impact on a 
person’s character formation, including genetics, family, environment, circumstances, 
accidents, experience, etc.  On this basis, it has been argued that where there is sufficient 
reason to believe that the agent ‘could not have helped becoming what he has become,’ and 
his defects of personality are correctable, then he should be treated.  This treatment would be 
to help the agent behave to an appropriately acceptable standard that he can ‘understand and 
accept for good reason.’267  Presumably, where such an agent has a notably uncorrectable 
defect or one that does not respond to treatment in a particular case, punishment would be the 
only option, on utilitarian grounds.  If an agent could have avoided becoming what he has 
become, then punishment is advocated.268  It is submitted that proving that someone could 
have done something to avoid becoming what they have become may be very difficult.  For 
others, whether or not someone could have avoided turning out the way they have is 
completely irrelevant.  Responsibility lies in D’s free choice, even accepting that human 
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action is caused, and therefore determined, ‘free choice is not precluded,’269 provided it was 
rational and non-coerced.   
 
2.5.2 The requirement of an act 
 
Condemning undesirable character traits that result in harm to others affirms the harm 
principle270 and could be justified on this basis, but what must be considered further is (1) 
whether it can be acceptable to punish an agent for a defective character trait before this trait 
has been manifested in harmful conduct,271 and (2) whether one harmful act alone272 can be 
shown to manifest such an undesirable character trait?  To address the first of these questions, 
it would generally be seen as unacceptable for the criminal law to extend its reach to punish 
its citizens for bad thoughts without such thoughts, indicative of an undesirable character 
trait, manifesting themselves in a harmful act.273  This is because it is a characteristic of 
human nature that we are all capable of bad thoughts, but such thoughts usually do not lead to 
harmful conduct.  Although there were government proposals to detain dangerous severe 
personality disordered individuals under a new Mental Health Bill274 if they were diagnosed 
as potentially posing a serious risk to themselves or others, but before they had committed 
any criminal offence, such proposals were not pursued.  The Humean character theory could 
be seen to support the view that such preventative action is justified but submits that 
blameworthiness alone is an insufficient condition for punishment or treatment noting that 
                                            
269 S.H. Pillsbury, ‘The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibility’ 
(n 156) at 724. 
270 J.S. Mill, On Liberty (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974) Chapter 1. 
271 For example, a person suffering from a severe mental disorder, or someone with learning disabilities. 
272 G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (n 50). 
273 It is clear that English criminal law has never extended this far even though it has been heavily influenced by 
Christian theology, bad thoughts being sufficient for the latter to require punishment (penance) to atone for sin 
and bring man closer to God, see A. Lévitt, ‘The Origins of the Doctrine of  Mens Rea’ (n 10). 
274 Home Office, ‘Managing Dangerous People with Severe Personality Disorder, Proposals for policy 
development, (July 1999); Department of Health and the Home Office: Reforming the Mental Health Act Part II 
High risk patients, (Dec 2000), CM 5016DII.  
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granting the state the power to punish or treat without an overt act requirement ‘unreasonably 
risks freedom for security.’275 
 
The character theorist’s answer to the second question also provides a rationale for the 
answer to the first question.  Without an act there would be insufficient evidence of an 
undesirable character trait that deserved censure and a social response.  If actual criminal 
conduct was not a requirement, there would be a danger that innocent people would be 
convicted.  This approach establishes that the connection between the undesirable character 
trait and criminal conduct are contingent.  To punish on the basis of what an individual would 
or might do rather than for actual deeds fails to respect the presumption that the individual is 
a rational and responsible agent.276  As yet it does not answer why one act can be sufficient to 
attract liability.   
 
Character theorists propose that the courts should determine in each case whether one action 
was indeed sufficient to evidence an undesirably dangerous disposition and if it did not they 
should acquit.277  Also the criminal law’s general requirement of proof of mens rea, for 
example that an act is done ‘purposely, knowingly, recklessly’ can help to support the 
inference of bad character.278  It has been argued that the different mental elements required 
by the mens rea of offences differentiate between attitudes to harm with greater blame being 
attached to more undesirable attitudes.279  On a Humean character view liability for 
negligence could be difficult to justify as it may not be possible to infer an undesirable 
character trait from one careless act.     
 
                                            
275 M.D. Bayles, ‘Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility’ (n 107) at 19. 
276 R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts (n 119) 190. 
277 Ibid. at 187. 
278 M.D. Bayles, ‘Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility’ (n 107) at 8. 
279 See discussion below at 2.5.15.  
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Lacey’s view is that defendants should not be held criminally liable for ‘out of character’ 
actions, actions only being ‘in character’ when they are ‘genuinely expressive of the agent’s 
disposition.’280  An obvious response to this suggestion is that any theory which exempts 
liability for serious harm on the basis that the conduct was uncharacteristic of the defendant’s 
normal disposition is clearly controversial.  An alternative way of addressing these issues is 
to state that if the ‘out of character’ behaviour is a result of circumstances that would give 
rise to a defence then exemption for liability would be justified.  This is because the agent’s 
‘capacity to guide his actions by the values to which he was truly committed’281 was 
impaired.   It could also be the case that the action was not caused by D’s character and as 
such, no adverse inferences to bad character can be drawn.282     
 
2.5.3 Character theory, Kingston, and determining what is ‘character’ 
 
This raises the question of how character theorists might deal with a case like Kingston.283  
From the judgments it was found that the defendant retained some control over his actions 
and he knew that what he was doing was morally wrong.  His argument that his capacity to 
retain his self-control was diminished by involuntary intoxication284 attracted sympathy from 
the appeal courts but the House of Lords held that a drugged intent was still an intent, the 
circumstances only affording mitigation.  In the Court of Appeal, Lord Taylor of Gosforth 
was prepared to allow a defence where the sole reason for crossing the threshold between 
having paedophilic inclinations and putting them into practice ‘is, or may have been that the 
                                            
280 R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts (n 119) 187. 
281 Ibid. at 188. 
282 Note the example given earlier, text to note 240, where a previously honest person finds himself in a 
situation, through no fault of his own, where he has to steal food to survive. 
283 [1994] QB 81 (CA); [1995] 2 AC 355 (HL). 
284 A defence under the Model Penal Code if it causes D to lack ‘substantial’ capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his act, ‘or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.’ §2.08(4)  However, most States 
only allow the defence where the incapacitation is the extent required to satisfy a defence of legal insanity had it 
been caused by mental disease, S. Kadish, ‘Excusing Crime’ (n 90). 
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inhibition which the law requires has been removed by the clandestine act of a third party,’285 
as ‘the operative fault is not his.’  There are different ways of interpreting Kingston’s 
character from these circumstances.  The first possibility is that Kingston was acting ‘out of 
character’ whilst he was denying his desires but, when he sexually assaulted the boy he was 
then acting in accordance with his character and should not be afforded any excuse.  This 
would accord with the view, noted by Wilson, that ‘[O]ne’s settled dispositions… are those 
which would be acted upon in the absence of self-control’.286   
 
Character has been described in terms of a ‘very significant subpart’ of a person’s 
personality, a ‘collection of many of his dispositions to act.’287  Problematically, there is no 
accepted analysis of which traits and dispositions to act are included within the conception of 
moral character and those which are not.288  One distinguishing feature that has gained 
acceptance is the view that relevant character traits are those which produce acts which are 
subject to D’s voluntary control, the exercise of his free will.289  In each case it will be a 
matter of assessing the ‘degree to which their manifestation is subject to voluntary 
control.’290  If then, with regard to a particular character flaw, a person cannot behave in any 
other way their flaw is not a character trait.  An obvious example would be that of stupidity in 
the sense of a lack of intelligence.  This is an interesting argument but it raises two questions.  
First, surely the level of control we generally exhibit forms part of our character?  As many of 
us do not behave well or responsibly when we lose our self control such a proposition would 
suggest that we all have ‘bad’ characters.   The second issue is that it is odd to think that a 
                                            
285 Kingston [1994] QB 81 at 89, per Lord Taylor. 
286 W. Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (n 117) 349; see also W. Wilson, Criminal Law Doctrine and 
Theory (n 8) 226. 
287 G. Vuoso, ‘Background, Responsibility, and Excuse’ (n 40) at 1670.  
288 Ibid.  
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prolific sexual offender who was unable to behave otherwise would not be considered to be a 
bad character.  Consequently, the theory may work with flaws like stupidity but not with 
others.   
 
If an agent possesses a character trait because he can normally refrain from manifesting it in 
actions then it seems that Kingston had an underlying, hitherto hidden, bad character and 
would be deserving of punishment but if we also take into account the ‘degree of control’ 
then allowances should be made when the will is undermined, when the self control is taken 
away by the acts of others.  All that is clear from the view is that if the ‘manifestation is not 
at all subject’291 to D’s control, it is not one of his character traits.  There is no explanation of 
whether it matters that there is some control, and if so, how much or little is needed.  Where 
the trait can be controlled in the absence of external interference it is unclear which side of 
the boundary the disposition to act would fall on.  One criticism of character-based theories is 
their assumption that one’s character is the fundamental cause of our dispositions to act in a 
particular way, taking no account of ‘situational phenomena’.292  From a psychological 
perspective, it is suggested that an agent is behaving in a certain way because of his 
‘conditioned’ reaction to specific situational factors,293 not because of internal character 
traits.  Whilst this argument is based on limited evidence it poses a potential problem for 
character theorists.  The research still provides evidence that character is responsible for 
behaviour, and furthermore, without the underlying character trait being present, it would be 
impossible to determine whether the agent would still have acted in the same way.  
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A distinction has also been made between ‘hidden’ character traits, as in Kingston, for which 
one can be held legitimately responsible, and ‘alien’ character traits which are deserving of 
exculpation as in the case of T.294  It will be recalled that T had taken part in a robbery having 
been raped three days earlier.  She was acquitted on the grounds of non-insane automatism 
because of her disassociated state at the time of the offence.  Had this decision been based on 
any ‘out of character’ defence it would be very difficult in determining in any given case 
whether the court was dealing with a ‘hidden’ trait or an ‘alien’ trait; such a distinction would 
cause exactly the same forensic difficulties that arose in Kingston.  
 
The second possibility is to alternatively argue that having previously managed to 
successfully control his predilections, Kingston had shown  evidence of good character and 
this incident was an example of ‘out of character’ behaviour that should therefore be 
exculpatory.  This second view would accord with the proposition that character theorists 
must acknowledge the interdependency between possession of a particular trait, D’s strength 
or weakness of will and his choices.295  It has been observed that sexual preferences are a 
matter of luck and to require forbearance is ‘to require a great deal’.296  Consequently, where 
someone becomes blamelessly disinhibited and loses self-control when tempted it is not 
obvious that it is in the public interest for him to be punished for a stigmatic offence297 unless 
his conduct was very grave, such as killing and non-consensual penetrative sex.   
 
There are some, like Aristotle, who would dispute whether our character was all a matter of 
luck.  
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Persons who have attained sufficient maturity can, it is argued, by introspection and 
reflection respond to criticism and resolve the tension between first- and second-
order desires.  Values can be strengthened and secured, thereby developing and 
enlarging moral selves.298   
To what extent such exercises can affect our ability to control our sexual preferences is open 
to debate.  It has been suggested that in some circumstances criminal responsibility should be 
subject to a ‘unity of self doctrine’ so that in cases such as Kingston, where there is a 
‘temporary change in the mentality or personality’299 of D as a result of blameless external 
factors which arise outside D’s control, a defence should be possible.300  Lord Mustill 
admitted that there ‘is an instinctive attraction in the proposition that a retributory system of 
justice should not visit penal consequences on acts which are the ultimate consequence of an 
event outside the volition of the actor’301 and that to treat it as purely a matter of mitigation 
was unjust.  In such circumstances this is clearly correct. 
 
2.5.4 A destabilisation defence 
 
A form of character theory could be employed in cases where D is blamelessly destabilised 
by exceptional circumstances to such an extent that he acts in a way that he would not 
otherwise have done.  This would apply to a first or first relevant, offence and would require 
consideration of previous convictions, if any, before a defence of ‘good character’ could be 
raised.302  In other words, ‘good character’ for the purposes of this proposal simply means an 
‘absence of previous relevant convictions or relevant character-based acquittals.’303  In the 
few exceptional cases where such a defence could be raised, as it would not be available for 
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the most heinous wrongdoing,304 punishment could not be justified on either Kantian or 
utilitarian grounds.  For retributivists, punishing those whose crimes were committed as a 
result of circumstances that were not of their own making and where compliance with the law 
was made extremely difficult for them is to ‘punish beyond just deserts, notwithstanding the 
presence of mens rea and the absence of compulsion’305 and from a utilitarian viewpoint 
deterrence would not be achievable because of the requirement for exceptional 
circumstances.  In recognizing such a defence we would be accepting that D is the ‘victim of 
events’ rather than his ‘own psychology, history or context,’ and ‘general morality bids us 
excuse.’306   
 
More recently, the Law Commission rejected any move towards a defence of ‘reduced 
inhibitions or blurred perception of morality’307 in cases of involuntary intoxication.  The 
Commission could not agree to support Sullivan’s proposal to completely negative mens rea 
where D was still to some extent at fault, as with the partial defence of provocation.  Apart 
from public safety demands, it drew attention, as Lord Mustill had already noted, to practical 
difficulties with any such defence, including the fact that it would be an entirely subjective 
test308 as to whether a particular defendant’s inhibitions or ‘moral compass’ were completely 
undermined, a factor that would be difficult for a jury to determine even with the aid of 
expert evidence.  Furthermore, there was concern that the ‘strength of D’s disposition to 
engage in anti-social conduct should not make it easier for D to claim a complete excuse for 
any crime committed in consequence.’309 This final consideration is perhaps the most 
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persuasive as it could open the floodgates to those who possess other morally reprehensible 
dispositions, such as those who are predisposed to violence. 
 
Finally, if such a defence was permitted where D’s inhibitions were caused by an act for 
which he was blameless there would be no grounds for refusing to recognize ‘a general 
character-based excusatory defence for any inherent condition or “irresistible impulse” for 
which D is equally not responsible.’310  The Commissioners considered that extending 
existing defences311 to give them a more general application could be argued for but was 
beyond the scope of their current deliberations.    
 
2.5.5 A broader view of character traits and acting ‘out of character’ 
 
Arenella adopts a ‘motivational’ view of character traits which goes beyond the descriptive 
view that stems from identifying a person’s ‘consistent course of action over time,’ and takes 
a more ‘holistic and integrated’ view of character which ‘referred to the way an individual’s 
relatively consistent and coherent values, emotions, desires and aversions interact with each 
other over time to generate that person’s goals, motivations, and interpretations of his social 
reality.’312  If we apply the first limited conception of character then any act inconsistent with 
the normal pattern of behaviour will be ‘out of character’ whereas if we adopt his second 
broader view, fewer actions will be judged to be ‘out of character’ even when a person has 
never acted in such a way before.  This is because understanding a person’s character allows 
us to identify enduring moral character traits in his future actions.   
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312 P. Arenella, ‘Character, Choice And Moral Agency: The Relevance Of Character To Our Moral Culpability 
Judgments’ (n 39) at 81. 
77 
 
Criminal actions are constitutive of the kinds of character traits and dispositions that should 
concern the criminal law and therefore the actions must be ‘suitably related to the attitudes or 
motives which are aspects of her continuing identity as a person.’  These are ‘the agent’s 
practical attitudes as manifested in and constituted by her criminal actions.’313  Any ‘out of 
character’ behaviour in the relevant sense is neither indicative of the agent’s settled 
dispositions nor does it reveal ‘character’ at all.  Finding criminal actions as constitutive of 
undesirable character traits supports the view that the law should treat citizens as rational and 
responsible agents and seek to guide their conduct by giving them good reasons to comply 
with its requirements.  On this rationale it is necessary to subject them to criminal sanctions 
only where they refuse to act rationally by complying with legal requirements when they 
have the capacity to do so.  
 
2.5.6 Character theory and the mentally disordered 
 
The mentally disordered offender could pose a problem for some character theorists. It has 
been suggested that it would be appropriate to convict a criminal with a severe mental 
disorder because his behaviour demonstrates an undesirable character trait314 and whether he 
lacked the capacity to conform to the law is irrelevant.  It is conceded that treatment rather 
than punishment could be more appropriate if it could correct the undesirable trait.  
Presumably if treatment would not be effective punishment would be the only option on such 
a view.  This notion has been rejected on the basis that it abandons ‘any attempt to justify a 
‘character’ theory of criminal liability: it destroys the distinction …between condemning and 
punishing responsible wrong-doers for their crimes, and diagnosing and treating those who 
are dangerous to themselves or others.’315  A more rational response to the problem of 
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mentally disordered offenders is for the character theorist to recognize that ‘defects of 
character are defects of attitude or motivation’ and a mental disorder does not fall within such 
a definition.  Character in this nomenclature: 
consists in a person’s rational dispositions of thought, feeling, and motivation – those 
which reflect an intelligible conception of reality and value.  It is, though, a defining 
feature of mental disorder that it involves non-rational, or rationally unintelligible, 
patterns of thought, feeling, and motivation.316  
As the mentally disordered individual is incapable of engaging in a critical discussion of his 
conduct or his underlying motives for acting such a person cannot be held morally 
responsible or criminally liable as this is reserved only for rational agents.317  This 
proposition would also seem to suggest that the individual needs to possess the capacity for 
reflection.  Although this argument is persuasive, it must be remembered that the term 
‘mental disorder’ covers a multitude of states of mind,318 for example, ranging from 
psychopathy to depression, and whereas a severely mentally disordered agent might well be 
incapable of rational thought it does not follow that all mentally disordered individuals are so 
afflicted.319  On that basis it is suggested that the proposition needs to be refined somewhat to 
exclude from liability those who are genuinely incapable but to hold accountable those who 
have sufficient capacity.  This would obviously require expert medical evidence to be 
adduced in each case.320 
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2.5.7 Character theory and the capacity for moral responsiveness 
 
Arenella, who extends character traits to include ‘motivational character traits,’321 agrees that 
a capacity for reflection is necessary, but does not restrict his discussion to this capacity 
alone.  He proposes that moral agents need a ‘capacity for moral responsiveness’ which 
presupposes an appreciation of the ‘normative significance of the moral norms governing 
their behaviour,’ coupled with an assumption that they can ‘exercise moral judgment’ to 
apply these norms appropriately.322  This latter ability requires ‘moral motivation: the desire 
to use the applicable moral norm as the basis for acting,’ which can be acted upon ‘despite 
conflicting desires and impulses.’323   
 
In summary, these factors are crystallised down to ‘some modest capacity for critical self-
reflection and self-revision.’324  These moral capacities are acquired and developed through 
social interaction and it has been contended that the ability for character control ‘often 
requires some form of socially created transformational opportunity being made available to 
an individual who has the capacity to take advantage of it.’325  Therefore, it has been argued 
where defendants have experienced life conditions that have made it difficult for them to 
develop into full moral agents, we need to address these conditions and offer the individuals 
transformational opportunities.326    
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There has been some debate about the extent to which it is fair to punish someone who, given 
their poor upbringing and social/environmental background, has broken the law.327  Clearly 
there are some who would show some sympathy towards such defendants,328 whereas others 
would view the absence of such an upbringing and opportunities as irrelevant because 
punishment would still be deserved for bad deeds.329  Aristotle himself considered that the 
importance of a ‘good upbringing’ was essential to the development of a good character330 
and the rejection of bad character traits.  Whilst this may be true to some degree the difficulty 
in permitting such a defence is that it fails to stand up to scrutiny as it is not a cause of 
criminal activity in itself.  Society may have a moral responsibility in failing to address social 
deprivation but that does not equate to an individual lacking personal responsibility for 
wrongdoing331 and further consideration of this is outside the scope of this work.332   
 
2.5.8 Flaws in the character theorists approach 
 
One major criticism advanced by ‘choice’ theorists would be the exclusion of criminal 
liability where the agent acted ‘out of character’.333  The assertion that culpability is grounded 
on bad character traits which are attributable to the ‘settled disposition of the agent’ is seen as 
a major error334  on the part of some character theorists like Lacey.335  This is primarily 
because it would exculpate even the gravest harm intentionally inflicted if D acted 
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335 See text to notes 380-386, below, for Moore’s criticism of Lacey’s view. 
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uncharacteristically.  Rather than seek a settled disposition or trait, character theorists should 
instead hold that the crux of culpability lies in an ‘evaluation of the defendant’s conduct, in 
the circumstances, in the light of an idealised conception of an agent of good character.’336  
Accordingly, culpability could then arise even where D has previously been of scrupulous 
character.   
 
Of course, although this suggestion is a logical means of solving this issue for some character 
theorists, it would need to incorporate some elements of the capacity/choice theory to 
accommodate those who lack the capacity to attain the minimum reasonable standard set by 
this idealised ‘good character.’  Without such an accommodation this view links well with 
Gardner’s337 proposal, discussed below,338 that culpability is determined in light of a person’s 
ability to fulfil their particular role in the way a reasonable person in that role should.  
  
Moore, the leading critic of character theory, has scrutinised the character theorists’ position 
on the relationship between character and actions and concludes that it means:  
 we are excused from responsibility for our actions when those actions do not 
 manifest, express, reveal or indicate bad character; when such actions are not the 
 result of, not determined by, explained by, or are not attributed to bad characters; 
 when such actions are not an exercise of a character defect; or when such actions 
 are not evidentiary of bad character.339   
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2.5.9 Character and action 
 
Moore first questions whether responsibility for character is merely a retrospective analysis 
of past behaviour because if character amounts to nothing more than this it is clearly wrong: 
‘character is not identical to past behaviour although it can be evidenced by it.’340  Nor can he 
accept that character can be determined by dispositions to act in certain ways in the future.  
He rejects the notion that the character theorists’ stance, noted above, describes the logical 
relation between character and actions that are ‘in character’ on the basis that it is ‘too 
behavioural’.341  Considering whether a causal link exists between character and action would 
move away from a purely behavioural focus, but this would be problematic too because 
character traits can be manifested in a variety of ways and not just one.  He gives the example 
of the greedy man who can either demonstrate greedy behaviour or can behave in an overtly 
generous way in an effort to compensate for his greediness.342   
 
2.5.10 The ‘out of character’ problem 
 
Whether an overtly generous person could genuinely be greedy is open to question.  An 
obvious difficulty that arises once an action is labelled as ‘out of character’ and therefore 
subject to exculpation would be in ensuring that it was not the result of a latent character 
defect that was manifesting itself at a suitable opportunity or arising because of a change in 
external circumstances.  An ‘out of character’ defence could lead to the exculpation of 
someone of previous good character who simply yielded to an irresistible temptation.343  How 
can we know whether someone is a person of reasonable firmness, for example, if they have 
never been put to the test?  An apparently honest and trustworthy person may suddenly 
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decide to steal when an opportunity to take an unusually large amount presents itself for the 
first time or when they realise they are in a lot of debt and face a greater temptation than 
before.  It is difficult to insist that such cases would be examples of ‘out of character’ 
behaviour.  It is such concerns that have prompted challenges to the traditional restricted 
view of character theorists and to the submission that there are crucial connections between 
possession of a character trait and how such a trait links in with both the motivational goals 
and desires, and the strength of will of the individual.344 
 
Having rejected the behavioural approach and the causal link discussed above, Moore argues 
that an ‘evidentiary relation’ between character and action is the most appropriate approach. 
 Some act A will evidence some trait C if and only if not only C causes A, but also 
 states of type C typically cause events of type A.  Effects are evidence of causes 
 only where there is some general connection between the class of events that 
 includes the effect and the class of events that includes the cause.345 
 
Moore uses this ‘evidentiary relation’ to try to identify a distinction between a person’s 
character and his choices to differentiate between the two leading theories of culpability. He 
concludes that the character is not just another way of referring to choice as: 
 [a]ny action evidences the possession of a will, because a will can typically will 
 anything and still be a will.  But ...while a character can cause any action, to be 
 possessed of a character precludes the possibility that one’s character can 
 typically cause any class of actions equally well.  Characters, to be characters,  
can  only typically cause some classes of actions, but not others.’346 
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At first sight this argument seems to be correct because otherwise how would any class of 
action be indicative of a character trait?  The difficulty lies with Moore’s own example of the 
character Bulstrode.347  If a greedy person can hide his greedy disposition by being overtly 
generous to others then surely to be ‘possessed of a character’ does not preclude acting 
contrary to it if we so wish.  
 
The criminal actions that the character theorist would excuse for being ‘out of character’ are 
precisely the same kind of actions that the ‘choice’ theorists would exclude on the basis that 
that they were not ‘freely chosen’.348  There are similar problems for the character theorist 
with the defence of mistake as there are with the ‘choice’ theory, namely that as long as the 
mistake blocks any inference of a bad character trait it should be irrelevant that the mistaken 
belief is unreasonable.  The only way character theorists could catch the unreasonable 
mistake-maker would be if there was a lesser offence of negligence as to make an 
unreasonable mistake could be sufficient to infer the undesirable character trait of failing to 
take reasonable care.  
 
2.5.11 What is ‘character’? 
 
There have been difficulties in determining exactly what “our character” should include.  
Drawing on the work of Freud and Watson, Moore examines how we constitute our sense of 
self ‘through owning up to, or disowning various emotions, desires or behaviours.  The 
phenomenological sense of the id is of the “not-me”, the ego-alien emotions, thoughts 
etc.,’349 that we may suppress into our subconscious.  Moore cites Freud’s view that the ego-
alien represents our ‘instinctual desires and emotions’ and Watson’s proposition that our 
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sense of self exists in the ‘reflective, evaluative self that picks and chooses which of the 
desires, emotions, thoughts, etc. are worth being considered part of the self.’350 
 
If this research into the phenomenology of character is accepted, does character include only 
the part of us that we identify as ‘self’ or the broader view encompassing other elements like 
our instinctual desires?  If the broader view of character and choosing are taken, then both 
choice and character theorists can equally ground culpability where D states that his wrongful 
action stems from strong emotions.351  Similarly, if this broader view of character is adopted, 
it would be difficult if not impossible to suggest that D’s action was out of character.  Plato 
referred to this as the ‘appetite’ or ‘spirited part of us’ and St Paul called this the “sin that has 
its lodgings in us” [Romans 7:14-20] which subsumes/overrides the part of us that directs 
moral action.352  It has been proposed that when this has occurred it would be unfair to punish 
as we do not choose the part of us that is the “bad part” that overrides the “good part” of us 
when we act immorally.353  Yet this argument cannot prevail because in the majority of 
instances we do possess the capacity to control our instincts and desires even though we may 
choose to give in to them knowing that we are doing wrong. 
 
It has also been suggested that if a person knowingly acts immorally and is ‘genuinely 
indifferent to the authority of moral imperatives’ then such imperatives do not apply to that 
person, ‘she is outside their scope and hence does nothing wrong...,’ such a person is ‘amoral’ 
rather than immoral and moral blame would be unjustified.354  However, just because 
someone is ‘indifferent’ to moral imperatives does not necessarily mean that they do not 
apply to them.  If such a person is incapable of moral responsiveness then perhaps such an 
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attempt at excusing them is correct, providing an alternative to punishment was available.  
Certainly, if someone has this capacity but simply chooses to pursue their own desires in the 
full knowledge that they are breaching society’s moral norms then blame is fully justified.  
The contrary view is that all that is necessary to hold someone criminally responsible is that 
they have ‘a basic conception of human value;’ it is not necessary that the individual agrees 
with society’s conception of this value or that they have ‘feelings for others.’355   
 
2.5.12 The extent of responsibility for our characters 
 
If ‘character’ is simply another way of describing our ‘choosing agency’ then there is really 
only one theory, choice 356 unless there is a ‘metaphysical difference between character and 
will.’  Whilst not denying that in some sense we are responsible for our characters there is 
‘room for disagreement as to exactly how and in what sense.’357    Pillsbury358 identifies three 
different approaches to character theory, the first being ‘a causal model’ that ‘tries to 
distinguish between those aspects of character caused by unchosen influence,’ which should 
be excused, leaving only those that are attributable to the individual as attracting blame and  
punishment.   Although seemingly an attractive proposition, it fails because it would 
eliminate choice entirely as all action is causally linked.  The second approach, his 
‘representative action model’, is where culpability is linked to D’s ‘enduring moral character’ 
and here punishment is for wrongful action which demonstrates possession of a bad character 
trait.  It is not only the act that is being punished here, but the person ‘revealed by the 
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action.’359  There is a lack of a clear definition from character theorists as to what counts as 
an ‘enduring character trait’ limiting the effectiveness of this view.   
 
The third approach Pillsbury terms the ‘moral capacity model’ and on this view a 
precondition of moral responsibility requires more than simply chosen action.  It requires 
‘certain moral-emotional capacities’, including ‘the ability to empathize,’360 a prerequisite for 
Arenella.  Such an approach could raise serious public protection issues if wrongdoers 
lacking such a capacity are excused.  How is such moral capacity determined?   It is generally 
judged by one’s deeds, but it also encompasses moral potential and that we ‘must resist the 
conclusion that a person who never has done better, also could not do better.’361  The 
difficulty in determining moral capacity, the problem that this capacity model opposes 
commitment to choice theory, and finally the fact that such a stance ‘mandates’ that D must 
have the ‘ability to want to do good’ causes Pillsbury to refute it.362  
 
Moore considers two possibilities as to how we could be deemed responsible for our 
characters: the first is that we have chosen to become what we are, but if this is correct it 
collapses into choice as its foundation.  The second option is that we are responsible for our 
characters because ‘we are (at least in part) our characters.’363  For Moore, although 
Aristotle364 advanced the first view, there are two reasons to doubt it.  The first is whether we 
actually have much of a capacity to mould our characters; and then perhaps more 
fundamentally, ‘who is the “he” who is choosing character?  Does he himself have any 
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character, and, if so, was it chosen too?’365  This is a problem for character theorists, which 
‘invites an infinite regress.’366 
 
Must a person already possess some character before he can start this selection process to 
build the character he wants to become?  Do we acquire some through early experiences and 
then at some point afterwards start to make choices?  Moore addresses such questions using 
what he terms the weak Aristotelian view – initial character formation is something we have 
little or no control over, responsibility comes from ‘our later choices to maintain these 
already formed traits.’367  He accepts there is some merit in this argument but he does not 
believe that it can account for all our attributes that can be subject to moral judgement giving 
emotions as an example.  We cannot will our emotions ‘into or out of being,’ despite this ‘we 
still hold people responsible for their emotional makeup’.368  Despite holding people morally 
responsible for their emotional makeup we expect people to control any morally 
reprehensible emotions and not act on them.  It is only when they fail to exercise reasonable 
control and commit a proscribed wrong that we hold them criminally responsible. 
 
Because of this problem Moore believes that it is the second possibility that reflects 
responsibility for character – ‘that we are, in part, constituted by our characters.’369  We do 
not choose to become or remain who we are in the same way that we choose and are 
responsible for acting in a certain way, yet responsibility for characters stems from ‘a kind of 
aesthetic morality that governs our assessment of character’ as character judgments have 
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‘moral overtones’ and we shun and disadvantage those with bad characters.370  To ‘the extent 
that such persons did not choose their character, they are …morally unlucky.’371 
 
2.5.13 Moore’s critique of five claims advanced by character theorists 
 
The first claim,372 that preventative aims of punishment can only be justified when 
individuals have shown a bad character because others are not dangerous and punishment 
could not act as a deterrent, is dismissed by Moore because it cannot show when someone is 
morally innocent.  The second claim,373 that character theory fits in well with the current 
practice in American law he rejects because it does not show which theory the law should 
recognize.  The third claim374 is that character theory can cope with the hard determinist 
view, difficult for choice theorists, if we support the argument that we are responsible for our 
characters ‘because we are our characters.’375  The fourth376 is that character theory best 
represents society’s blaming practices as it focuses on a more holistic view of the sort of 
person D is, whereas choice theory is limited to an examination of capacity and opportunity 
at the moment D acts.  Moore argues that this still fails to explain why one theory is better 
than the other.377  The final claim for character theorists that Moore raises is Fletcher’s view 
that ‘[a]n inference from the wrongful act to the actor’s character is essential to a retributive 
theory of punishment.’378  As punishment is linked to desert ‘the desert of the offender is 
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gauged by his character’ so that ‘judgment about character is essential to the just distribution 
of punishment.’379 
 
It is Lacey’s defence of this stance that Moore then attacks.  He examines her claim that it is 
morally ‘unfair to hold people responsible for actions which are out of character [but] fair to 
hold them so for actions in which their central dispositions are centrally expressed.’380  He 
then tests this rationale by devising the following two examples:  
(1)an actor freely chooses to do wrong (i.e., he had the capacity and a fair 
opportunity not to so choose), and yet the action is “out of character” for that actor; 
(2) an actor’s behavior is good evidence for a settled disposition (character) of a bad 
kind, and yet he has not (yet) chosen to act on that disposition.381    
 
If Lacey is right, Moore argues, we ought to find it fair to punish the second but not the 
first.382  Such a result would be obviously wrong.  The problem with “out of character” 
excuses, as in the first example, has been discussed earlier.  In relation to (2) if we examine 
Lacey’s claim more closely she is clearly requiring a wrongful act and not punishment for 
bad character per se.   Also, if an actor’s behaviour is truly to be taken as evidence of his bad 
character, are we to assume his lack of action in line with his bad character is simply down to 
a lack of opportunity to do so, or is it in the alternative, evidence of a good character in trying 
successfully to resist acting wrongfully?  
 
Moore also takes issue with Lacey because she holds that “bad character” means ‘a settled 
hostility to, rejection of, or indifference to the values of the community that the criminal law 
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seeks to protect and foster.’383  It is not clear why, for some character theorists, bad character 
traits require proof of a continuing bad attitude384 but this is not the concern here.  He quotes 
Lacey’s statement that the criminal law should ‘treat seriously the individuality and sense of 
identity of each person by responding punitively only to actions which are genuinely 
expressive of the actor’s relevant disposition: with which the agent truly identifies, and can 
call her own.’385  On his interpretation this means that ‘we are only our character’ which has 
two ‘startling implications.’  The first is that as our character develops and changes we would 
become a different person; the second, that a multiple-personalitied person would actually be 
‘many persons with one character each’386 rather than just one individual.  In consequence he 
dismisses the notion that character is equivalent to identity.   
 
This argument has merit but perhaps all Lacey is suggesting is that before punishment can be 
justified, both a person’s character and his identity need to be taken into account.  Our 
characters show the ‘kind of person’ we are but our identity also considers ‘who we are’ and 
gives an insight into how we have become the person we are now.  Such a view would 
incorporate the weak Aristotelian view, as our identity would include factors such as our 
socio-economic background, education, IQ/ capacity and our ability to be morally responsive, 
etc., and in consequence if D could not have helped becoming what he has become then 
punishment for crime is perhaps only appropriate where serious harm has been caused. 
 
Moore admits that we have an ‘aesthetic’ kind of responsibility for ‘unchosen’ aspects of our 
character but such aspects do not warrant punishment because ‘we could not have avoided 
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possessing these aspects of ourselves.’387  Consequently, choice theory is the preferred theory 
of excuse because it only ‘excuses where there is no choice, no matter how much bad 
character may be exhibited’ and does not ‘excuse where there is free choice, however much 
out of character it may be’.388   
 
A choice theorist would argue that the criminal law does not punish people for having a ‘bad 
character’ but it does punish those with ‘good characters’ who act in a bad way, thus choice 
theory is the correct blaming practice.  The choice theorists’ suggestion that only those 
showing objectionable character traits can be punished if character theory is employed could 
be rejected on the basis that negligent behaviour can also be encompassed either because D 
was ‘careless and inattentive’ as a person or because D failed to ‘exercise their character 
strengths because of a momentary distraction.’389  Whilst it may seem appropriate to hold 
someone criminally liable for harm caused in circumstances where an individual is ‘careless 
and inattentive’ because they are indifferent to the welfare of those around them,390 it is hard 
to justify criminal responsibility where someone has been momentarily distracted simply 
because it can happen to us all. 
 
2.5.14 Liability for negligence 
 
Choice theorists struggle with liability for negligence but have argued that character theorists 
have difficulty too, which is a weak argument for promoting the supremacy of choice 
theory.391   Even though we may punish one negligent act, such an isolated action does not 
signify that we are often careless, a bad character trait.  When Lacey suggests that a 
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consistently negligent actor demonstrates an attitude of indifference392 this is not necessarily 
the case for all those who would fit this description, which could equally be attributable to 
‘awkwardness and stupidity.’393  Moore proposes that criminal liability for negligence can 
only be justified on utilitarian rather than moral grounds, as it cannot be founded upon 
culpable choice unless it could be universally applied to all negligent actors.  Similarly, 
character theory fails because it too cannot always apply universally even though it often can 
identify inferences of bad character where moral excuse fails.394  This is true to the extent that 
character and choice theories alone cannot underpin criminal negligence, but the utilitarian 
justification is also weak. 
 
2.5.15 Mens Rea and Character Theory 
 
It has been suggested that the distinctions between the various forms of mens rea are 
grounded in degrees of dangerousness rather than reflective of any particular mental 
element395 but Bayles396 has refuted this proposition, arguing that they are each indicative of 
the agent’s attitude towards harm occurring, reflecting different degrees of bad character 
traits.  He attempts to differentiate between certain mens rea terms based upon the different 
degrees of risk involved in such behaviour and links these mental states to different attitudes 
towards harm, proposing that more blame is deserved the more undesirable the attitude 
inferred.397  He lists ‘purposefully,’ ‘knowingly’ and ‘recklessly’ as comparators and suggests 
that the agent who acts ‘purposefully’ shows the worst attitude as he positively desires the 
harm to occur.  Is the ‘purposeful’ actor really showing the worst possible attitude as Bayles 
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suggests?  True, such an actor desires the harm to occur to a particular person but he will 
generally have a specific reason for his action, such as a sense of being wronged by that 
person.   
 
This assertion that recklessness portrays evidence of a less undesirable character trait than 
intentional acts has been questioned.398  Bayles observes that harm could be intended without 
any confidence in the agent’s actions being successful.  Where harm is intended the agent is 
likely to try again making him more dangerous.  An alternative view is that as the agent with 
intention is acting for a reason his level of dangerousness would depend on how often he is 
likely to have that reason for acting.  With the reckless agent, he is willing to cause harm for 
no reason at all, other than that he wants to pursue another goal.  As a result it is difficult to 
see how the intentional agent is demonstrating a worse undesirable character trait that the 
reckless agent.  A reckless action does not demonstrate a willingness to act in a way that is 
sure to cause harm, just a willingness to take the risk that the foreseen harm might occur.399  
Having said this it must be recognised that in general terms the intentional actor would 
usually be deemed to be the worse character of the two and the most dangerous, even though 
this may not always be the case.   It could also be said that harm is more likely to result when 
it is actually intended.400  There can be some fine distinctions drawn between the degrees of 
probability of harm occurring, an issue to be discussed later in chapter three which examines 
the development of the concept of oblique intention using the language of recklessness. 
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For Bayles,401 the ‘knowing’ actor displays a slightly less undesirable attitude  than the 
‘purposeful’ actor as he is almost certain that harm will occur but he does not necessarily 
desire it and the ‘reckless’ actor is less reprehensible still because ‘he will usually try to avoid 
harm whereas the defendant who knowingly causes harm, simply not caring, will not.’402  
Unfortunately, he does not make any attempt at defining the terms ‘knowingly’ or 
‘recklessly’ which makes it difficult to determine any distinction between these two states of 
mind.  Is the ‘knowing’ actor a person who could be deemed to be acting with oblique 
intention?  If recklessness is considered in its purely subjective sense then the actor knows of 
the risk and goes on to take it; this would seem to place him in the category of a ‘knowing’ 
actor.  If recklessness is approached from a purely objective standpoint the actor does not 
know of the risk (at least in the sense of conscious advertence) but could not, in consequence, 
possibly try to avoid it. 
 
There are three responses to the debate as to whether mens rea reflects levels of 
dangerousness or degrees of bad character.  There are those who would dispute Gross’ claim 
that mens rea terms necessarily reflect dangerousness as the intentional actor may be less 
dangerous than the reckless person;403 at least the intentional actor will have a reason for 
desiring harm in a particular instance and perhaps only in a particular instance.  The reckless 
actor could potentially be more dangerous as he may expose more people to harm, more 
frequently.  The second contention is that Bayles makes too much of a generalisation by 
suggesting that reckless people usually try to avoid harm and the third response is that like 
those who act knowingly, the reckless actor can also simply not care, being indifferent to the 
needs of others.404   
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There has been support of  Bayles’ attempt to identify the link between mens rea and 
character because if crimes reveal bad character traits, which are correctable, it is helpful to 
know what D’s mental state was to determine what treatment should be provided to help D to 
correct his character in the most socially beneficial way.405  A sole examination of D’s mental 
state at the time of the actus reus would be retributive and perhaps too restrictive, the entire 
circumstances could be scrutinised to determine whether the act is truly indicative of a 
character flaw.406  
2.6 Choice or character theory as a sufficient basis for criminal liability 
 
Neither of these theories of culpability, including others discussed below, can adequately 
explain the criminal law’s determination of culpability to the exclusion of all other theories, 
possibly because the law is as much the product of the ‘shared history of cultural-moral 
evolution,’407 as it is of moral theory.408  It is also clear from the discussion above that there is 
a fair amount of congruence between the theories, each to some extent relying on the other.  
We are morally responsible both for who we are and the choices we make.409   Moreover the 
minimum standard of behaviour the criminal law demands does not accommodate an 
individual’s personal characteristics or the context within which he acts.410  The criminal law 
should recognize and make allowances for the cognitive capacity of the individual defendant.   
 
Even though we might not be morally blameworthy for external factors beyond our control 
that may make us more susceptible to break the law, such as poor upbringing and 
environmental pressures, these factors can only offer an explanation for our wrongdoing, not 
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excuse it.  Compassion for such individuals is not incompatible with blame and criminal 
liability, ‘over-excusing can have a morally and psychologically undesirable effect on 
wrongdoers.’411  This is because it sends the wrong moral message to offenders.  It is also 
psychologically desirable to encourage the feelings of guilt and remorse as they are evidence 
of the recognition that D has breached society’s values, he blames himself, accepts 
responsibility and connects to our moral values.  It is by feeling the pain of guilt and remorse 
that D can decide to change his behaviour and become a better person.412  Punishment allows 
him to pay his debt to society and alleviate some of the guilt felt.  Excusing him is saying he 
is not morally responsible for what he has done, undermines this ‘regenerative process’ and 
can sometimes be seen as shifting the blame onto others, or even the victim.413 
 
The ‘character’ theory advances the preferred approach as to who can be held criminally 
liable, i.e. moral agents who exhibit antisocial and undesirable character traits, reminding us 
that actions can be judged as criminally wrong because of the bad attitudes that they reveal, 
as well as bad choices that have been made.  This theory suggests that offenders are liable for 
what they are rather than for what they do.  It has been advanced that it is more the character 
of our actions that is the focus of the criminal law rather than an agent’s character per se.414  
There is also a risk that where D is known to possess a ‘bad’ character he may be denied a 
legitimate excuse because we may not believe him and a ‘good’ person may convince a court 
that he is entitled to an excuse when there is little evidence to support his claim.415  The 
‘choice’ theory, on the other hand, identifies in a preferred way what we should be liable for, 
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but it does this by reference to our ‘choices’ and fails to accept the integral relationship 
between our character and our choices.   
 
The law’s concern is with the character of our actions, not in ‘character’ as distinct from 
action.416  This is the extent to which character traits, or virtues and vices are relevant.  That 
is why it is submitted here that the focus is on the character of our actions to the extent that 
they reflect our character.  Responsibility for actions stems from D’s free choice because it is 
only under such circumstances that it can reflect badly on his character.417  It is clear that 
ignoring the link between character and choice weakens the choice theorists’ stance and 
results in a failure of that theory to justify moral culpability.418  Neither theory sits happily 
with negligence nor can they cope with spontaneous and instinctive reactions where on the 
one hand there is no choice and on the other, there is no evidence of ‘bad’ character. 
 
2.7 Alternative theories: 
2.7.1 The ‘role’ theory of culpability 
 
Gardner419 dismisses the traditional views of both choice and character theorists, judging 
them both to be flawed, and instead grounds culpability and responsibility on a role basis.  In 
his dismissal of character theory, he argues that the actions of D are not merely evidence of 
D’s character but rather constitute it.  Therefore if D acts ‘out of character’ it can only be a 
mitigating factor.  Similarly he opposes choice theory which he finds inextricably linked to 
character theory: 
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the capacity that D has to act virtuously at t is also no more and no less than the 
virtue that D has at time t.  And this is because one cannot have the capacity 
associated with a particular virtue whilst at the same time lacking the tendency to be 
virtuous.420 
 
Possession of a good character trait is not equivalent to always behaving virtuously in 
accordance with it.421   Rather, our behaviour at any given time will be determined not only 
by whether or not we possess a particular virtue but also on our other ‘motivations and goals.’  
This view seems to support the proposition that strength of will and other goals are 
important.422  Even if Gardner accepted a distinction between character and choice theories 
he would still find no ground for exculpation because a ‘lack of capacity to behave with a 
good character provides no excuse at all’.423  Surely the question here does not concern a lack 
of capacity to behave virtuously, rather a lack of the strength of will to do so?   
 
On Gardner’s424 model, responsibility only lies where we are fulfilling a role, for example a 
specific role like doctor, police officer, teacher, parent; or a non-specific role i.e. a human 
being, and we fall below an idealised standard of a reasonable person in the role we are 
fulfilling.  All roles have standards of character, skills and knowledge attached to them and D 
should only be excused if his conduct fell within the boundaries of reasonableness for 
someone in that role.  It is irrelevant whether we have the capacity to achieve this idealised 
standard; a person’s capacity to do better is immaterial.   
 
                                            
420 J. Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ (n 53) at 583. 
421 V. Tadros, ‘The Characters of Excuse’ (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 495. 
422 See Hudson’s example of the Pliable Dodger who would normally act virtuously but on one occasion does 
not because he lacks the strength of will, for Aristotle such a person would be incontinent, i.e. weak-willed, S. 
Hudson, ‘Character Traits and Desires’ (n 227)at 548. 
423 J. Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ (n 53) at 583; V. Tadros, ‘The Characters of Excuse’ (n 421) at 496. 
424 J. Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ (n 53) at 593-596. 
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Gardner’s model fits well with liability for negligence and for non-advertent recklessness (as 
per Caldwell recklessness which covered both subjective and objective tests within its 
scope)425 and yet it will have difficulty with advertent recklessness because where it could not 
be proved that D foresaw the risk of harm occurring he would have to be acquitted, even if a 
reasonable person would have foreseen the risk.  Thus Gardner supports a stricter, more 
Aristotelian view of character theory.426  Yet currently the criminal law does acknowledge 
either a lack of responsibility or alternatively, for exculpation on capacity grounds.  For 
example, defences like insanity and diminished responsibility operate in this way.  A lack of 
responsibility applies in relation to status as in infancy.  Furthermore, capacity can be 
relevant in establishing the requisite mental element as was shown in Sheppard427 where the 
mens rea of the offence specified, ‘wilful neglect,’ becomes impossible to prove where D 
lacks the mental capacity to realise the harm being incurred. 
 
Other factors preventing the ‘role’ theory of culpability having a universal application are 
that it cannot adequately accommodate the defences of provocation,428 duress and involuntary 
intoxication, even though the first two incorporate elements of reasonableness.429  
Provocation becomes difficult because even if getting angry was justified it can never be 
reasonable to kill in such circumstances.  In involuntary intoxication, there is no standard of 
the reasonably intoxicated man for comparative purposes.  This would not help a defendant 
like Kingston, and furthermore such a person could only be compared with a reasonable 
human being, not a person with Kingston’s predilections.  To adequately allow for these three 
                                            
425 See Chapter 3, below. 
426 J. Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ (n 53); Offences and Defences Selected Essays in the Philosophy of 
Criminal Law (n 37) Chapter 6. 
427 [1980] 3 All ER 899 where parents failed to summon medical help and their child died.  Lord Diplock held 
the parents were not ‘wilful’ if they had neither thought their child was at risk unless examined by a doctor nor 
being unaware of the risk they refrained from seeking assistance because they did not care whether the child 
needed treatment or not. 
428 Now the defence of ‘loss of control’. 
429 V. Tadros, ‘The Characters of Excuse’ (n 421) at 499-502. 
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defences it has been argued that we need to rely on character and choice theories instead.  
This is because some part of our character is dependent on the reasons that motivate us and 
the reasons to which we are indifferent, and following Sullivan’s destabilisation defence 
proposal, this could affect D’s ability to practically reason, to control himself, or ‘an 
alteration in his motivations ...the reasons that motivate his actions.’430 
 
Accordingly, the defences of provocation and involuntary intoxication can only properly be 
grounded, not on Gardner’s rationale, but on the basis that D’s loss of control shows that he is 
no longer responsive to the guiding reasons that normally motivate him to act or refrain from 
acting, an argument founded in character theory.   Alternatively, on a capacity view, D is 
exculpated because he could not have behaved any better than he did in the circumstances.  
Using duress as an example, where D is overwhelmed by fear and submits to the threat, 
Gardner would state that D’s claim to be cowardly would not be a reason for excusing him of 
any wrongdoing but an admission of fault on D’s part.  In rebutting Gardner’s claim that 
there is no distinction between D’s character and the character of D’s action at time t, it has 
rightly been argued that D can possess a virtue without mechanically acting in accordance 
with it on every occasion.431 
 
In the Aristotelian tradition, Gardner432 would state that if D is courageous he would see life 
through the courageous person’s eyes, viewing danger as a challenge and not as the threat 
that more cowardly people would perceive it to be.  In consequence D cannot have the virtue 
of courage if he does not act courageously or if he has to overcome the inclination to act as a 
coward.  Such a viewpoint would leave no room for the true hero, D, who foresees the threat 
and may well be afraid but chooses to act courageously nonetheless.  It could be argued that 
                                            
430 Ibid. at 504. 
431 Ibid. at 496 and 502-503; J. Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ (n 53) at 583. 
432 Ibid. at 582; V. Tadros, ‘The Characters of Excuse’ (n 421) at 511. 
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such an actor is truly courageous whereas Gardner’s courageous person is one who may be 
acting without courage, acting impulsively perhaps.  It could even been said that Aristotle and 
Gardner’s heroes lack imagination.  Courage suggests bravery – can D be brave if he only 
sees the danger as a challenge rather than a threat?  This aside, being courageous surely 
depends upon the circumstances and whether the reasons to act or refrain from acting are 
sufficiently strong in that instance. 
 
If account was taken of capacity, D could be allowed a defence even where he would fail to 
meet the standard of the reasonable person for the defence of duress because he is overly 
fearful.  This would not be applicable where D’s conduct showed a lack of respect for the 
criminal law but this would make it necessary to be able to distinguish between a defendant 
who ‘simply succumbs to fear’433 and the person who could not possibly have acted in any 
other way because of his fear.  This would not be an easy distinction to make but that is not to 
say it is not possible to do so.  A defence of choice theory in this regard seems to follow 
Hampton’s434 defiance theory principles, discussed above.435   
 
It would, however, be possible to draw on character theory and Gardner’s ‘role’ theory to 
present a composite of the two that would ground culpability based on moral desert.  This 
could be achieved by subjectivising Gardner’s theory to take account of the capacity of D.  In 
this way D could be judged not on the basis of whether he was acting in or ‘out of character,’ 
but on whether on the particular occasion in question, in performing whatever role, the 
character of his conduct was morally blameworthy.  It is this synthesis of the two theories 
that is advocated in this work and which forms the basis of the limits of criminal recklessness 
and negligence advanced in Chapters Three and Four.  
                                            
433 V. Tadros, ‘The Characters of Excuse’ (n 421) at 514. 
434 J. Hampton, ‘Mens Rea’ (n 59). 
435 Text to notes 59 -61, above, at 2.2.1. 
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2.7.2 The manifestation of vices 
 
In contrast with the view that the criminal law is concerned with judgements about D’s 
fitness for a particular role, for Tadros it is also concerned with D’s manifestation of certain 
vices, those that cause D to be ‘insufficiently motivated to act or not to act by the interests of 
others.’436  Carelessness should only be included where D demonstrates insufficient regard 
for the risk that D’s activity might cause to others to take proper care, particularly where the 
activity is a risky one.  Any vices which do not show a lack of regard for the interests of 
others should not be the concern of the criminal law and ‘merely having a vice, or displaying 
a lack of skill does not show this in itself.’437  This is because criminal liability represents the 
State’s condemnation which is only appropriate where D’s vices cause harm and demonstrate 
a lack of concern for the interests of others.  Where D lacks capacity these criteria are not 
met.  In relation to Kingston,438 D should be offered at the very least a partial excuse, either 
on the basis that his character had been destabilised or because his motivational reasons for 
acting or not acting had been altered by the intoxicants. 
 
2.7.3 Aristotle’s virtues and vices 
 
Aristotle439 distinguished between four possible states of character: the truly virtuous, the 
self-controlled (or ‘continent’), the weak-willed (or ‘incontinent’), and the vicious.  It is clear 
that such distinctions cannot be successfully employed within the modern criminal law 
simply because there would be no reliable way of distinguishing between the classes, 
particularly between the virtuous and the self-controlled, and the weak-willed and the 
                                            
436 V. Tadros, ‘The Characters of Excuse’ (n 421) at 517. 
437 Ibid. 
438 [1994] QB 81; [1995] 2 AC 355. 
439 Aristotle, ‘Nichomachean Ethics’ (n 219). 
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vicious.440  It could be impossible to determine whether someone was manifesting a vice on a 
specific occasion or simply succumbed to temptation.  As it is not possible to get inside 
someone else’s mind we could not be certain whether an agent was truly virtuous by 
Aristotle’s criteria441 or simply exercising his self-control to remain law abiding.  To 
undertake such a task would involve examining ‘not just his behavioural dispositions to act 
rightly or wrongly, nor just his deliberative dispositions –the kinds of reasons by which his 
actions are guided: we must examine his emotive and appetitive dispositions too, the patterns 
of feeling and desire which help to constitute his character.’442  This would be too intrusive 
an inquiry and also unnecessary as the law is not concerned with whether someone is vicious 
or weak willed, neither does the law demand true virtue –self-control is quite sufficient.443  It 
is only in certain situations when some of the criminal defences are called upon that vice can 
be a condition of liability, for reliance on the defences of provocation, duress and self-
defence.  In these instances, we are determining whether D’s action was ‘reasonable’ or not 
rather than judging his character or whether he possesses a virtue or vice.  This also avoids 
argument over which of D’s characteristics are attributed to the ‘reasonable person.’444 
 
2.7.4 ‘Agency’ Theory 
 
Another possibility has been proposed, ‘agency’ theory,445  where what is being judged is  
not ‘character’ but ‘conduct… by reference to its relative (lack of) success.’446  This theory 
links better with degrees of mens rea and allows us to rank harms.  Starting with the 
paradigm of successful agency, i.e. when harm is intentionally caused in the way intended, an 
                                            
440 R.A. Duff, ‘Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an Aristotelian Criminal Law’ (n 414). 
441 Text to note 432, above. 
442 R.A Duff, ‘Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an Aristotelian Criminal Law’ (n 414) at 165. 
443 Ibid. at 168. 
444 Ibid. at 179. 
445 J. Horder, ‘Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory’ (n 129) attributes the inspiration for 
this theory to the work of Antony Duff, ‘Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) 
Chapter 5. 
446 Ibid. Horder, at 210. 
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evaluation of D’s conduct depends on how close it comes to hitting this target directly, like 
the target in archery.  An attempt to cause the same harm that was unsuccessful would form a 
concentric circle close to the circle of the paradigm as would intentional harm not caused in 
the intended way.  Concentric circles further away from the centre would include 
endangerment and the ‘lower the risk of harm posed by the particular conduct, the further 
distance’ away it would be.447  This would leave negligence the outermost ring.  In this 
manner ‘the way in which the victim is harmed, or subjected to the risk of harm, shapes 
culpability.’448  It would not be helpful to a defendant like Kingston as a drugged intent is still 
an intent and would fall within its paradigm of successful agency. 
 
Even ‘agency’ theory cannot stand alone as it relies on the presumption that ‘agency’ means 
‘sane, mature agency’ and is thus dependent on capacity or character theory to justify the 
exculpation of the young and the insane.449  With its focus on the way harm is brought about, 
it disregards D’s reasons for acting which are important when seeking to rely on the defence 
of duress, for example, and would again need supplementing by one of the other theories.  
The theory does not address the situation where the resultant harm exceeds that envisaged by 
the defendant, e.g. the one throw punch that kills.  Such circumstances can still be 
encompassed by the choice theory on the basis that D chose to cause some harm, and by the 
character theory because it shows aggression. 
 
  
                                            
447 Ibid. at 212. 
448 Ibid. at 213. 
449 Ibid. at 214. 
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2.7.5 A ‘first-person’ approach to culpability 
 
There has been the suggestion that responsibility is not dependent on choice, rather we should 
be responsible only where we ‘feel responsible, irrespective of choice.’450  If distinctions are 
made between the concept of guilt as a legal concept and as a feeling, it is accepting the 
‘third-person concept’ as correct: if the law says you are guilty then you are, no matter what 
you feel.  On an alternative first-person approach, legal guilt would correspond with the 
feelings of guilt: if you really feel that you are not responsible then the law should not find 
otherwise, and vice versa.  From a practical stance, where D feels responsible even if the 
current law would find he was not so, there would have to be systems in place to help D 
accept his responsibility and work through the consequences of it.451  Where D feels he bears 
no responsibility, even where a court feels that he should, he must accept that his sense of 
responsibility falls to be considered ‘alongside the first-person sense of responsibility of the 
judge and jury and all others concerned,’452 so it would seem that a false claim or indeed, any 
claim, could be overruled by the other participants in the legal process.  It is difficult to see 
how the first-person approach could work in practice.  It could end up criminalising the 
wrong people, those who feel responsible when they are without fault, and how could we 
know, beyond reasonable doubt, what a defendant was actually feeling and if a lack of feeling 
could be supplanted by the court’s view what would be the point?   It is submitted here that 
such a proposition is unworkable. 
 
It is apparent that there is no single theory of culpability or excuse that can universally apply 
to all of the main mens rea terms and circumstances, as has been observed.453  Our choices, 
                                            
450 A. Freeman, ‘Responsibility Without Choice A First-Person Approach’ (2000) 7 Journal of Conscious 
Studies 61. 
451 Ibid. at 65. 
452 Ibid. at 66. 
453 V. Tadros, ‘The Characters of Excuse’ (n 421); and J. Horder, ‘Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a 
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character and the role we are fulfilling are all relevant factors in currently determining 
criminal liability but they are not an exhaustive list of considerations.  Furthermore, it is not 
simply a matter of establishing culpability in these terms but a matter of proving that D had 
the mental element proscribed by the particular criminal offence with which he is charged.  It 
is for this reason that the requirement of mens rea must now be reconsidered. 
 
2.8 Mens Rea - The relationship between mens rea and culpability 
 
So what is the relationship between mens rea and culpability?  It would appear from the 
above that degrees of mens rea do not equate necessarily to the level of culpability, rather 
mens rea is only one facet to determining blameworthiness.  The fact that D may have 
possessed the requisite mens rea will not necessarily equate with a conviction as he may have 
a defence.  Furthermore, mens rea has other functions too.  For example, stipulating a 
particular mental state requirement for an offence may actually increase or reduce the ambit 
of the offence.  From the standpoint of the mental element of the defendant and culpability, 
the latter is also influenced by other factors that feature in the criminal justice system which 
include the degree of harm caused, how the harm was brought about, the identity of the 
victim(s), whether it was a first offence, the capacity of D and other mitigating 
circumstances.  Such factors are relevant to sentencing rather than establishing that D is 
criminally liable.  Moreover there are procedural matters such as the burden of proof, 
admissibility of evidence etc. that cause practical difficulties in the trial process, factors that 
played a crucial role in the Law Commission’s deliberations when deciding not to 
recommend a change to the law on involuntary intoxication.  Gardner and Jung454 have 
argued that culpability principles or mentes reae must be sensitive to such procedural issues 
                                                                                                                                       
 
454 J. Gardner and H. Jung, ‘Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony Duff’s Account’ (n 78) at 583. 
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whereas moral culpability distinctions need not be.  For them, mentes reae comprise a 
‘number of heterogeneous elements without any common core’455 but this is challenged on 
the ground that there are common concepts central to a theoretical examination of mental 
states, the imposition of liability and the attribution of degrees of culpability.456 
 
Gardner and Jung’s position on this is that mens rea terms should be defined on the basis that 
legally stipulated definitions are preferable even if they cannot accurately reflect their moral 
counterparts in ordinary language.457  For example, any:  
more “accurate” definitions of intention, capturing the essence of the concept as it 
features in moral evaluation, might be less readily understood and less readily 
applied in concreto than more artificial, legally stipulated definitions, so that the use 
of the former actually promotes perverse results.458   
 
Moreover, their argument intimates that definitions of such terms are necessarily hostage to 
instrumental considerations and cannot equate to moral responsibility.  This would seem to 
conflict with the views and approach of some of the judiciary.  For example, Lord Bridge’s 
statement in R v Moloney459 where he said that intention should be given its ordinary meaning 
and deciding whether D intended the act should be left to the jury’s good sense, the judiciary 
should only explain the term in cases where ‘further explanation or elaboration is strictly 
necessary to avoid  misunderstanding.’  Similarly, Lord Diplock in MPC v Caldwell460 
thought that recklessness was not a term of legal art and should bear its ordinary meaning.  
Negligence is already an area where this happens; a jury are not given extra guidance on what 
                                            
455 J.A. Laing, ‘The Prospects of a Theory of Criminal Culpability: Mens Rea and Methodological Doubt’ 
(1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 57 at 58. 
456 Ibid. at 61. 
457 Ibid. at 58. 
458 J. Gardner and H. Jung, ‘Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony Duff’s Account’ (n 78) at 581. 
459 [1985] AC 905 at 906. 
460 [1982] AC 341 at 351, examined in Chapter 3, below. 
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exactly amounts to ‘gross negligence’ even though some tautologous advice can be provided 
on what ‘gross’ means.   
  
If mens rea terms are simply ‘composite standards of culpability,’ which merely imitate some 
aspects of morality then the argument is that we will need ‘different custom-built distinctions 
for different kinds of situations.’461  Gardner and Jung’s argument has been criticised because 
it seems to suggest that  there is no underlying moral theory behind mens rea terms.  Clearly 
we believe that there are morally distinctive differences between  diverse types of behaviour 
reflected in different cognitive states and/or the practical attitudes demonstrated.462  What is 
clear is that they are arguing that it is not possible to have equivalence between legal terms of 
mens rea and their moral counterparts.  Perhaps this is the real issue here, as it is clear that 
the courts have tried to achieve this in relation to oblique intention, recklessness, and 
particularly with negligence where the jury also have a role in imparting their own moral 
judgments.  When the terms used for the proscribed mental element are guilt-assuming, 
unless they are clearly straightforward to interpret, it has been argued that we need some 
guidance to their meaning in non-normative terms, otherwise we are left with the assumption 
‘that “we just know” the look of a vicious, malicious or dishonest man or action.’463   
 
The various mens rea terms employed in the criminal law are necessary to adequately reflect 
the distinctions between differing degrees of culpability demonstrated by D.  It is for this 
reason that any attempt to reduce the mental element required for criminal responsibility to 
just one mental state, such as ‘recklessness’464 or perhaps ‘knowledge’465 are unlikely to gain 
                                            
461 J. Gardner and H. Jung, ‘Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony Duff’s Account’ (n 78) at 581. 
462 J.A. Laing, ‘The Prospects of a Theory of Criminal Culpability: Mens Rea and Methodological Doubt’ (n 
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463 Ibid. at 64. 
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much support.  The idea of ‘recklessness as insufficient concern’ for others being advanced 
as a ‘unified conception of criminal culpability’466 is also misleading as what is being 
advocated is more precisely a unified conception of mens rea.   
 
2.8.1 A single mental state of ‘recklessness as insufficient concern’ 
 
A single, unifying mens rea state has been advanced: purpose and knowledge can be 
subsumed within recklessness as all these mental states demonstrate the same ‘basic moral 
vice of insufficient concern for the interests of others.’467  Remaining terms can either fit 
within the scope of such recklessness or are ‘undesirable, because they punish a character 
trait or disposition rather than an occurrent mental state.’468   Negligence would be excluded 
from criminal liability.   
 
It has been said that advocates of such a unified concept can base it on some or all of the 
following grounds:  
(1) purposeful, knowing, and reckless wrongdoers who cause the same harm are 
equally blameworthy; (2) they are not equally blameworthy, but the differences in 
culpability are de minimis; and (3) whether or not significant differences in 
culpability exist, there is no reliable way to draw out distinctions, so we are better off 
with a one-mens-rea-fits-all system.469   
 
There would be some advantage to such an approach.  For example, it would avoid having to 
distinguish between direct and oblique intention.  It would have solve the problem of having 
                                                                                                                                       
465 C. Finkelstein ‘The Inefficiency of Mens Rea’ (2000) 88 California  Law Review 895. 
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to hold that D ‘closed his mind’ to a risk of harm arising from his conduct where foresight of 
harm was required for recklessness470 and conscious awareness could not be established.  
Finally, it would prevent the need to deem ‘all cases of purpose with respect to a given harm 
to be more culpable than all cases of recklessness with respect to the same harm.’471   
 
In practice subtle academic mens rea distinctions are often irrelevant where offences can be 
committed with more than one mens rea.  For example, where D is charged with intentionally 
or recklessly committing an offence472 a jury will determine the innocence or guilt of the 
offender.  They are generally not required to decide whether they believe D intended to 
commit the offence or was merely reckless.  As this leaves the actual state of mind of D 
undecided no culpability distinction is actually made by them.  It is the judge or magistrates 
who then determine whether they think the act was done intentionally or recklessly (not a 
jury) and sentence accordingly taking any other mitigating factors into consideration.  It is 
quite possible that the judge’s perception may differ from that of the jury as to D’s mental 
state.  Having said that, where it is clear from the evidence that D intended to commit the 
offence a more stringent sanction would be expected.  Certainly, society would view the 
intentional actor as the more morally blameworthy of the two.473 
 
Alexander’s justification appears to be grounded in the belief that those who cause the same 
harm, unless it is done negligently, are equally blameworthy.  Under the Model Penal Code, 
§2.02(2)(a)(i) D acts with criminal purpose if ‘it is his conscious object to engage in conduct 
of [the required] ...nature or to cause [the required]...result.’  In consequence, as D ‘must 
                                            
470 See Chapter Three, below. 
471 L. Alexander, ‘Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability’ (n 464) at 932. 
472 For example, some offences under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 or the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861. 
473 Whether there is a moral distinction between intending to seriously harm one person and recklessly exposing 
many to the risk of harm is open to debate. 
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believe that he is increasing to some extent the risk of harm, then criminal purpose has the 
same structure as recklessness.’474  Knowledge under the MPC is where D believes ‘to a 
practical certainty’ that his ‘conduct will bring about a particular result,’475 and therefore 
amounts to nothing more than ‘a limiting case of recklessness’ in American law.  The only 
distinction ‘is at some point as the risk of harm approaches a practical certainty, the burden of 
proof ...shifts’ so that it falls to D to prove that his actions were justifiable.476 
 
2.8.2 Knowledge as the basic mental state required 
 
Finkelstein does not propose a unified concept of mens rea but does submit that the basic 
mental state for criminal liability is knowledge, ‘whether knowledge that a certain result will 
occur or knowledge that there is a substantial risk of the occurrence of that result.’477  The 
argument starts from the position that the mens rea of ‘intention’ is relatively unimportant as 
a concept within the criminal law because the focus is not generally on D’s reasons or 
motives for acting,478 rather the legal concept of guilt looks to ‘conformity to a conduct 
norm.’479  Occasionally a crime requires intention but generally this is not the case.  To 
illustrate the point, Finkelstein gives the example of D who plants a bomb on a plane to kill a 
particular passenger X but sees a friend boarding the plane.  He might not get another 
opportunity to kill X and reluctantly continues with his plan even though he knows his friend 
will be killed too.  He sincerely hopes his friend will survive but all aboard are killed when 
the bomb detonates:  
                                            
474 L. Alexander, ‘Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability’ (n 464) at 942. 
475 MPC §2.02(2)(b) 1985. 
476 L. Alexander, ‘Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability’ (n 464) at 940. 
477 C. Finkelstein ‘The Inefficiency of Mens Rea’ (n 465) at 897. 
478 Ibid. at 913: Except in crimes of attempt and accomplice liability, in exculpatory defences the reasons for 
acting are relevant to exculpation, not inculpation. 
479 Ibid. at 906. 
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The law of murder does not care that he intended the death of one, actively hoped for 
the survival of another, and was indifferent about the deaths of the rest.  The lowest 
common denominator for all the bomber’s victims is his knowledge that by blowing 
up the plane he would cause their deaths, a mental state that is sufficient to make all 
the killings murder.480 
 
Although it may seem a credible suggestion that a unified form of mens rea is possible it 
would create too broad a concept and cannot, as noted above, reflect the gradations of 
culpability which is ‘not naturally an all-or-nothing concept.’481   Although under the Model 
Penal Code ‘a knowing or extremely reckless killing482 is as good as an intentional one’483 in 
English law direct or oblique intent must be proven.  Nonetheless, the claim that the basic 
notion of mens rea is that applicable to murder, i.e. D ‘is as culpable if he merely knew his 
action would result in someone’s death as if he intended his action to have that result’484 is 
true with respect to guilt even though it may not necessarily be reflected in sentencing. 
2.8.3 Reflecting moral blameworthiness 
 
Moral blameworthiness is more apparent in the defences that the criminal law permits and 
Fletcher’s categorization of defences into either justifications or excuses represents guidance 
as to the morality of behaviour expected.485  For example, where D has committed a 
proscribed wrong but can avail himself of the defence of self-defence his behaviour would be 
justified in that he had done what was morally acceptable.  Where D has committed a 
proscribed wrong and is merely excused, for example where D relies on the defence of loss of 
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self-control on a murder charge, then the message to society is that this kind of behaviour is 
not morally acceptable but some allowance is being made because of the circumstances D 
was in.486  Consequently, the criminal law encourages citizens to develop reasonable 
standards of behaviour and is not simply reflecting expected standards.487 
 
Where elements of moral concepts have been employed by the legislature and courts to 
promote reasonable standards of behaviour, it has led to approaches to culpability that have 
been either subjective, objective, or a mixture of the two approaches.  Whilst some would 
suggest that inadvertent behaviour should not attract criminal liability and morally we should 
reserve punishment only for those who were consciously aware of the risk of harm to others 
by their actions, others would state that excluding those who act inadvertently provides a 
morally unsubstantive account of the criminal law.  This is because inadvertence can also 
demonstrate moral fault.  The two viewpoints need further consideration in terms of 
culpability and moral blameworthiness. 
 
2.9 Conclusion to Chapter Two 
 
The main theories of culpability, character and choice, are considered to be subjective in 
nature, as noted earlier.  Choice theory focuses on what the particular agent chose to do, 
requiring intention, foresight or belief.  This would require all approaches to culpability to be 
purely subjective, although in relation to the criminal law excuses, choice theory uses the 
concept of the reasonable man, introducing an element of objectivity.  Character theory, 
although subjective as it directly judges the character of the individual agent, does so by 
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comparison with a society’s view of what it is to possess a good character, again an 
‘objectivised’ subjectivity. 
 
Choice theory cannot adequately accommodate liability arising through inadvertence but 
character theory can to an extent where the inadvertence manifests an indifference to the 
welfare of others.  Gardner’s ‘role’ theory fits nicely with inadvertence, an objective test for 
recklessness, and liability for negligence would not be an issue here; but subjective 
recklessness would create difficulty.  This theory makes no allowance for the capacity of the 
accused with regard to his ability to achieve the standard of the reasonable man, whereas this 
is relevant to subjective recklessness.  Clearly, none of the theories discussed above have 
universal application to the forms of mentes reae addressed in this work and it has been 
submitted that the criminal law’s concern is with the character of our actions to the extent that 
they reflect our character.  Consequently, it is submitted that a synthesis of aspects of the 
character and role theories is the most appropriate basis for grounding culpability and this 
approach underpins the proposed formulation of recklessness advanced in Chapter Three of 
this work and the remit of criminal negligence proffered in Chapter Four. 
 
There have been suggestions that the mentes reae terms should be unified, but such proposals 
have been rejected as moral culpability distinctions are necessary to the extent that they can 
be incorporated into the criminal law, otherwise the requirements of justice cannot be 
adequately satisfied.  Conflicting subjective and objective approaches have been identified 
and  it has been shown that part of the problem with this labelling lies in determining  what is 




The next chapter will critically examine greatest debate on the subjective/objective 
distinction which has taken place in the context of the definition of recklessness.  In his 
leading judgment in MPC v Caldwell,488 as noted earlier, Lord Diplock, expressed concern 
with the increasing use of these labels stating that ‘questions of criminal liability are seldom 
solved by simply asking whether the test is subjective or objective.’489  This is especially the 
case when it is unclear that these terms are being interpreted consistently.  Moreover, with 
regard to recklessness for example, even if we adopt a subjective definition it will 
nevertheless have an objective element to it, which is the taking of an ‘unjustified risk.’490  
Whether a risk is an unjustified one to take or not is a question that has been judged by 
reference to an external standard, whether the judge or jury think it was reasonable to take it 
in the circumstances known to D.  If this “subjective” definition was truly subjective the 
justifiability of the risk would have to be judged by whether D, himself, thought it was 
reasonable, not by the standards of others.491  This, it will be submitted, is a possible 
interpretation of the current definition established in R v G & R492.  Some493 have rejected this 
criticism of labelling, arguing that these are straightforward terms that are convenient 
expressions of important legal distinctions.  This, as has been observed above in relation to 
character and choice theory, and as will be demonstrated with regard to recklessness, is not 
necessarily as straightforward as it has been claimed. It will be seen that it has also been an 
issue with regard to determining intention,494 although this was later overruled by statute.   
  
                                            
488 [1982] AC 341. 
489 [1982] AC 341 at 353 para.(E) and 354 para.(F). 
490 See also K. Amirthalingam, ‘Caldwell Recklessnesss is Dead, Long Live Mens Rea’s Fecklessness’ (n 103) 
who argues that blameworthiness and culpability cannot be determined without reference to some external 
standard which calls for a degree of objective evaluation. 
491 This is an issue identified with the wording of the current ‘definition’ of recklessness in the next chapter, 
below. 
492 [2004] 4 All ER 765. 
493 J. C. Smith, ‘Commentary on Caldwell' [1981] Criminal Law Review 392 at 396; and G. Williams, 
‘Recklessness Redefined’ [1981] Cambridge Law Journal 252. 
494 DPP v Smith [1961 AC 290. 
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It will be submitted, in the next chapter, that the current definition of recklessness is too 
narrow and it does not truly reflect current practice.  A broader, more objective approach will 





Mens Rea: An Analysis of the Language of Criminal Recklessness  
 
3.1 Introduction to Chapter Three  
 
Any examination of intention, recklessness and criminal negligence needs to scrutinize 
subjective and objective approaches to mens rea; this is because much of the complexity in 
the academic and judicial debate in this area centres around whether foresight of the risk of 
harm alone can ground criminal responsibility.  An objective stance allows for constructive 
liability where conscious advertence cannot be established, but the standard subjective 
interpretation requires that D was consciously aware of the risk his intended action posed and 
went on to take that risk.  As noted earlier,1 determining whether an approach is objective or 
subjective is not quite as straightforward as it first appears given that the labels operate along 
a continuum.  These issues are critically analysed briefly in relation to the development of 
one form of intention, oblique (or indirect) intention, and particularly with regard to defining 
criminal recklessness.   
 
It is submitted that a more detailed approach is needed in the use of these labels and a 
synthesis of the two is required to appropriately determine reckless conduct.  A system of 
criminal justice can and does employ both objective and subjective approaches2 to 
culpability,3 and often these modes of culpability are mixed so that a test is neither entirely 
subjective nor purely objective.  It could be said that the lack of judicial consistency in the 
application of subjective or objective approaches to interpretation within the criminal law 
                                            
1 Chapter 1 at 1.1 
2 J.C. Smith, ‘Subjective or Objective? Ups and Downs of the Test of Criminal Liability in England’ (1981) 27 
Villanova Law Review 1179. 
3 Applied in R v Mohammed [2005] EWCA Crim 1880 and R v Van Dongen [2005] EWCA Crim 1728. 
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results from a desire to hold culpable those who are deemed so4 and also to do justice in a 
particular case.5  A similar line of reasoning has led to the development of oblique intention, 
also discussed in this chapter in order to illustrate how the language of recklessness was 
employed to hold criminally responsible those who killed without direct intent.   
 
Although subjective approaches6 have gained dominance in the courts recently,7 it will be 
argued that there is scope for more objectivity in the criminal law with regard to determining 
recklessness, whilst supporting the overturning of an objective approach to intention in DPP 
v Smith.8  It is contended here that the current definition of recklessness is a form of ideal 
subjectivism, which is unacceptable.  It will be demonstrated that the courts already create 
legal fictions when they find foresight of risk in cases where it is highly unlikely that 
conscious thought of the risk ever occurred, even though defendants may well have had 
knowledge that a risk may exist had they stopped to think about it.   A cognitive capacity 




Although the focus of this work is primarily on recklessness and negligence, the development 
of the former has historically been intertwined with the development of intention, or more 
                                            
4 Victoria Nourse submits that different approaches have sometimes been applied depending on gender, 
producing inequality before the law. She contends that the debate over purely subjective or objective standards 
‘obscures the commonsense necessity of having a hybrid standard; ‘After the Reasonable Man: Getting Over the 
Subjectivity/Objectivity Question’ (2008) 11 New Criminal Law Review 33. 
5 Although Gardner and Jung argue that the dispute between subjectivists and objectivists is essentially about 
imposing criminal liability for negligence, J. Gardner, and H. Jung, ‘Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony Duff’s 
Account’ (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 559.  However, it is submitted here that it has a broader 
remit; it is a debate about the theoretical underpinning of English criminal law. 
6 See for example R v G & R [2004] 4 All ER 765. 
7 Except for the defence of provocation, see Holley [2005] UKPC 23, and now the new loss of self control 
defence. 
8 [1961] AC 290. 
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precisely with ‘oblique’ intention.9  Intention has always been seen as the most serious form 
of wrongdoing,10 ‘the central or fundamental kind of wrong-doing is to direct my actions 
towards evil – to intend and to try to do what is evil.’11  This seems to be a morally 
substantive account of what we would generally feel towards those who intend harm but, on 
closer inspection, the position is not as clear cut as it might seem.   
 
As a general principle those who intend to cause harm are often viewed as thoroughly bad 
characters, possibly because intention implies desire12 and the feeling that wanting to cause 
harm is morally worse that causing the same harm without wanting to.  This position is only 
tenable where D is unaware of the risk of harm or tries to avoid it or perhaps minimise it.  In 
some circumstances D would also be judged in a better light if, aware of the risk, he ran it 
because he was trying to avoid a greater harm.  But generally, if D foresees that harm will 
occur and deliberately runs the risk of it occurring, even though he might not want it to 
happen, there is arguably little moral distinction between him and the intentional harmer; 
neither care sufficiently about another to desist.   
 
Even if a distinction was to be made between D who wanted to harm another for its own sake 
and the person who foresaw harm as a consequence of his actions in order to achieve another 
goal, it can be difficult to show that the latter was morally not as bad as the former.  At least 
the first actor considers the interests of others, the second is apparently indifferent.13  Yet still 
there may well be an intuition that the intentional harmer, the agent who wants to cause harm 
                                            
9 Arguably constructive intention as D might not “intend” to harm in the ordinary sense of the word. 
10 Crimes committed recklessly or negligently are generally sentenced more leniently than those committed 
intentionally because of the social and moral differences between them, G Williams Textbook of Criminal Law, 
2nd Edn., (London: Stevens, 1983) 83; See also T. Baldwin, ‘Foresight and Responsibility’ [1979] 54 
Philosophy  347 at 352. 
11 R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) 113. 
12 T. Baldwin, ‘Foresight and Responsibility’ [1979] 54 Philosophy 347 at 352. 
13 Ibid. at 353. 
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to another, is morally worse and deserving of more condemnation and punishment.  It is 
submitted here that this is because the intentional harmer gains satisfaction, if not pleasure, 
from inflicting harm whereas the person who risks harm in the pursuit of another goal may be 
selfish, but he does not experience the same emotion if the unintended/ unwanted harm 
results.  It is the satisfaction or pleasure that makes the intentional harmer morally worse and 
deserving of more censure and punishment. 
 
The development of the concept of oblique intention has arisen in the context of homicide 
cases,14 perhaps to address the lack of moral distinction noted above between the intentional 
harmer and the person who foresees the risk of harm arising from his actions but nonetheless 
continues and runs the risk of it occurring.  Originally English common law held that 
homicide was a strict liability offence, before moving towards a requirement of moral 
blameworthiness and then finally to the modern position that the act must be accompanied by 
a mental state.15  It has been a long held principle that foresight was sufficient for criminal 
responsibility,16 often foresight being seen as proof of intention.17  Although it was 
acknowledged18 that the maxim ‘[A] man must be taken (or presumed) to intend the natural 
consequences of his acts,’ relied upon in R v Vickers,19 was not an irrebuttable presumption 
of law but an inference that could be drawn from all the facts of a particular case.  Given that 
a man is usually able to foresee the natural consequences of his acts, Byrne J observed that as 
a rule it would therefore be reasonable to infer that he did foresee them and intend them, but 
this would not always be the case.  Similarly, in R v Steane20 Lord Goddard CJ stated:  
                                            
14 As murder requires proof of intention, recklessness will not suffice in English Law. 
15 M. Sornarajah, ‘Reckless Murder in Commonwealth Law’ (1975) 24 The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 846. 
16 This proposal is found in the work of utilitarian philosopher J. Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation (New York: Hafner Publishing, 1965) Chapters 8-9. 
17 T. Baldwin, ‘Foresight and Responsibility’ (n 12). 
18 DPP v Smith [1961] noted by Byrne J in the Court of Criminal Appeal. 
19 [1957] 2 QB 664; [1957] WLR 326; [1957] 2 All ER 741; 41 Cr App R 189, CCA. 
20 [1947] KB 997; [1947] 1 All ER 813 CCA. 
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No doubt if the prosecution prove an act the natural consequence of which would be a 
certain result and no evidence or explanation is given, then a jury may, on a proper 
direction, find that the prisoner is guilty of doing the act with the intent alleged, but if 
on the totality of the evidence there is room for more than one view as to the intent of 
the prisoner, the jury should be directed that it is for the prosecution to prove the 
intent to the jury’s satisfaction, and if, on a review of the whole evidence, they think 
either that the intent did not exist or they are left in doubt as to the intent, the prisoner 
is entitled to be acquitted.21 
This position appears to be a matter of common sense and it is perhaps difficult to see how 
the later difficulties with interpreting intention in the context of homicide arose.  Intention is 
obviously present where D aims to bring a consequence about because he wants and desires a 
particular outcome; it is his purpose to bring about a desired result.22  In DPP v Smith,23 the 
accused was found to have intended to kill a policeman, not because it was his aim or 
purpose, but because a reasonable person would have foreseen that serious harm may have 
befallen the victim as a result of the defendant’s actions.   Smith’s appeal to the Court of 
Criminal Appeal led to the decision of the trial judge being reversed and a verdict of 
manslaughter substituted.  The Crown then appealed to the House of Lords.  Smith’s appeal 
was on the ground that the trial judge had applied an objective test of intention, namely what 
the reasonable man would contemplate as the probable result of his acts and would therefore 
intend, not what D, himself, contemplated.   
 
                                            
21 [1947] KB 997 at 1004. 
22 A.P. Simester and G.R. Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine, 3rd Edn., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2007) 120. 
23 [1961] AC 290,  D had stolen goods on the back seat of his car and when a policeman asked him to pull over 
he drove off with the officer clinging on to the side of the car.  The officer was shaken off into the path of an 
oncoming car receiving fatal injuries and D was charged with capital murder. 
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The Court of Criminal Appeal considered there was a distinction to be made dependent on 
whether, during the relevant 10 seconds, Smith really did realise the degree of likelihood of 
serious injury.   If the jury believed he deliberately tried to drive the body of the officer 
against oncoming cars it was open to them to find he intended serious injury.  If they 
concluded he merely swerved or zigzagged to throw him off or that for any reason he may 
not have realised the degree of danger he was exposing the officer to different inferences 
could be drawn.  In the former case ‘they were dealing with consequences that were certain; 
in the latter only with degrees of likelihood’.24   
 
The House of Lords had a different view holding that ‘it matters not what the accused in fact 
contemplated as the probable result or whether he ever contemplated at all, provided he was 
in law responsible and accountable for his actions’.25  The test of foresight was not to be what 
the particular accused foresaw, but what a man of reasonable prudence would foresee as the 
natural and probable result of D’s actions.26  Furthermore, Lord Kilmuir cited with approval 
the judgment of Palles CB who said:   
[T]he law imputes to a person who wilfully commits a criminal act an intention to do 
everything which is the probable consequence of the act constituting the corpus delicti 
which actually ensues. …[T]his inference arises irrespective of the particular 
consequence which ensued being or not being foreseen by the criminal, and whether 
his conduct is reckless or the reverse.27 
The quote shows an amalgamated approach to intention and recklessness. The appeal was 
allowed and the conviction for murder was restored.  This was an extremely harsh and highly 
                                            
24 [1961] AC 290 at 326. 
25 Ibid. at 327. 
26 [1961] AC 290 at 327 per Viscount Kilmuir L.C., citing with approval the words of J. Holmes in “The 
Common Law”. 
27 R v Faulkener (1877) 13 Cox C.C. 550, 561-562 (Court of Crown Cases Reserved for Ireland). 
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criticised decision,28 especially as Smith had been on friendly terms with his victim, there 
was no evidence of an intent to kill and the death penalty applied.  He had even returned to 
the scene of the incident after disposing of the stolen goods to see how the officer was. 
 
The precedent set by this decision was overturned by section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 
196729  which now requires a judge or jury to determine whether D ‘did  intend or foresee 
that result, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.’  
This could be seen as setting the law back on the right track as it was in line with the 
guidance in Steane and should have resolved matters.  Evidence of foresight of harm could 
have been left to consideration of reckless conduct; only in rare cases would there be 
sufficient evidence on which a judge or jury could find that D intended harm.  Unfortunately 
the judiciary struggled subsequently to find a balance between foresight of risk, generally 
equated with criminal recklessness, and intention.  What followed was the development of 
the concept of ‘oblique intention,’30 starting with the decision in Hyam v DPP.31   
 
3.2.1 Hyam v DPP 
 
In this case a murder conviction was upheld by a majority of 3:2 stating that the court was not 
applying an objective test as in Smith, but that the jury must have found that the appellant 
knew it was highly probable that serious bodily harm would be caused and that following R v 
Vickers, that was sufficient mens rea for murder.  There are three issues from this: once again 
probability was brought into the equation,32  Lord Hailsham’s use of knowledge rather than 
                                            
28 See, for example, G. Williams, Criminal Law (The General Part), 2nd Edn., (London: Stevens, 1961) 94 et 
seq.; Law Commission Report No. 10, Imputed Criminal Intention (Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith) 
(1967). 
29 The decision in Smith was overruled later in Frankland and Moore v R [1987] AC 576. 
30 A term first coined by Bentham. 
31 [1975] AC 55.  D set fire B’s house to frighten her into leaving the neighbourhood.  Two of B’s children died 
in the fire. 
32 Also present in the decision in DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290. 
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foresight, and whether the decision in Vickers was sound (that an intention to cause grievous 
bodily harm was sufficient in the absence of an intent to kill).  
 
Lord Hailsham, delivering the leading judgment, stated unequivocally that ‘knowledge or any 
degree of foresight’ is insufficient for a murder conviction; it is only evidence from which a 
jury may find the necessary intention existed.  There must be ‘an intent to kill or cause 
grievous bodily harm (in the sense of really serious injury).’33  Approving this classical 
definition of murder cited in the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in Vickers,34 Lord 
Hailsham stated that the definition contains no reference to ‘foresight of the consequences as 
such, either as equivalent to intention in murder or as an alternative to the requisite intention, 
or to a “high degree of probability” to describe the degree of certainty of what has to be 
foreseen.’35  His Lordship approved the comments of Byrne J in the Court of Appeal in Smith 
in quashing the conviction because the trial judge’s direction to the jury had clearly indicated 
that foresight of consequences could establish sufficient mens rea and ‘likelihood and not 
certainty is enough.’36  Lord Hailsham also agreed with comments made by Lord Reid in a 
civil case: 
Chance probability or likelihood is always a matter of degree.  Many different 
expressions are in common use.  It can be said that the occurrence of a future event is 
very likely, rather likely, more probable than not, not unlikely, quite likely, not 
improbable, more than a mere possibility, etc.  It is neither practicable nor 
reasonable to draw a line at extreme probability.37 
 
                                            
33 [1975] AC 55 at 65. 
34 [1957] 2 QB 664. 
35 [1975] AC 55 at 68. 
36 Ibid. at 69. 
37 Southern Portland Cement Ltd. v Cooper [1974] AC 623 at 640. 
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At this stage in the judgment the position appeared clear and straightforward and in line with 
approved authorities.  Lord Hailsham then shifted his attention from foresight of the 
probability of consequences to situations such as the present case, where D ‘knows’ that 
his/her proposed action exposes another to a serious risk of death or grievous bodily harm 
without directly intending such consequences and continues to do the act without lawful 
excuse.38  For his Lordship, this was not merely foresight of probable consequences (which 
should be deemed recklessness and insufficient mens rea for a murder conviction)39 but ‘an 
actual intention to expose his victim to the risk of those consequences whether they in fact 
occur or not’,40 despite not intending them, and the necessary intent for the conviction to 
stand.  Support for this proposition was found in the Fourth Report of the Commissioners on 
the Criminal Law (1839) where no legal distinction was found between a direct intent to kill 
and ‘wilfully doing an act of which death is the probable consequence.’41  Lord Hailsham 
stated ‘[i]n the field of guilty knowledge it has long been accepted…that “a man who 
deliberately shuts his eyes to the truth will not be heard to say that he did not know it.”’42   
 
His Lordship rejected that such a stance was incorporating an objective test of knowledge or 
intention, but as it is not possible to read the mind of a defendant at the time he commits the 
prohibited act, it is contended here that this created the danger that juries would apply an 
objective test, depending on the circumstances, if they would expect that D, as a reasonable 
person, would have had knowledge of the risk.  A similar problem existed with the test for 
recklessness following MPC v Caldwell, discussed below.  Lord Hailsham’s approach was 
also moving away from foresight of consequences, which is actual awareness of the risk of 
                                            
38 [1975] AC 55 at 74. 
39 Note recklessness is sufficient mens rea for murder in other common law jurisdictions; M Sornarajah, 
‘Reckless Murder in Commonwealth Law’ (n 15). 
40 Ibid. 
41 [1975] AC 55 at 77. 
42 Ibid. at 77-78 quoting Lord Reid in Southern Portland Cement Ltd. v Cooper [1974] AC 623 at 638. 
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harm, to knowledge that is passive consciousness and quite frequently linked to what D as a 
reasonable person should have known.  Furthermore, passive consciousness of the risk of 
harm is more the realm of criminal negligence, which would be a degree of assimilation 
between three quite distinct forms of mens rea. 
 
Lord Hailsham found that as Hyam had first checked that her ex-lover, Mr Jones, was not at 
his new girlfriend’s house, as she did not want him to come to any harm, and as she was 
aware of the danger of harm to the occupants of her rival’s house, she must have intended to 
expose them to the risk of death or serious injury.43  How Lord Hailsham came to this 
conclusion is not straightforward and may well be as a result of the means Hyam adopted to 
frighten her rival, rather than her actual degree of foresight.44  What is not clear is that Hyam 
foresaw the risk of death or serious injury to the occupants so that even if the court was 
taking a subjective and not an objective approach to establishing intention, the outcome is the 
same as in Smith.45 
 
Lord Dilhorne was in agreement with Lord Hailsham, citing Desmond’s Case,46 the definition 
of “malice aforethought” in Stephen’s Digest of Criminal Law,47 and the Royal Commission 
on Capital Punishment48 who had stated:  
it is murder if one person kills another by an intentional act which he knows to be 
likely to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm,…and may either be recklessly 
                                            
43 [1975] AC 55 at 78. 
44 T. Baldwin, ‘Foresight and Responsibility’ (n 12) at 350. 
45 [1961] AC 290. 
46 (1868) The Times, April 28. An attempt to break Irish prisoners out of Clerkenwell jail by blowing a hole in 
the prison wall using explosives, at least 12 people living nearby were killed.  The murder conviction for those 
responsible was based on the old doctrine of constructive malice but alternatively it was proposed that doing an 
act with the knowledge or belief that life would be endangered by it was sufficient. 
47 (1877) Art. 223. 
48 (1949-1953) (Cmd. 8932) at 27. 
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indifferent as to the results of his act or may even desire that no harm should be 
caused by it.   
His Lordship contended there was no question of a subjective or objective test arising as the 
jury must have found that Hyam knew it was highly probable that serious harm would 
ensue.49  The issue here is that ‘knowledge’ is not the same as actual foresight of the risk of 
harm, as it does not require actual awareness at the time of acting.   
 
Lord Diplock, in Hyam, found no distinction to be drawn in English law between the state of 
mind of one who acts with the desire to bring about a result and one who acts ‘knowing full 
well that it is likely to produce that consequence although it may not be the object he was 
seeking to achieve…’ as both show ‘willingness to produce the particular evil 
consequence.’50  The difficulty is that knowing there is a risk and going on to take it is the 
domain of criminal recklessness, not the mens rea of intention.  The reason that foresight of 
harm was relevant in murder trials was enunciated by Lord Diplock: 
Until as late as 1898 persons accused of murder were incompetent to give evidence in 
their own defence.  So the actual intent with which they had done the act which had in 
fact caused death could only be a matter of inference from the evidence of other 
witnesses as to what the accused had done or said.  In drawing this inference from 
what he had done it was necessary to assume that the accused was gifted with the 
foresight and reasoning capacity of a “reasonable man” and, as such, must have 
foreseen as a possible consequence of his act, and thus within his intention, anything 
which, in the ordinary course of events, might result from it.51 
 
                                            
49 [1975] AC 55 at 85. 
50 Ibid. at 87. 
51 Ibid. at 90. 
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Thus the objective test, wrongly applied in Smith, was in earlier times the only way of 
ascertaining what the actual intention of the accused was.  Once a defendant was permitted to 
give evidence on his own behalf there was more than one way of assessing D’s actual state of 
mind.  Finally, his Lordship and Lord Kilbrandon dissented from the majority to the extent 
that they believed that the crime of murder should be restricted to a direct intention to kill or 
where there was foresight of bodily injury likely to endanger life.52  Lord Cross was not 
prepared to decide this point, but voted with Lords Hailsham and Dilhorne in upholding the 
murder conviction.  This is a concern given the seriousness of the offence.  First, this is 
because murder is the most heinous of crimes and if there was any uncertainty Lord Cross 
should have sided with the dissenters.  Secondly, Lord Hailsham’s judgment was clearly 
contradictory and an extension of the existing law of murder without acknowledgement that 
this was his intention. 
 
However, Lord Cross did note that Hyam could not have been deemed to have been acting 
recklessly ‘in the sense of not having reflected on the probable consequences of her act.’53  
This is a strange comment to make given that foresight of risk was required at this time for 
criminal recklessness to be established; objective recklessness did not officially arrive until 
the decision of the House in Caldwell.54  It would appear that Lord Cross was confusing 
recklessness with negligence. 
 
Following Hyam, Lord Diplock stated in Whitehouse: Lemon [1979] AC 617 at 638: 
When Stephen (History of the Criminal Law of England) was writing in 1883, he did 
not regard it as then settled law that, where an intention to produce a particular 
result was a necessary element of an offence, no distinction was to be drawn in law 
                                            
52 Ibid. at 93; Lord Kilbrandon at 98. 
53 Ibid. at 95. 
54 [1982] AC 341. 
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between the state of mind of one who did an act because he desired it to produce that 
particular result and the state of mind of one who, when he did the act, was aware 
that it was likely to produce that result but was prepared to take the risk that it might 
do so, in order to achieve some other purpose which provided his motive for doing 
what he did.  It is now settled law that both states of mind constitute ‘intention’ in the 
sense in which that expression is used in the definition of a crime whether at common 
law or in a statute.  Any doubts on this matter were finally laid to rest by the decision 
of this House in R v Hyam [Hyam v DPP][1975] AC 55.55 
Again, the difficulty with this, is that it clearly shows a lack of distinction between criminal 
intent and criminal recklessness; something that should not happen if we regard acting with 
intention as more blameworthy and deserving of more punishment.56  As has been noted,57 
there are clear justifications for holding that a person who intentionally and deliberately 




The decision in the subsequent case of R v Moloney58 held that apart from a direct intention to 
kill, the necessary intention to kill for a murder conviction can be found where foresight of 
the death as a natural consequence is established.59  This would mean that the decision in 
Hyam was wrong as it is unlikely that Hyam saw foresight of death or serious injury as 
                                            
55 D. Ormerod, Smith &Hogan Criminal Law Cases and Materials, 9th Edn., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
56 A. Norrie refers to Hyam- style recklessness, Crime, Reason and History, 2nd Edn., (London: Butterworths, 
2001) 55;  R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability  (n 11). 
57 Above, note 10. 
58 [1985] AC 913 D shot and killed his beloved step-father when they were both drunk. They challenged each 
other to load a shotgun and fire it to see who was fastest. 
59 This could be argued to be simply the worst degree of criminal recklessness rather than intention but such a 
debate is outside of the scope of this thesis. 
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virtually certain to occur.60  Moloney’s conviction was quashed on appeal as the judge had 
misdirected the jury that D intended serious bodily harm if he foresaw it as probable.   
Lord Bridge advanced his well-known terrorist bomber example61 and wrongly suggested 
that the result in his example would be murder, as there would be an intention to expose the 
bomb disposal squad to the risk of death or serious bodily harm.  Although there is an 
intention to expose the squad to the risk of harm, such harm is not virtually certain, or highly 
probable,62 to occur.  His Lordship’s example did not come close to meeting his own criteria 
of serious harm that would occur as a ‘moral certainty,’ ‘a probability which is little short of 
overwhelming’ and a ‘certain event’ unless something unforeseen intervenes to prevent it. 63  
It has been argued that this hypothetical example does not establish intention, but looks like 
recklessness which is insufficient mens rea for murder. 64  
 
Moloney established the ‘golden rule’ that the courts employ, that intention should be left to 
bear its ordinary meaning, ‘the judge should avoid any elaboration or paraphrase of what is 
meant by intent and leave it to the jury’s good sense to decide whether the accused acted with 
the necessary intent.’65   Unfortunately, Lord Bridge then muddied the waters by directing 
that where a jury require more guidance they should be asked if death or serious injury was a 
‘natural consequence’ of D’s voluntary act and if so, whether D foresaw it as a ‘natural 
consequence.’66  This narrowed the definition from Hyam by removing foresight of probable 
consequences as sufficient mens rea for murder, but caused its own difficulty by referring to 
‘natural consequences,’ discussed below.   
                                            
60 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, 12th Edn., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 104. 
61 A bomber plants a time bomb in a public place and gives a warning so that the public will be evacuated, 
knowing that a bomb disposal squad will be called. The bomb explodes killing one of the squad who was trying 
to diffuse it.   
62 As required in Hyam. 
63 [1985] AC at 925, 926, and 929. 
64 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, 12th Edn., (n 60) 104. 
65 R v Moloney [1985] AC 905 at 926 per Lord Bridge. 
66 Ibid. at 1039. 
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3.2.3 Hancock and Shankland 
 
Natural consequences can have varying degrees of probability, not just consequences that 
were morally certain to occur.  An example often cited to illustrate this point is that of 
pregnancy being a natural consequence of sexual intercourse.  As a result, in R v Hancock 
and Shankland67 the Court of Appeal found the Moloney guidelines used by the trial judge to 
be defective in this respect and quashed the conviction.  The jury may have equated ‘natural 
consequence’ with a ‘direct consequence’ rather than the ‘moral certainty’ Lord Bridge had 
intended.68  This ambiguity could give rise to convictions in cases where there was a causal 
link between D’s act and V’s death without this outcome being virtually certain to occur.69  
Lord Lane’s explanation of what ‘natural’ signified used the phrase ‘highly likely’70 which in 
effect means ‘probable,’ thus reverting back to the Hyam test of foresight of the probability of 
harm.71  Lord Lane’s position was supported by Lord Scarman in the House of Lords stating:  
[T]he greater the probability of a consequence the more likely it is that the 
consequence was foreseen and if that consequence was foreseen the greater the 
probability is that this consequence was also intended.72 
 
The effect of this was to broaden the law through the guidance given to juries whilst at the 
same time acknowledging that the mens rea for murder was a direct intention to kill or an 
intention to cause serious bodily harm.  The end result is a combination of intention and 
                                            
67 [1986] AC 455 Two striking miners threw concrete blocks over the parapet of a motorway bridge onto the 
carriageway below killing a taxi driver taking a striking miner to work.  They claimed to be aiming for an 
adjacent lane so as to scare the miner and stop him going to work, and did not mean to harm anyone. 
68 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, (n 60) 104. 
69 A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History, (n 56) 52. 
70 [1986] AC 455 at 644. 
71 A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History, (n 56) 53. 
72 [1986] AC 455 at 650. 
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recklessness: ‘the law is expressed in terms of virtual certainty while advice to the jury is 
premised on a kind of recklessness test.’73 
 
3.2.4 Nedrick and Woollin 
 
The appellate courts continued this approach in the cases of R v Nedrick74and R v Woollin.75  
As a result, where there is an absence of a direct intent, it is now settled law that D may be 
found to have intended the proscribed act (i.e. the actus reus of the offence) where he foresaw 
its occurrence as a virtually certain consequence of his actions.76 For Norrie, this leaves the 
law based on ‘orthodox subjectivist principles’ with the guidelines reflecting a broader 
morally substantive approach to encompass certain kinds of violence.77  Given that foresight 
of virtual certainty simply entitles a jury to find that D intended death or serious injury, rather 
than establishing that in such circumstances it must find that D acted with the necessary 
mental element, there is still ‘moral elbow room’78 for the jury to acquit in circumstances 
where D does not morally deserve the label ‘murderer.’  The cause of the difficulties with the 
broadening or narrowing of the definition of criminal intention was the desire to separate 
legal responsibility from moral responsibility, a division that becomes unworkable when 
substantive moral issues arise that need redress.  By incorporating foresight of consequences 
into the deliberations it is clear that there has been a blurring of the distinction between 
criminal intent and criminal recklessness.   
 
                                            
73 A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History, (n 56) 54. 
74 R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025 The facts were very similar to Hyam.  D poured paraffin through the letter 
box of a woman’s house, ignited it, and her son died in the fire.  Nedrick’s conviction for murder was quashed. 
75 R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82 D threw his crying baby against a hard surface in a moment of anger. 
76 Ibid.  
77 A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History, (n 56) 55. 
78 J. Horder, ‘Intention in the Criminal Law – A Rejoinder’(1995) Modern Law Review 678 at 688. 
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It has been argued that using foresight as a method of determining intention is flawed, as is 
assessing degrees of probability of risk.79  The former is impossible to know without a 
confession from the defendant, the latter unreliable as there can be many possible degrees of 
probability dependent upon the main purpose for acting.80  Whilst these arguments have 
merit, foresight can be a useful guide as to what D may have intended by his actions.  The 
probability of risk and D’s perception of risk would need to be analysed from both a 
subjective viewpoint and applying a common sense reasonable person test.  This would mean 
taking the individual characteristics of the defendant into account and then considering what 
a person with such characteristics could reasonably foresee.   
 
It has been observed that had it not been for the old presumption of intention, then the cases 
above may never have arisen and it is odd to state that an agent intends harm in 
circumstances when he clearly may not.81  What is also clear is that a person can intend to do 
something he does not desire in order to achieve another goal.  A prime example is R v 
Steane,82 where the defendant intended to assist the enemy because that was the only way to 
save his family from the concentration camps.83  Similarly in Re A,84 separating conjoined 
twins was the only way of saving one of them, even though it meant the death of the other, 
yet without the operation both would die.  In both these instances, the effect of pursuing the 
chosen course of action would have been accompanied by foresight of the unwanted 
consequences.   
                                            
79 M.C. Kaveny, ‘Inferring Intention from Foresight’ (2004) Law Quarterly Review 81. 
80 Ibid. at 96. 
81 E. Griew, ‘States of mind, presumptions and inferences’ in P. Smith (ed.), Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of 
J.C. Smith (London, Butterworths, 1987) 82. 
82 [1947] KB 997. 
83 A. Halpin, ‘Intended Consequences and Unintentional Fallacies’ (1987) 7 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
104 at 111. 
84 Re A (children)(conjoined twins: surgical separation)[2004] 4 All ER 961. 
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By way of contrast, in Hyam, Moloney, Hancock and Shankland, Nedrick, and Woollin it is 
quite possible that such foresight was absent.  It has been argued that instructing a jury that 
they may infer intention is simply a way of saying, ‘[y]ou may, if you see fit, declare that this 
case is one of murder.’85  Perhaps that would have been a preferable approach all along.  
Certainly, there have been suggestions that a better solution would have been to either restrict 
the definition of intention to direct intent, or to extend the mens rea of murder rather than risk 
merging the concepts of intention and recklessness.86  These suggestions have merit as we 
cannot on the one hand advocate that causing harm intentionally is morally worse and 
deserving of the most severe punishment, whilst at the same time assimilating intention and 
recklessness.    
 
Having considered the boundaries between intention and recklessness it is clear that the 
earlier decisions obscured the breakpoint between these two legal concepts by equating 
intention with foresight because of historic developments and a desire to find culpable 
defendants guilty of the most serious form of homicide.  More recent cases, have sought to 
separate the two fault terms by limiting oblique intention to foresight of virtual certainty but 
although some distance has now been put between them for the purposes of this analysis, 
there is still criticism of the current state of indirect intention and future reform is possible.87  
It is now necessary to turn the focus on to the courts’ treatment of the concept of 
recklessness, where it will be demonstrated that the judiciary have had a similar battle in 
determining the appropriate scope for criminal recklessness.  Whereas the debate about 
intention concerned the degree of foresight necessary to permit a finding that D intended the 
proscribed act, the development of recklessness has centred upon whether foresight of the 
                                            
85 E. Griew, ‘States of mind, presumptions and inferences’ (n 81) at 82. 
86 A. Halpin, ‘Intended Consequences and Unintentional Fallacies’ (n 83) at 114. 
87 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13thEdn., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
 at 108-116. 
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risk of harm is relevant at all.  Once again it will be shown that in an attempt to convict those 
deemed deserving of punishment, the courts have struggled to find a settled definition of 
recklessness which has universal application, impinging on the realm of criminal negligence 
as a result.   
 
3.3 Recklessness: The history – a move from “malice” to “recklessness” 
 
As this chapter has already highlighted, there has been difficulty in establishing the legal 
definition of “intention,” a word with a relatively straightforward everyday meaning.   
However, the judicial struggles over “intention” have been matched, if not eclipsed, when 
compared to the judicial search for a legal definition of the word “reckless”.  This chapter 
will now critically analyse the different approaches to determining recklessness in the 
criminal law resulting from a judicial and legislative search for a legal definition.  The 
advantages and disadvantages of each approach will be considered in relation to issues of 
moral culpability.  In particular, Caldwell/Lawrence recklessness will be scrutinised as it is 
submitted that the law on recklessness is still not settled following R v G and R.88   It will be 
submitted that the latest definition is flawed, inappropriate, and does not reflect current 
practice.  Consequently, a more objective, capacity based approach will be advocated. 
 
As is known, in 2004, the decision of the House of Lords in R v G & R89 overruled the 
definition of recklessness from MPC v Caldwell,90 or at least departed from it, and heralded a 
                                            
88 [2004] 4 All ER 765. 
89 G & R [2004] 4 All ER 765. 
90 [1982] AC 341 But only in relation to the definition of ‘reckless’ for the purpose of the CDA 1971, G & R 
[2004] 4 All ER 765, per Lord Bingham at 783, para.(j); but see Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 2003) 2 
Cr App R 367. Lord Rodger states G&R overrules Caldwell; Lords Bingham and Steyn “depart” from it which, 
as Kimel observes, is more technically correct given that the facts in Caldwell concerned self- induced 
intoxication and the case would still be decided the same way; D. Kimel, ‘Inadvertent Recklessness in Criminal 
Law’ (2004) 120 Law Quarterly Review 548. 
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return to a subjective definition of recklessness,91 not an earlier interpretation from R v 
Cunningham,92 but using the definition found in the Draft Criminal Code.  An analysis of 
these cases and the definitions employed will be discussed below.  What will become clear is 
that the labels of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ can be misleading as there are different degrees 
of subjectivism and objectivism revealed by the case analysis.  The current definition, it will 
be argued here, could be now interpreted as a purely subjective test which would be a 
departure from all previous forms of criminal recklessness.  If such an interpretation was to 
be followed it would be extremely difficult to convict anyone of recklessly committing an 
offence.   
 
What will be considered in greater detail is whether recklessness as a form of mens rea 
should be based on subjectivism or objectivism,93 or a synthesis of the two.94  It will also be 
necessary to consider whether there needs to be a consistent application of approach to 
recklessness across all offences where it forms part of the mens rea or whether a variety of 
interpretations are more appropriate.   
 
Whilst a subjective definition of recklessness might seem attractive, it fails to catch all those 
who are morally blameworthy.  In contrast, a purely objective interpretation can lead to 
injustice in circumstances where the defendant lacked the capacity to foresee the risk of 
harm.  A more objective form of recklessness that considers the capacity and attitude of the 
defendant will be strongly advocated, but not a revival of the Caldwell/Lawrence Model 
                                            
91 The judgment essentially restricted its application to criminal damage but it has since been held to cover all 
offences unless otherwise specified in statute. 
92 [1957] 2 QB 396. 
93 V. Tadros proposes a more objective test in ‘Recklessness and the Duty to Take Care’ in S. Shute and A. 
Simester (eds.), Criminal Law Theory Doctrines of the General Part (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
257-258.  This test would address some of the issues with the subjective position but does not address all of 
them, which is why it is not adopted here. 
94 R. Tur, ‘Subjectivism and Objectivism: Towards Synthesis’ in S.Shute, J. Gardner and J. Horder (eds.), 
Action and Value in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 213. 
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Direction, as this was deemed to be purely objective.  It will be argued that recklessness 
based upon conscious awareness produces too narrow a definition and culpable inadvertence 
should be encompassed by examining why no thought was given to the risk. 
   
3.3.1 Recklessness – the continuing search for a definition95 
 
There are three96 main approaches which have been employed to deal with the concept of 
recklessness within the criminal law, although others have been recognised.97  These will be 
examined in turn, after a brief historical background has been outlined. 
The development of this mens rea term has been invaluably investigated by Norrie98 who 
traces its oscillation from an objective approach to a subjective view at the hands of the 
Victorian Law Commissioners.  The Commissioners were considering the doctrine of implied 
malice, now the concept of recklessness, as it applied to murder.99  Norrie notes that they 
reinterpreted the words used by the eighteenth century lawyer, Sir Michael Foster, which 
would have extended liability beyond foresight.  As a result, the concept was restricted to a 
‘question of subjective advertence’ which ‘was a means of depositivising, de-moralising and 
thereby rendering certain the law of recklessness with regard to homicide.’100  To facilitate 
certainty and consistency in decisions a more objective approach, with its inherent flaw of 
                                            
95 An earlier draft of much of the following material in this chapter has been published: C. Crosby, 
‘Recklessness – the continuing search for a definition’ (2008) 72 Journal of Criminal Law 313. 
96 Advertent and subjective recklessness in R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396; objective recklessness including 
inadvertence in Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis v Caldwell [1982] AC 341;and the subjective test in 
the Draft Criminal Code, (Law Commission,  A Criminal Code for England and Wales, Law Com. No. 177 
(1989), vol. 1, cl.18).   
97  ‘Indifference’ recklessness i.e. displaying an indifference as to whether there is a risk or not, see R v  
Sheppard [1981] AC 394, R v Kimber [1983] 3 All ER 316,  R v Breckenridge (1984) 79 Cr. App. R 294, and R 
v Satnam and Kewal (1983) Cr App R 149, cited by Andrew Ashworth , Criminal Liability in a Medical 
Context: the Treatment of Good Intentions, in A.P. Simester and A.T.H. Smith (eds), Harm &Culpability  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 175.  Norrie considers a fifth interpretation i.e. recklessness as committing a 
crime of ‘basic intent’ whilst intoxicated, (DPP v Majewski [1976] 2 All ER 142), A.W. Norrie, Law and the 
Beautiful Soul (Glasshouse Press: London, 2005) 112. There could soon be another definition added by the Law 
Commission’s Draft Criminal Law Bill for the offences against the person, Law Com. 218 (1993). 
98 A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History, (n 56).  
99 Ibid. at 76. 
100 Ibid. at 77.  
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allowing a jury to influence decisions by bringing to bear their own values and opinions on 
what the law should be into their deliberations, was rejected.  It can be argued that as juries in 
Victorian times were hardly representative of the population at large and could well have 
possessed a skewed set of moral values relative to the values of the wider society; this could 
have been some justification for such a restriction of culpability. 
 
3.3.2 Cunningham Recklessness 
 
Prior to 2004, it is well known that there were two main opposing interpretations of the term 
“reckless”, within the criminal law.  The first of these approaches came from R v 
Cunningham101  which maintained the subjective view of the Commissioners referred to 
above.  As will be recalled, in Cunningham, Byrne J had cited with approval the definition 
apparently102 proposed by Professor Kenny in Outlines of Criminal Law: ‘the accused has 
foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done, and yet has gone on to take the risk 
of it.’103  The requirement of foresight was then accepted throughout the criminal law, 
providing consistency.  Although this is described as a ‘subjective’ test it is important to 
make clear at this stage that this is a little misleading.  The test is certainly subjective to the 
extent that the particular defendant must be found to have foreseen the risk of a particular 
harm arising from his conduct.  It is also objective in the assessment of whether the risk was a 
reasonable one to run in the circumstances, a question for the judge or jury to determine.    
 
The facts of Cunningham are worthy of further consideration because the case was not as 
straightforward as it first appears.  Cunningham tore a gas meter from a cellar wall to steal 
                                            
101 [1957] 2 All ER 412.   
102 See J. Horder, ‘Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens Rea’ [1997] 113 Law Quarterly Review  
95 at 114, who submits that the ‘definition’ was in fact J.W.C. Turner’s misleading paraphrasing of Kenny’s 
more precise definition in his Outlines of Criminal Law (1902) 147-148. 
103 [1957] 2 All ER 412. 
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money from it.  He left gas escaping from the pipes, which seeped into a neighbouring 
occupied house.  He was charged and convicted of theft of the money from the meter, but he 
was also convicted under s.23 Offences against the Person Act 1861, with maliciously 
causing a noxious thing to be taken by a person so as to endanger life.  This conviction was 
subsequently quashed by the Court of Appeal on two grounds.  First, because the trial judge 
had instructed the jury that D must have known the gas would seep through into the 
neighbouring property, whereas it was the jury’s role to determine whether D foresaw such a 
risk as a matter of fact;104 and secondly, because the judge had stated that statutory malice 
meant ‘wickedness’, clearly a wrong direction and the reason the term ‘malice’ was later 
abandoned. 
 
What is interesting is that D was not trespassing in the cellar; he had permission to be there 
from his future mother-in-law, the tenant of the house.  He was going to move into the house 
after his marriage and there was a stopcock nearby which he could have used to turn off the 
gas supply.   His behaviour did not make any sense, but he did not give evidence at trial.  
Clearly, by leaving the gas escaping there was a danger of an explosion, but as it was the gas 
escaped into the adjoining property.  This happened because the two properties had originally 
been one, and when converted into two separate houses, the party wall in the cellar between 
the two houses was ‘shoddily constructed of rubble loosely cemented’.105  The question is 
whether Cunningham was aware of this.  It is not certain that he would have been convicted 
even if the trial judge had given the correct direction to the jury as it is possible that he did 
not know of the problem with the wall. 
 
                                            
104 G. Williams, ‘The Unresolved Problem of Recklessness’ (1988) 8 Legal Studies 74 at 79. 
105 Ibid. at 79. 
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When the term ‘malicious’ was replaced by the word ‘reckless’ in statutes, starting with the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971, subsequent cases followed this subjective line and Cunningham 
recklessness was subsequently extended and clarified in the later cases of R v Parker,106  R v 
Briggs, 107 and R v Stephenson,108 to mean that foresight of ‘some’ damage of a particular 
kind was all that was required and that ‘knowledge or appreciation of a risk …must have 
entered the defendant’s mind even though he may have suppressed it or driven it out.’109  
 
The unfortunate consequence of applying the subjective definition to recklessness is that 
failing to think about a risk would not ground criminal culpability.  This establishes what 
Norrie terms a morally unsubstantive account of criminal responsibility,110 as a defendant 
could still be morally culpable for his actions, for example by behaving with a callous 
disregard for others, but by failing to consider the effect of his actions he could not be 
deemed criminally reckless.  The subjective definition clearly reflects choice theory as D is 
making a conscious choice to risk harm, but where D acts with a total disregard for the 
welfare of others, even though he fails to consider any risk in his actions, he should be held 
criminally responsible and character theorists would support such an extension of liability.  A 
lack of thought can portray a bad character. 
 
The dilemma which arises as a result of Cunningham recklessness is whether it is appropriate 
to adopt a narrow liability based solely upon whether, as a question of fact, the accused 
                                            
106 [1977] 2 All ER 37 D was having a terrible day, he overslept on the train home missing his station, had to 
pay an extra fare to cover his excess travel and tried to phone a taxi to get home but the public telephone did not 
work.  He banged the telephone handset down on its cradle 2-3 times just as two police officers were passing.  
He was charged with criminal damage to the cracked phone. 
107 [1977] 1 All ER 475 D tugged at V’s car door handle to open the door causing it to break off.  He was 
charged with criminal damage but acquitted on appeal as he had only used normal force and the risk was not so 
inherent in his actions as to make his appreciation of the risk inevitable. 
108 [1979] QB 695 at 704 D was a tramp who sheltered from the cold in a haystack and lit a fire to keep warm.  
He was a schizophrenic and may not have had the capacity to appreciate the risk of damage and so his 
conviction was quashed. 
109 [1979] QB 695 at 704, per Lord Lane. 
110 A. Norrie, Law and the Beautiful Soul (London: Glasshouse Press, 2005) 84. 
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foresaw the risk of harm?   Admittedly, this approach111 clearly establishes the morally 
censurable behaviour of D in that he exercised a free choice to take the risk.  It also has the 
advantage of providing a seemingly simple question for a jury to determine when compared 
with a more objective test of asking the jury to determine whether D should have foreseen the 
risk.   But a subjective approach to the mens rea of recklessness also has the unfortunate side 
effect of risking undermining confidence in, and support for, the criminal justice system 
because if the judge or jury accept that D did not foresee the risk they must acquit, even 
where D should have foreseen it and was capable of such foresight.  The only way liability 
could still lie would be if the particular offence could also be committed negligently, 
inadvertence being sufficient in such circumstances.   
 
This is not always the case.  Sometimes where D should possibly have foreseen the risk and 
the matter of foresight is in doubt, D has still been convicted because the courts have found 
foresight existed where it may well not have done.112  There has also been foresight found on 
occasion where it is doubtful that even the reasonable person would have foreseen the risk.113  
Such convictions have been secured by imposing an objective standard in reality, whilst 
stating that the subjective test applied.  This risks undermining confidence in the criminal 
justice system as the law is not being applied in a transparent way.  The solution is to adopt a 
more objective standard. 
 
In support of the subjective approach it has been said that a judge or jury in practice does not 
have to rely entirely on D’s account of what he was or was not thinking at the time of acting: 
                                            
111 Now adopted in the leading case of G & R [2004] 4 All ER 765, discussed below. 
112 For example,  R v Parker [1977] 2 All ER 37, discussed below. 
113 See Booth v CPS [2006] EWHC, discussed below. 
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The jury may (and generally should) find that he knew of a risk of which everyone 
would have known – provided that there is nothing in the facts to indicate that the 
defendant did not know it.114 
This is evidence that an objective approach is being applied in practice and it also creates the 
danger that a jury may well decide that as they would have foreseen the risk then D must 
have done so too, yet the jury has the benefit of hindsight, something not available to D at the 
time of acting.  In some of the examples, discussed below, it is unlikely that even a jury 
would have actually foreseen the risk, without the benefit of hindsight.  It would be 
preferable to have a more transparent test for recklessness that does not require advertence to 
risk, based upon the capacity and attitude of D and placing an evidential burden on him to 
show why he should not be deemed reckless in the particular circumstances.   
 
3.3.3 Caldwell/Lawrence Recklessness 
 
In response to the flaws in the subjective test, noted above, a second interpretation of 
recklessness was adopted by the House of Lords in Metropolitan Police Commissioner v 
Caldwell,115 producing a more objective definition of recklessness.  In this case the term 
‘reckless,’ chosen by the legislature as a replacement for the misunderstood term of 
‘malicious’ under the Criminal Damage Act 1971, was interpreted.116  The House held that 
the term reckless should not be restricted to the narrow interpretation given in Cunningham 
and a broader approach was propounded.  Lord Diplock, delivering the leading judgment, 
stated that a person would be reckless under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 if:  
                                            
114 G. Williams, ‘The Unresolved Problem of Recklessness’ (n 104) at 75. 
115 [1982] AC 341, [1981] 1 All ER 961. Having quarrelled with an hotel owner, D got drunk and set fire to the 
hotel.  The fire was discovered and extinguished before any serious harm occurred. 
116 Note, the term had already been interpreted subjectively by the Court of Appeal, see, for example , R v 
Stephenson [1979] QB 695 at 703-704. 
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(1) he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that property will be 
destroyed or damaged and (2) when he does that act he either has not given any 
thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or he has recognised that there 
was some risk involved and has none the less gone on to do it.117 
In his Lordship’s opinion, this was an appropriate direction to be given to a jury and it later 
became known as Lord Diplock’s Model Direction.  In R v Lawrence,118 decided after 
Caldwell but on the same day, Lord Diplock again used his Model Direction but the ‘obvious 
risk’ under (1) was amended to an ‘obvious and serious risk’ for offences of reckless driving.  
The direction encompassed two states of mind in which either the defendant chose to ignore a 
risk of harmful consequences flowing from an act which the accused had recognised as 
existing, or he failed to give any thought to whether there was any risk in circumstances 
where, if any thought were given to the matter, it would be obvious119 that there was.120  Lord 
Diplock’s Direction ‘defined’121 statutory recklessness, with the exception of offences under 
the Offences against the Person Act 1861,122 for more than 20 years.  This was seen as 
creating a link between mens rea and concepts of moral wickedness.123 
 
The flaw that emerged from this ‘definition’ resulted from the ambiguity in Lord Diplock’s 
judgment.  It was not at all clear whether the test was to be a purely objective one regardless 
                                            
117 Caldwell [1981] All ER 961 at 967, per Lord Diplock. 
118 [1982] AC 510, a case of reckless driving. 
119 Williams suggested that Lord Diplock intended that the risk be obvious to the defendant, G. Williams, 
‘Recklessness Redefined’ (1981) 40 Cambridge Law Journal 252 at 270.  However, subsequently the courts 
gave Lord Diplock’s Direction a purely objective meaning, see, for example, Elliott v C (A Minor) [1983] 1 
WLR 939, discussed below. 
120 Note, Donovan J in R v McKinnon [1958] 3 WLR 688 had considered ‘recklessness’ should be left to bear its 
full meaning and would cover the case of a high degree of negligence without dishonesty. See also Hyam where 
Lord Cross used ‘reckless’ to cover ‘not having reflected on the probable consequences of her act.’(1974) 50 
Cr.App.R 9 at 100. 
121 Halpin notes that an actual definition of recklessness was not provided, the word was to bear its ordinary 
English meaning , Lord Diplock recognising a number of states of mind but not providing a synthesising 
definition; A. Halpin, Definition in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart  Publishing, 2004) 78-80. 
122 It may seem unprincipled that this established an objective test for criminal damage yet cases of physical 
injury employed a subjective approach; K. Campbell and. A. Ashworth, ‘Recklessness in assault – and in 
general?’ (1991) Law Quarterly Review 187. 
123 L.H. Leigh and J. Temkin, ‘Recklessness Revisited’ [1982] 45 Modern Law Review 198. 
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of the cognitive capacity of the accused or if it was intended to be adaptable to the capacity of 
the individual defendant.  Choice theory would clearly be represented in the second limb of 
the Model Direction (where D has recognised the risk), but could only be reflected in the 
inadvertent strand if it was clear that D had knowledge of the risk involved in his actions.  
Utilising character theory principles, both the advertent and inadvertent agent could be 
demonstrating bad character flaws on either limb of the Direction, but the capacity of the 
individual defendant would need to be taken into account when determining whether his 
actions evidenced a bad character flaw.  This would retain some subjectivity in an otherwise 
objective test.  If the capacity of the accused was irrelevant it would fit well with Gardner’s 
role theory of culpability124 and would result in pure objectivism.  What was clear was that by 
including inadvertence to risk Lord Diplock was blurring the clear distinction that had 
hitherto existed between reckless and negligent conduct, the former requiring advertence 
unlike the latter. 
 
As will be shown, the courts subsequently chose to follow an objective interpretation; the 
defendant would be reckless if an ordinary prudent person would have been aware of the risk.  
This had the potential to produce inherently unjust convictions and attracted trenchant 
criticism.125  It must be noted that his Lordship ascribed to the adjective’s possible meanings 
‘careless, regardless, or heedless’ which he believed presupposes that if D thought about it 
before acting the risk of the harmful consequences would have been apparent to him.126  
These terms are also employed to describe criminal negligence and someone who causes 
harm by being ‘careless, regardless, or heedless’ should not be considered reckless without 
more.  It is the combination of these with sufficient cognitive capacity and evidence of a 
callous disregard for others that should amount to criminal recklessness. 
                                            
124 See discussion of this in Chapter 2 at 2.7.1 
125 For example, G. Williams, ‘The Unresolved Problem of Recklessness’ (n 104).  
126 Caldwell [1982] AC 341 at 351. 
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Attention has been drawn to the fact that the Model Direction is presented as a unity but that 
with point (2) it is actually two distinct tests.  This is because for the inadvertent strand (‘has 
not given any thought’) the risk foreseen by the ‘reasonable person’ must be an ‘obvious’ 
one, whereas with the advertent strand (‘has recognized that there was some risk involved’) 
there is no such requirement for the risk to be obvious as ‘the element of deliberation suffices 
to convict for recklessness’127 for running even a small risk.  If this is correct and the risk 
does not have to be an obvious one to a reasonable person where D has recognized that there 
is a risk, this surely must refer to a conviction for deliberately running a small risk that could 
possibly result in serious consequences rather than choosing to risk a slight possibility of 
minor harm.  It would be more difficult to justify imposing liability where the risk was not an 
obvious one and the harm risked was minimal but, if D’s actions had no social utility 
whatsoever, liability could still be justified.  However, it must be acknowledged that 
assessing the degree of risk and probability of harm can be difficult and involves evaluative 
socio-political and moral judgements which cause indeterminacy.128  Here, it is advocated 
that where D is inadvertent a requirement that the risk be an obvious one to a reasonable 
person should be a minimum requirement, but account should also be taken of the cognitive 
capacity and attitude of the accused. 
 
3.3.3.1 The Caldwell/Lawrence Lacuna 
 
Although Lord Diplock intended to expand the definition of recklessness, it is clear from the 
Model Direction that certain defendants would be technically outside the scope of his 
direction.  Smith,129 Williams,130 and Griew131 all identified a lacuna within the 
                                            
127 A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History (n 56) 76. 
128 A. Norrie, Law and the Beautiful Soul (n 110) 84-85. 
129 J.C. Smith, ‘Commentary on Caldwell' [1981] Criminal Law Review 392 at 394. 
130 G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ (n 119) at 278. 
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Caldwell/Lawrence direction where D had considered whether there was a risk and decided 
there was none or where D had foreseen a risk and believed he had taken ample precautions 
to prevent it from happening.   This has led to the suggestion that the genuine but negligent 
mistake-maker would be excused from liability for recklessness.132  This would be a desirable 
state of affairs.  
 
Clearly, any reference to such an individual was unnecessary on the facts in either case, 
however, it has been argued that there would be no justification for acquitting a driver ‘whose 
unshakeable faith in their ability to avoid danger displays an arrogance bordering on 
lunacy.’133  Whilst this is acknowledged, whether such an individual would be deemed by a 
judge or jury to be a ‘genuine but negligent mistake maker’ is perhaps unlikely.  Also, such 
an individual could be deemed reckless, under the approach advocated here, as his actions 
would show a callous disregard for the welfare of others; he would not be able to satisfy the 
evidential burden imposed upon him.  This would leave the truly negligent mistake maker to 
fall within the remit of negligence. 
 
Evidence supporting the lacuna is possibly in the extra dictum to the Model Direction found 
in Lawrence, that the inference of recklessness might be displaced by ‘any explanation’ that 
D might give as to his state of mind at the time.134  Another issue raised135 concerned the 
defendant with special knowledge who identifies a risk that would not be obvious to the 
ordinary prudent man.  Such a person would have been convicted under the subjective test 
because he foresaw the risk and yet would unjustifiably escape liability on an objective test 
                                                                                                                                       
131 E. Griew, ‘Reckless Damage and Reckless Driving: Living with Caldwell and Lawrence’ [1981] Criminal 
Law Review at 748. 
132 J.C. Smith, ‘Commentary on Caldwell' (n 129); G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ (n 119). 
133 D.J. Birch, ‘The Foresight Saga: The Biggest Mistake of All?’ [1988] Criminal Law Review 4 at 5. 
134 Ibid. 
135 J.C. Smith, ‘Commentary on Caldwell' (n 129). 
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because the ordinary prudent individual would have lacked the expertise to realise that a risk 
existed.  This would not have happened under the Model Direction as it clearly included the 
subjective test; rather it was the objective test that was satisfied by reference to the ordinary 
prudent person so that the inadvertent risk taker was judged by reference to common sense 
rather than specific expertise. 
 
If consideration is given to circumstances where the defendant claims to have ruled out the 
risk, Williams sees this as a challenge to Lord Diplock’s dismissal of the restricted meaning 
given to recklessness in Cunningham because:  
it called for meticulous analysis by the jury of the thoughts that passed through the 
mind of the accused to distinguish between not attending to risk and knowingly 
running the risk.136   
He contends that on the same basis the distinction between not attending to risk and ruling 
out the risk is at least as ‘narrow’ and difficult for the jury. 
These lacunae have never been successfully argued.  In Chief Constable of Avon and 
Somerset v Shimmen,137 D had been acquitted at first instance because he fell within the 
lacuna, having foreseen the risk but deciding, wrongly, that he had eliminated it.  On appeal, 
it was held that the wrong interpretation had been placed upon D’s evidence, it was not that 
he believed he had completely eliminated the risk but rather that he thought he had eliminated 
it as much as possible leaving him caught by the Model Direction.  Birch suggests that this 
case narrowed the lacuna, by extending the time frame within which the recklessness would 
be tested, so that ‘only …those who confidently believe that …no precautions are required 
                                            
136 G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ (n 119) at 279. 
137 (1987) 84 Cr.App.R. 145 D was a martial arts expert and was demonstrating his skill to friends by kicking 
close to a window that he did not intend to break but he smashed the window. 
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because no risk exists’ would benefit from it.138  This, she argues, could be a morally flawed 
distinction to make as the person who realises ‘that precautions are necessary and who is 
trying his incompetent best may be the worthier soul.’139  Certainly from a choice or character 
theory viewpoint Birch’s contention is correct. 
 
There are two further points in relation to the negligent mistake maker.  First, society expects 
people to form their opinions based upon reasonable grounds and secondly, any moral 
distinction based upon D’s opinion that there was no risk must rely on an assumption that D 
would have acted differently had he known otherwise and this is not always the case.140  
These are both salient arguments.  Where D forms an opinion based upon unreasonable 
grounds or where he wrongly believes there is no risk it is likely that the court would find his 
explanations unconvincing unless there were other factors present that impacted upon D’s 
practical reasoning. 
 
3.3.3.2 The Effect of Caldwell 
 
As is known, Caldwell attracted widespread criticism141 and its application was subsequently 
judicially limited to the offences of criminal damage, reckless manslaughter142 and reckless 
driving.143  Lord Diplock’s leading judgment had changed the definition of recklessness from 
                                            
138 D.J. Birch, ‘The Foresight Saga: The Biggest Mistake of All?’ (n 133) at 17-18.  See the comments of 
Mustill LJ in R v Reid (1989) 91 Cr App Rep at 269. 
139 D.J. Birch, ‘The Foresight Saga: The Biggest Mistake of All?’ (n 133) at 18.   
140 Ibid. 
141 See, for example, the judgments of Glidewell, J. and Goff, L.J. in Elliott v C (A Minor)  (1983) 77 Cr.App.R. 
103; G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ (n 119); E. Griew, ‘Reckless Damage and Reckless Driving: Living 
with Caldwell and Lawrence’ (n 131); J.C. Smith, ‘Commentary on Caldwell' (n 129); cf G. Syrota, ‘A Radical 
Change in the Law of Recklessness’ [1982] Criminal Law Review 97; and also J. McEwan and St J. Robilliard, 
‘Recklessness: the House of Lords and the criminal law’ (1981)1 Legal Studies 267. 
142 R v Seymour [1983] 2 AC 493. The extent to which this offence still exists following R v Adomako [1995] 1 
AC 171 is questionable. 
143 Later replaced by dangerous driving following the Dept. of Transport and the Home Office, Road Traffic 
Review Report in 1998 which found Lawrence recklessness too subjective, see C. Clarkson and H. M. Keating, 
Criminal Law, Text and Materials, 5th Edn., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003). 
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the subjective test in Cunningham144 to an objective test, based upon the state of mind of the 
‘ordinary prudent individual.’145  This upset the ‘well-established order of forms of 
liability,’146 that being intention (the most culpable), recklessness requiring advertence, then 
negligence (but only when it is “gross”) which involves inadvertence when the mind is 




The attraction of a more objective approach, provided it considers the cognitive capacity of 
the individual, is that those agents who should have foreseen the risk of their conduct causing 
harm to others could be found culpable.  One disadvantage is that this would allow the law to 
be affected by politics and social value judgements which could lead to uncertainty as 
different panels may decide similar cases but come to different conclusions.  Allowing such 
influences makes the law arguably fairer because justice can be done in a particular case and 
precedents would be established over time which would make the law more certain.  On 
closer examination, it is difficult to assess exactly what the majority in Caldwell actually 
intended the ratio of the case and the legal definition of recklessness to be. While the 
judgments offer no definitive answer they do reveal some insights into their Lordships’ 
reasoning and give rise to several issues requiring further consideration. 
    
3.3.3.3 The Question before the House in Caldwell 
  
One such issue is that the question before the House in Caldwell was not whether the term 
‘reckless’ should be subjectively or objectively defined, but whether self-induced intoxication 
                                            
144 [1957] 2 All ER 412. 
145 Caldwell [1982] AC 341 at 354 para.(c). 
146 A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History (n 56) 62. 
147 G. Williams, Criminal Law: the General Part (n 28) 100. 
151 
 
was a defence to a charge based on intention or recklessness under s1(2)(b) Criminal Damage 
Act 1971, following R v Majewski.148  On that basis it could be argued that the direction on 
recklessness was not the complete ratio of the case and the direction should have been 
viewed in the context of Lord Diplock’s whole judgment before the ratio was determined.149  
This approach might have produced a fairer capacity based test for reckless conduct, which 
may well have been what Lord Diplock envisaged.  
 
Alternatively, accepting the ratio solely on the facts of the case, in situations where D was 
neither drunk, enraged nor over-excited, the precedent could have been distinguished.  This 
option could have drastically limited the scope of a more objective test and provided an 
opportunity to close a gap in the law to ground culpability where the risk was obvious and D 
should have foreseen it.  After formulating his novel direction as to what constituted 
recklessness, Lord Diplock cited with approval the speech of Lord Elwyn-Jones LC in 
Majewski and the correct interpretation of English Law found in the provision in  §2.08(2) of 
the American Penal Code: 
When recklessness establishes an element of the offence, if the actor, due to self-
induced intoxication, is unaware of the risk of which he would have been aware had 
he been sober, such awareness is immaterial. 
This could support an argument, (though not one supported here) that, as in both Caldwell 
and Majewski the defendants were drunk, the approach to recklessness approved by the 
majority in Caldwell should have only been applied in such circumstances of self-induced 
                                            
148 [1977] AC 443 D, whilst heavily intoxicated, assaulted a number of police officers who were restraining and 
arresting him. 
149 Note the judgments of Lords Goff and Ackner in R v Reid [1992] All ER 673 where they consider that 
directions such as the ‘Model Direction’ should be adapted to fit the facts of a particular case and should be 
capable of adaptation as it is difficult to foresee what new situations may occur.  
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intoxication.150  More importantly, it should be noted that this quote is also partially 
subjective in that the actor ‘would’ have been aware had he been sober.  This could be viewed 
as evidence that a capacity to foresee risk was an essential element of the Caldwell/Lawrence 
objective test, as submitted here.  It is not that the actor should have been aware because a 
reasonable person would have foreseen the risk.151   
 
In consequence, although it is possible that their Lordships did intend to extend the scope of 
recklessness in Caldwell to include those who were capable of foreseeing the risk under 
different circumstances, for example when they were not in a rage,152 nor drunk, nor even 
excited,153 it is less clear that they really intended that individuals who were incapable of ever 
foreseeing the risk could be guilty of an offence.154  What is beyond doubt, is that the 
judgment in Caldwell is ambiguous and where there is any uncertainty in the criminal law 
subsequent courts should interpret any such words in favour of the defendant.155    
 
It is possible to argue that after sitting in judgment in Majewski, Lord Diplock’s approach 
may have become hardened by appeals involving defendants who chose to become 
intoxicated and were trying to escape liability for resulting crimes,156 such defendants 
becoming the focus of his attempts to redefine ‘recklessness’.  Yet, such an argument would 
fail as it is evident from some of his judgments that he did not apply purely objective 
                                            
150 Lord Edmund- Davies found even this suggestion “draconian” drawing support from the Report of the Butler 
Committee, [1981] 1 All ER 961 at 972; [1982] AC 341 at 361. 
151 G. Williams, Criminal Law: the General Part (n 28) 105. 
152 G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ (n 119) at 260 supports this argument as it is culpable. 
153 Ibid: rejecting extending culpability to include those who are excited. 
154 However, Lord Bingham states that it is ‘questionable whether such consideration would have led to a 
different result’ because of the overruling by the majority of Stephenson, see G&R at 786 para.(a) 
155 ‘One does not have to accept the full sweep of Dworkin’s rights thesis to believe that, where there is 
ambiguity in the case law, it should be interpreted, where possible, in accordance with the fundamental principle 
that an individual ought not to be punished where there is no capacity or fair opportunity to act otherwise,’ F. 
Field and M.  Lynn, ‘The capacity for recklessness’ (1992) 12 Legal Studies 74 at 79. For statute ambiguity see 
Hobson v Geldhill [1978] 1 WLR 215. 
156 ‘One instinctively recoils from the notion that a defendant can escape the criminal consequences of his 
injurious conduct by drinking himself into a state where he is blind to the risk he is causing to others,’ per Lord 
Bingham in G&R at 785 para.(j). 
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principles.  For example, in R v Sheppard,157 he held that the mens rea for reckless wilful 
neglect of a child required an awareness of the risk or unawareness due to not caring, and also 
in R v Miller,158 D would only be liable where he had an awareness of the risk that he had 
created and then failed to take reasonable steps to avoid harm.  Clearly, Lord Diplock did not 
advocate liability for inadvertence per se.   
 
It was observed that Lord Diplock’s dicta in Sheppard would only have excused those who 
were ‘constitutionally incapable’159 of seeing the danger.  Consequently, if the parent had the 
necessary capacity and yet failed to act, indifference would be presumed, indifference being 
‘a conclusion to be drawn from capacity.’160  Where the welfare of the vulnerable is 
concerned this is seemingly the correct position however it should not be an irrebuttable 
presumption as there could be a rare case where justice would demand leniency.  
  
3.3.3.4 The Problems of a Capacity Based Test 
 
In order to advocate a capacity based test for recklessness, it is necessary here to consider 
what factors could be relevant in assessing D’s culpability where he fails to foresee a risk. It 
is interesting to consider the two examples that Lord Diplock examined to justify his 
departure from a subjective test.  He referred to the situation where it had crossed a 
defendant’s mind that there was a risk but this defendant’s mind was so ‘affected by rage or 
excitement or confused by drink, he did not appreciate the seriousness of the risk or trusted 
that good luck would prevent its happening’.161  Such a defendant would be guilty under a 
                                            
157 [1980] 3 W.L.R. 960 Parents were acquitted of the wilful neglect of a child because they lacked the capacity 
to appreciate the child needed medical attention. 
158 [1983] 2 AC 161 D was squatting in a house and fell asleep while smoking. When he woke he realised his 
mattress was on fire and simply moved to another room instead of taking steps to prevent the fire spreading. 
159 D.J. Birch, ‘The Foresight Saga: The Biggest Mistake of All?’ (n 133) at 13. 
160 Ibid. 
161 [1982] AC 341 at 352 para.(b). 
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subjective test because he had thought about it, but if the same defendant for any of the same 
reasons had not given it any thought he would not be guilty, unless voluntarily intoxicated.162  
The important point here is that Lord Diplock regarded both scenarios as equally 
blameworthy,163 but did not elaborate on why this should be so.  
 
If we interpret Lord Diplock’s words to be referring to the defendant who has the capacity to 
foresee the risk under normal circumstances, when not affected by rage or excitement, then 
what he is suggesting makes sense.  Such a defendant may be deemed to be morally 
blameworthy for failing to show sufficient practical concern for the welfare of others and 
failing to control his behaviour.  We would not excuse a reckless driver from moral blame if 
his defence was based on his lack of perception of risk where he claimed to be too angry to 
think of it because another driver had pulled out suddenly in front of him or because he had 
had a row with his wife before leaving home.  Nor would we excuse from blame a driver who 
started his journey or continued driving when overtired, and arguably even the person who is 
reckless because of over excitement would be deemed blameworthy if he caused serious 
harm to others.  The same justification for liability can be applied in such circumstances as 
when consuming too much alcohol, the defendant can behave recklessly in the way he acts 
immediately prior to the actus reus, as in the self-induced intoxication cases,164 as well as 
during the commission of an offence. 
 
The leading academic subjectivists at the time of the decisions in Caldwell and Lawrence 
were highly critical of this extension of culpability.  Griew165 argued that where the lack of 
perception arises not from indifference but from the ‘effects of shock, stress or fatigue’ 
                                            
162 R v Majewski [1977] AC 443. 
163 [1982] AC 341 at 352 para.(c): ‘Neither state of mind seem to me to be less blameworthy than the other’. 
164 Although such cases do create problems for the general principle that the actus reus and mens rea must 
coincide for criminal liability.    
165 ‘Reckless Damage and Reckless Driving: Living with Caldwell and Lawrence’ (n 131) at 747. 
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censure would be inappropriate in some cases.  The example offered to support this assertion 
is that of the driver who is told some shocking news by his passenger and as a result of this 
shock he fails to foresee a risk.  Whilst one might have sympathy with the driver and would 
not want him to be criminally liable, this would surely depend upon whether he had the 
opportunity to pull over and stop the vehicle until he recovered.  From a character theory 
viewpoint, where there was no evidence of indifference or rage there would be no evidence of 
a bad character and such an agent should be excused. 
 
Williams166 admits that the factors Lord Diplock considered in his example, rage, excitement 
and drink, are problematic for supporters of a subjective approach.  Finding uncontrolled rage 
and drink reprehensible, he suggested that these could profitably be added to the Draft Bill on 
the Mental Element in Crime167 but questioned extending the proposition to excitement, even 
though he had permitted this possibility earlier.168  He considered that in such a state someone 
could play a stupid and dangerous practical joke, but where there was no evil intent it would 
be wrong to convict such a person on the basis of constructive recklessness.   This is a 
debatable point where serious harm results and, moreover, what amounted to evil intent 
would require further elaboration.  
 
A suggestion that there should never be any criminal responsibility without some ‘evil intent’ 
in such circumstances is too great a generalisation because there may well be instances where 
it would be appropriate to convict, especially where the activity undertaken is inherently 
dangerous.  Much would depend on the cognitive capacity of the accused and the attitude he 
                                            
166 G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ (n 119) at 260. 
167 Law Commission, Criminal Law, Report on the Mental Element in Crime Draft Criminal Liability (Mental 
Element) bill (Law Com No 89) (London: HMSO, 1978). 
168Textbook of Criminal Law (London: Stevens, 1978) 77. 
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showed to the welfare of those around him.  Williams169 does seem to accept that it might be 
possible to permit a degree of objectivity in particular cases, always assuming that it does not 
mean it should apply to recklessness generally.  He does not develop this point further. 
Syrota,170 believing that Caldwell recklessness was intended to be subjectively interpreted, 
goes further than Williams by suggesting that evidence that the perception of risk was 
affected by excitement, violent rage, exhaustion, the taking of a medically prescribed drug 
which induces drowsiness, as well as mental capacity should all be relevant factors in 
affecting a determination of recklessness.  This extension of incapacity is criticised; if such 
factors could be considered then why not ‘absent-mindedness arising from worry or 
anxiety…or any other cause’171 apart from self- induced intoxication?  What principle makes 
it permissible to select between different factors affecting foresight as such an approach 
would restrict the decision in Caldwell to intoxication.172  Of course, the principle that would 
make it permissible to select certain factors over others, it is submitted, would be grounded in 
character theory and allow justice to be done in circumstances where a bad character or 
attitude was manifested and for agents to be found not criminally liable where it was absent.    
There could be further complications, including the inexperienced in the group of persons 
who may lack capacity to foresee at least some of the risks obvious to the prudent person in 
some circumstances.173  It has been observed that unless we have learned by experience or 
have information that risk exists in some particular activity we are unlikely to think about 
it.174  Again, this is something that character theory would take into account.  There is also an 
alternative argument, which is that the inexperienced might take more care precisely because 
                                            
169 G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ (n 119) at 260 
170 [1981] Criminal Law Review 658. 
171 J.C Smith, Letters to the editor, a reply to Mr Syrota, [1981] Criminal Law Review 660. 
172 Ibid. 
173 S. Field and M. Lynn, ‘The capacity for recklessness’ (1992) 12 Legal Studies 74. They use the example of 
the inexperienced driver, but suggest that this may not be the only social context in which experience brings an 
enhanced capacity to spot hazards, 76.  
174G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ (n 119) at 279. 
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they are unfamiliar with a situation whereas with the experienced person, experience can 
produce automatic responses to situations without much conscious thought and this can result 
in a diminished awareness of reality.  Another similar factor which would need to be 
considered is the evidence that young people’s perception of risk differs from that of the 
average adult.175  Although these issues would require consideration, we have moral 
principles that could be used to guide us in our selection of factors that affect foresight.  
Certain factors we may well excuse such as shock, grief and fear; but those factors which 
demonstrate undesirable character traits, like rage and intoxication, we would not. 
While it is easy to argue that both of the states of mind to which Lord Diplock refers  are 
blameworthy, it is difficult to support his assertion that they are (necessarily) equally so.176  
In R v Reid,177 some years later, the House of Lords when applying Caldwell/Lawrence 
recklessness seemed to be of the same view.  Their Lordships concluded that in terms of 
moral desert, there was no distinction between the agent who takes a known risk whilst 
engaging in a dangerous activity and an agent who fails to see the risk, remarking that it is 
possible that in some cases the former might even be less blameworthy.178  
 
It is possible that a defendant who foresees a risk of harm and consciously decides to 
continue to act is more blameworthy because he has made a conscious choice to risk the 
harm.  He may simply view the risk of harm as minimal or the ensuing degree of harm 
negligible.  It is equally possible that the defendant who did not foresee any risk at all was 
perhaps so self-absorbed that even if he might have done so under normal circumstances, the 
                                            
175 See, for example, the view of I. D. Brown in ‘The Traffic Offence as a Rational Decision’, that young male 
drivers are more dangerous than other drivers because of hazard perception failure rather than a different 
attitude to risk, in S. Lloyd-Bostock, Psychology in Legal Contexts (1981) 203; cited in F. Field and M. Lynn, 
‘The capacity for recklessness’ (n 172). 
176 G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ (n 119) at 261 describes Lord Diplock’s argument that they are 
equally blameworthy as “totally unconvincing”. 
177 [1992] 1 WLR 793 D was driving in heavy traffic and tried to pass a car on its nearside.  Whilst accelerating 
the nearside of his car hit a taxi hut, and was thrown into the traffic, killing his passenger. 
178 L.H. Leigh, Cases: ‘Recklessness After Reid’ [1993] 56 Modern Law Review 208 at 209. 
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thought of any risk never entered his mind, and if it had, he might not have altered his 
conduct in any way.  Such defendants could be seen as at fault but to different degrees and 
need to be distinguished from defendants who under normal circumstances could not be 
judged to bear any fault attracting moral blameworthiness due to their inability to foresee any 
risk at all, for example those of immature or retarded development.  
 
Lord Diplock in Caldwell stated that the subjective approach in Cunningham was flawed 
because it required ‘the meticulous analysis by the jury of the thoughts of the accused’179 
before they would be able to determine what exactly the defendant was thinking at or before 
the time he acted.  He believed it was unnecessarily complicating matters to expect a jury to 
decide beyond reasonable doubt whether D’s mind had crossed ‘the narrow dividing line’180 
between awareness of the risk and not troubling to think about it.  His Lordship argued that 
this is not a practical distinction for a jury to make because: 
[t]he only person who knows what the accused’s mental processes were is the 
accused himself, and probably not even he can recall them accurately, when the rage 
or excitement under which he acted has passed, or he has sobered up.181 
Note that he was continuing with the same underlying theme by referring to the defendant 
who is enraged, excited or drunk.  This is noteworthy for two reasons:  it illustrates, as 
discussed above, that Lord Diplock may only have addressed his mind to one category of 
defendant, and secondly, because if D fell outside of this particular grouping he may be able 
to recall what he was thinking perfectly well. 
 
As determining the thoughts of the accused is always going to be a factor in any trial by jury 
where there is any subjective element at all, Lord Diplock stated:  
                                            
179 [1982] AC 341 at 351. 




mens rea is, by definition, a state of mind of the accused himself at the time he did the 
physical act that constitutes the actus reus of the offence; it cannot be the mental state 
of some non-existent, hypothetical person.182   
However, Lord Diplock’s Direction apparently required the accused’s mind to be assessed by 
reference to the equally hypothetical ‘ordinary prudent individual’.183  If Lord Diplock’s 
concerns are meritorious and it is accepted that it is difficult for a jury to determine that the 
‘narrow dividing line’184 has been crossed, it is submitted that the jury’s task must therefore 
be further complicated if they are expected to determine 185 whether D must have suppressed 
an awareness of the risk or have ‘driven it out of his mind.’ 
 
Although Caldwell overruled R v Stephenson,186 this, it is submitted, was in regard to the 
more restrictive definition of recklessness rather than the decision itself.  This is argued 
because it is not at all clear that Lord Diplock intended to find defendants reckless regardless 
of their innate cognitive capacity to appreciate a risk.  Given Lord Diplock’s stance in 
Lawrence, Miller and Sheppard, noted above, all the evidence points to a contrary intention.  
Lord Diplock was extremely critical of the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Briggs187 on two 
counts.  First, it excluded from recklessness the accused who gave no thought to the risk even 
where the risk is great and would be obvious to D if he thought about it, and secondly, but to 
a lesser extent, because it failed to address the situation where the risk might be ‘so slight that 
                                            
182 Ibid. at 354 para.(b). 
183 E. Griew defines him as ‘one who gives his mind adequately to what he is doing, unaffected by bodily states 
or emotional conditions,’ ‘Reckless Damage and Reckless Driving: Living with Caldwell and Lawrence’ (n 
131). 
184 Caldwell [1982] AC 341 at 352. 
185 Ibid. at 352-353. 
186 [1979] QB 695, the first case to interpret recklessness for the purposes of s1 Criminal Damage Act 1971, 
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some damage must have entered [his] mind even though he may have suppressed it or driven it out,’ at 703-704. 
187[1977] 1 WLR 605. 
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even the most prudent of men would feel justified in taking it.’188  If the latter was the case 
then the agent could not be deemed reckless.  
 
R v Parker189 attracted less criticism from his Lordship because it extended Cunningham 
recklessness to cover closing the mind to an obvious risk190 but still omitted the accused 
whose mind was never open in the first place.  To suppress an awareness of a risk suggests 
that at least a fleeting awareness of the risk must be present before it can be suppressed.  
Similarly, to drive awareness of a risk out of your mind191 suggests that you would have to 
have thought about it first before you could drive it out.192   
 
Cases like Parker raise suspicion as to whether foresight is actually the test in such instances 
where the risk is obvious to a reasonable man.  Here, D was having a terrible day, had 
overslept on the train home missing his station, had to pay an extra fare to cover his excess 
travel and used the remainder of his money trying to phone a taxi to take him home.  
Unfortunately the public phone did not work and in his frustration he banged the telephone 
handset down on its cradle 2-3 times, cracking it.  This occurred just as two police officers 
were passing and he was charged with, and convicted of, criminal damage to the phone.  The 
judge at first instance had directed the jury that D is reckless if he acts ‘without thought for 
the consequence[s]’193 and the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.   
 
Given the circumstances it is highly possible that the risk of damaging the phone did not 
cross Parker’s mind at all, certainly nobody could state categorically that it did so beyond any 
                                            
188 Caldwell [1982] AC 341 at 352-353. 
189 Parker [1977] 1 WLR 600. 
190 Caldwell [1982] AC 341 at 353. 
191 Stephenson [1979] QB 695. 
192 J.C. Smith, ‘Subjective or Objective?  Ups and Downs of the Test of Criminal Liability in England’ (n 2) at 
1190. 
193 (1976) 63 Cr App 211 at 214. 
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reasonable doubt.  He may well have passively had knowledge that phones could be broken 
by such actions but knowledge is not the test.  That is not to suggest that such behaviour 
should be excused and, on the approach advocated here, Parker could still be convicted.  It 
would appear that Parker’s conviction was based upon his knowledge of the fragility of the 
equipment and the degree of force he applied, a clearly objective standpoint.  Furthermore, 
although this imported ‘Holmesian theory’ applied in DPP v Smith  back into current law 
after being removed by s.8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967,194 this decision was supported 
by one of the leading subjectivists of the last century, Professor Glanville Williams.  
Williams had contended that knowledge of risk did not require conscious awareness at the 
time of acting.195 Accordingly, Williams stood accused of undermining subjectivism in its 
entirety, Smith contending that where there is no foresight D is convicted only ‘by a fiction, 
through a “constructive crime”.’196 
 
If foresight of a risk can be satisfied by knowledge of the risk without conscious awareness 
then it has been suggested that all that is required to secure a conviction is that D has the kind 
of knowledge of this risk which he could summon to the forefront of his mind at will.  For 
example, things can break if not handled appropriately.  Such a position has been criticised 
because:   
such knowledge is not knowledge of the particular risk created by my act; knowledge 
that this act may damage this receiver,… for I may fail to see my present act in the 
light of my general knowledge of the likely effects of certain kinds of action.197 
                                            
194 J.C. Smith, ‘Subjective or Objective?  Ups and Downs of the Test of Criminal Liability in England’ (n 2) at 
1190. 
195 G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (n 168) 79.  
196 J.C. Smith, ‘Subjective or Objective?  Ups and Downs of the Test of Criminal Liability in England’ (n 2) at 
1191. 
197 R.A. Duff, ‘Professor Williams and Conditional Subjectivism’ [1982] 41 Cambridge Law Journal 273 at 
274.  See Williams’ response: ‘A Reply to Mr. Duff’ [1982] 41 Cambridge Law Journal 286. 
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It also would make most negligent agents reckless under current law as they would generally 
know of the relevant risk in the abstract but have acted without consideration of it, often 
because they were distracted, absent minded or forgetful.  It is obvious that the subjective test 
for recklessness which requires advertence to risk taking cannot adequately deal with 
situations where an agent fails to consider a risk because he was too angry or tired.198  
 
If the judiciary are prepared to go to such lengths to secure the conviction of defendants that 
are deemed to be morally blameworthy we have to question whether in cases like Parker a 
capacity based objective test is actually in operation.  It is submitted that where the risk is an 
obvious one a jury may simply disbelieve a defendant who claims not to have foreseen it on 
the grounds that if he had the capacity he therefore must have seen it.  If in practice a 
constructive advertence test is being applied,199 it would be preferable to be transparent about 
it and adopt a more objective definition of recklessness, although as the judgments in 
Caldwell/Lawrence are ambiguous and have caused difficulties, a return to Caldwell 
recklessness will not be advocated here.  
3.3.3.5 The Apparent Change from a Subjective Test to an Objective Approach 
 
The decision in Caldwell, and also that of R v Lawrence,200 whose judgment was significantly 
delivered on the same day, were seen to create a change to an “objective” test for 
recklessness, but was this really the case?   Professor Smith201 believed that Caldwell left no 
room, ‘in the great majority of cases, for any inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind,’ Lord 
Diplock contradicting his own assertion that ‘mens rea is a state of mind of the accused 
                                            
198 L.H. Leigh, ‘Recklessness after Reid’ (n 178). 
199 See also Booth v CPS [2006] EWHC, discussed below. 
200 [1981] 2 W.L.R. 524. 
201 ‘Commentary on Caldwell' (n 129). 
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himself.’202  Smith found confirmation of his belief in Lord Diplock’s own words in 
Lawrence, that the new recklessness test would generally be no different in effect from the 
‘totally objective’ test adopted by the Scottish courts. This apparent confirmation can be 
viewed simply as a statement of the obvious, given that the majority of defendants would 
either foresee the risk or be deemed to be capable of foreseeing it.  Griew also deplored the 
turn the law had taken in these two cases suggesting it would need some modification.203 
 
Williams considered that it was possible that Caldwell could be partly subjective in that the 
risk could be interpreted as needing to be obvious to the particular defendant,204 but he 
regarded Lawrence to be completely objective205 as the risk only had to be obvious to the 
“ordinary prudent man”.  This argument is incorrect and Lawrence is not entirely 
objective.206  Although the judgment appears to apply the Caldwell Model Direction of 
recklessness to reckless driving, Lord Diplock then states: 
If satisfied that an obvious and serious risk was created by the manner of the 
defendant’s driving, the jury are entitled to infer that he was in one or other of the 
states of mind required to constitute the offence and will probably do so; but regard 
must be given to any explanation he gives as to his state of mind which may 
displace the inference.207  
 
                                            
202 Caldwell [1982] AC 341 at 354 para.(b). 
203 E. Griew, ‘Reckless Damage and Reckless Driving: Living with Caldwell and Lawrence’ (n 131). 
204 G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ (n 119).  See also G. Syrota, ‘A Radical Change in the Law of 
Recklessness’ [1982] Criminal Law Review 97, who supported this approach. 
205 G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ (n 119). 
206 Dept. of Transport and the Home Office, Road Traffic Review Report in 1998 which found Lawrence 
recklessness too subjective, C. Clarkson and H.M. Keating, Criminal Law, Text and Materials, 5th Edn., 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003). 
207 Lawrence [1981] 1 All ER at 982, (my emphasis added). 
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Concern was expressed because it was uncertain what this highlighted phrase means, leaving 
it difficult to refute the conclusion that it ties in with the lacuna208 in the Caldwell/Lawrence 
Direction, noted earlier.209  More interestingly, the dictum certainly appears to introduce an 
element of subjectivity and if, as has been suggested,210 Caldwell and Lawrence ‘must clearly 
be read together’ for what they have to say on the concept of recklessness, it lends support to 
Syrota’s interpretation that the two judgments did not effect such a radical change to the 
definition of recklessness.  Their Lordships did not intend to criminalise the acts of those who 
lacked the cognitive capacity to appreciate risk, merely those who were capable but 
indifferent.211   It could be said that where D was inadvertent, both capacity and the presence 
of moral wickedness was required for culpability to be attributed.212  This is a sound proposal 
although it is submitted that the requirement of ‘moral wickedness’ should be replaced with 
the need for a moral failure.  As a consequence, the potential for injustice lies more with how 
Caldwell was subsequently interpreted than with the decision itself.213  
  
Syrota214 refers to Lord Diplock’s comparison in Lawrence of s.3 Road Traffic Act 1972 with 
s.2 of the same Act,215 where his Lordship stated that even for an absolute offence the 
defendant’s mind must have been ‘conscious of what his body was doing’ but not of the 
consequences of his actions.   From this Lord Diplock argued that for a s.2 offence it was 
therefore necessary to show that the defendant was both “conscious” of his acts and their 
consequences.  It was proposed that the use of the word “conscious” is not in the sense of 
                                            
208 See discussion of the lacuna, above, at 3.3.3.1. 
209 D.J. Birch, ‘The Foresight Saga: The Biggest Mistake of All?’ (n 133). 
210 E. Griew, ‘Reckless Damage and Reckless Driving: Living with Caldwell and Lawrence’ (n 131); and G. 
Syrota , ‘A Radical Change in the Law of Recklessness’ [1982] Criminal Law Review 97 at 98. 
211 See also the judgments of Lords Keith, Ackner, Goff and Browne-Wilkinson in R v Reid  [1992] 3 All ER 
673. 
212 L.H. Leigh and J. Temkin, ‘Recklessness Revisited’ (n 123) at 203. 
213 See, for example, Elliott v C (A Minor) [1983] 1 W.L.R. 939. 
214 G. Syrota, ‘A Radical Change in the Law of Recklessness’ [1982] Criminal Law Review 97 at 100. 
215 Section 2 being the offence of reckless driving and s.3 that of driving without due care and attention; the 
latter not necessarily involving any ‘moral turpitude’, per Lord Diplock in Lawrence. 
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actually thinking about his actions, but that the defendant ‘could instantly have brought his 
mind to bear on what he was doing, had he chosen to do so.’216   
 
This is consistent with Lord Diplock’s critique of Murphy.217   It is clear that Lord Diplock in 
Caldwell approved of Eveleigh L.J.’s dictum in R v Murphy on what was meant by the word 
“knowledge” in the context of the risk of driving recklessly.  His Lordship had concluded that 
the term could equally apply to:  
knowledge which is stored in the brain and available if called upon…or knowledge 
that is actually present because it is being called upon…especially as everybody 
knows that there is a risk of an accident if a vehicle is not driven with due care and 
attention on the highway, whether he thinks about it or not.218 
It was the reference in this passage to “due care and attention” that Lord Diplock was critical 
of as its use in this context blurred the distinction between reckless driving with the lesser 
offence of negligent driving.  Perhaps Lord Diplock in Caldwell was striving to replace the 
word ‘foresight’ in the definition of recklessness with ‘knowledge’ or ‘belief’ instead.  
Similar suggestions have been made with regard to the legal definition of intention.219  This 
approach would legitimately catch those who would have the capacity to appreciate that there 
was a risk even if the awareness of it, in terms of advertence, failed to cross their mind at the 
time of the actus reus.220 
 
                                            
216 G. Syrota quotes from G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (1978) 78-79: “we use the word ‘knowledge’ 
to include information that may be summoned to the mind at will, or almost at will…It is a misunderstanding of 
the legal requirement to suppose that this knowledge of risk must be a matter of conscious awareness at the 
moment of the act.” [1982] Criminal Law Review 97 at 101. 
217 G. Syrota, ‘A Radical Change in the Law of Recklessness’ (n 214) at 100 referring to [1981] 1 All ER at 
981g-982d. 
218 Murphy [1980] QB at 440. 
219 V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 218. 
220 Lord Edmund-Davies in his dissenting judgment in Caldwell cites the Law Commission’s definition of 
recklessness which requires ‘knowing that there is a risk’ and it is unreasonable …to take it, having regard to the 
degree and nature of the risk which he knows to be present’ Working Paper No.31, Codification of the Criminal 
Law, General Principles, The Mental Element in Crime (1970). 
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3.3.3.6 The relevance of indifference. 
 
In Lawrence, Lord Hailsham supported Lord Diplock’s judgment, stating that the word 
“reckless” applied: 
to a person or conduct evincing a state of mind stopping short of deliberate intention, 
and going beyond mere inadvertence, or,…mere carelessness.221 
From this statement it would seem that Lord Hailsham had not interpreted Lord Diplock’s 
concept of recklessness as being wholly objective, and that it required a mental element on 
the part of the accused.   This is further evidence that a synthesised approach to determining 
recklessness was possible.  It has been argued222 that the difference between ‘mere 
inadvertence’ and culpable inadvertence amounting to recklessness is provided by Eveleigh 
L.J. in Murphy,223 and by Lane L.J in Stone and Dobinson;224 it is indifference.225   
 
Indifference is used in the sense of not caring,226 rather than mere carelessness.  Thus 
indifference is an essential element in both Lawrence, and by implication Caldwell 
recklessness.  It is not the attitude of indifference alone that leads to a finding of culpability, 
but rather how that indifference is manifested by the acts or omissions of the accused.  As 
Duff suggests:227  
[s]ome failures of attention or realisation may manifest not mere stupidity or 
“thoughtlessness,” but the same indifference or disregard which characterises the 
conscious risk-taker as reckless. 
                                            
221 [1981] 1 All ER at 978, cited in G. Syrota, ‘A Radical Change in the Law of Recklessness’ (n 214) at 103. 
Note that we are not provided with a definition of recklessness here either. 
222 Ibid.  
223 [1980] QB at  440-441. 
224 [1977] 2 All ER 341. 
225 [1977] QB 354, 363 
226 The kind of recklessness used in the civil law, as per Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App.Cas. 337. 
227 R.A. Duff, ‘Recklessness’ [1980] Criminal Law Review 282 at 290-291. 
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The submission here is that indifference can include a defendant who gives no thought to a 
risk but had the capacity to do so and could have called it to the forefront of his mind.  The 
indifferent defendant is either capable of foreseeing the risk but is so caught up with other 
emotions228 or so intent on his action that he fails to give any thought to the possibility of 
such a risk, or he actually foresees the risk but is indifferent to the possible, and maybe 
unintended, consequences of his actions.  In other words, if the accused had given sufficient 
thought to the matter and had foreseen the risk it would have made no difference to his 
actions.  It has been contended that judgements about indifference are objective judgements 
about character229 but if the extra part of the Model Direction added by Lawrence was 
employed, as advocated here, it would not be a purely objective test as D could provide 
evidence as to why he should not be seen as indifferent. 
 
Duff230 distinguishes between three different categories of advertent indifference, which 
attract distinct degrees of moral censure.  He distinguishes the accused who foresees the risk 
of harm as a near certainty, from the accused who foresees the risk as a likely consequence 
and from the accused who foresees the risk as an unlikely occurrence, but in all three 
situations the defendant continues to act and harmful consequences result.  What this insight 
provides is a gradient of culpability from a thorough moral condemnation in the first example 
to lesser moral outrage at the final instance and yet the same harm has resulted and in each 
case the defendant would argue that no harm was intended.   
 
A difficulty with his distinction can be seen when it is applied to the offence of murder.  If 
the accused foresees harm as a ‘near certainty’ and this is reckless indifference, then D can 
only be guilty of manslaughter.  If D foresees the harm as a ‘virtual certainty’ he 
                                            
228 J. Horder, ‘Cognition, Emotion and Criminal Culpability’ (1990) 106 Law Quarterly Review 469. 
229 J.B. Brady ‘Recklessness’ (1996) 15 Law and Philosophy 183. 
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demonstrates oblique intention and therefore has the mens rea required for murder.  The 
dividing line between ‘near certainty’ on the one hand and ‘virtual certainty’ on the other 
may not be an easy distinction to make.  Under the Law Commission’s proposals for reform 
of the law of homicide,231 the distinction between the two examples would be second degree 
murder for the former and first degree murder for the latter.  This change would at least result 
in a fairer labelling of the two types of conduct. 
 
Given the proposed statutory definition of recklessness232 Duff’s three defendants would all 
be guilty of the same offence if harm ensued.  Duff argues that although sentencing may 
reflect the lesser seriousness of the risk taken, this fails to alter the stigma of conviction for 
the offence.  If recklessness is to be a basis of criminal liability then we must determine for 
each offence what would amount to an unreasonable kind or degree of risk, and thus what 
level of practical indifference should attract liability, as perhaps not all unreasonably 
indifferent actions should be encompassed, especially given that the law should only 
criminalise behaviour falling short of what is minimally acceptable conduct rather than an 
ideal standard of behaviour.233  
 
Traditionalists234 would disagree with Duff’s suggestion of distinguishing between different 
categories of advertent recklessness because the foresight of harm evidences a reprehensible 
choice on the part of the defendant to increase the risk of harm occurring.235  As it is morally 
wrong to make such a choice it is irrelevant to delve further into the motives, attitude or 
                                            
231 Law Commission, Consultation Paper No 177, A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? (London: 
HMSO, 2005). 
232 Cl 18(c) of the Criminal Code Bill (1989); Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales (Law 
Com No 177) (London: HMSO, 1989) 
233 R.A. Duff, ‘Recklessness’ (n 227). 
234 For example, G. Williams, Criminal Law: the General Part (n 28) 53. 
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‘The Foresight Saga: The Biggest Mistake of All?’ (n 133) at 16. 
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desires of the defendant, he is ‘equally reckless if he wants to run the risk because it gives 
him a thrill, or if he is indifferent to whether it materialises or not, or if he fervently hopes it 
will not do so, and takes some steps to avoid it.’236  Society generally would not necessarily 
agree with such a hard line and it is likely that some would give credit where steps had been 
taken to avoid the risk, and even perhaps where an attempt had been made to minimise it. 
 
One objection was that a requirement of indifference cannot include a defendant who gives 
no thought to the risk because a blank mind cannot be classed as a true state of mind.237  Lord 
Keith in R v Reid238 stated that ‘absence of something from a person’s mind is as much part 
of his state of mind as its presence.’  This is why it is still categorised by some as a subjective 
approach; it is still examining the state of mind of a particular defendant rather than 
considering what a reasonable person would have thought.   Again this highlights the 
difficulty that can arise in knowing precisely what is meant by the labels of “subjective” and 
“objective” when they are employed.  Lord Diplock had refused to become embroiled in this 
debate in Caldwell as he found the terms unhelpful, possibly because their meaning can 
depend upon the context they are used in.  For his Lordship, D’s mental state is subjective to 
him, regardless of foresight.239  On occasion academics have been known to define the sense 
in which they are using the terms but this is rare, hence the confusion.240  Even when they do, 
the precise extent of remit may still be unclear.  For example, in one instance an objective test 
was stated as meaning where D ought to have known or foreseen a risk of harm or of a 
circumstance, and it would be irrelevant if D did not know these things if a reasonable man 
would.241  What is unclear here is whether D’s innate capacity to know is relevant. 
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Birch,242 also advocating a wider concept of recklessness, considers that in cases of 
advertence, caring is irrelevant but, as an alternative to foresight, evidence of a ‘reprehensible 
attitude’ of indifference should be an adequate alternative, citing Parker243 and Kimber244 as 
examples of judicial acceptance of such an approach.  In Parker, the justifications for 
conviction in the Court of Appeal were (1) that if D did not foresee the risk ‘he was 
deliberately closing his mind to the obvious’, and later, in Stephenson, (2) that appreciation of 
the risk must have entered D’s mind ‘even though he may have suppressed it or driven it out.’  
Birch submits that both these reasons ‘accord primacy’ not to choice but to a ‘reprehensible 
attitude’ and in (1) it is a substitute for foresight.   
 
It would be relatively easy for a jury to determine that D had a “reprehensible attitude” but 
the difficulties a jury would face in trying to determine whether D had ‘deliberately closed 
his mind’ to a risk or ‘driven it out’ were precisely the problems Lord Diplock was trying to 
avoid by his Model Direction.  Furthermore, it is submitted that as he may well have been 
reacting without thinking to the phone not working after swallowing his money, it is difficult 
to agree that Parker was displaying an attitude of indifference. 
 
It has been suggested that defendants who are attempting to evade being caught by the 
subjective test could argue that they were too preoccupied to realise any risk was involved in 
their action.245  For example, Cunningham was perhaps too preoccupied in getting money 
from the gas meter and Parker was too preoccupied with his difficulty in getting home.  The 
response to this argument was that it would not be a problem in practice because if a jury was 
properly directed they could be told to consider D’s knowledge before (at the planning stage), 
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during and after committing the crime.246  Knowledge is not the same as foresight and the 
relevant time frame is being extended beyond its normal limit if this plan is followed.  There 
would still be no guarantee it would catch the Cunninghams or Parkers even if it was applied. 
 
Further, following the reasoning in (2) there must have been a “flash of awareness” of the 
risk (which would amount to foresight coupled with an intention to run the risk) but where a 
defendant is acting on the spur of the moment the “flash” might come too late to prevent 
withdrawal from the actus reus which results in no moral distinction between this case and 
where D gives no conscious thought at all.247 
 
In Kimber, D raised the defence of honest belief in the victim’s consent as a defence to the 
offence of indecent assault but had then admitted that he was indifferent to her feelings.  
Birch submits that the importance here is that if the jury believe that D would have acted in 
the same way if he had foreseen the risk then it becomes irrelevant whether D actually had a 
flash of awareness or not as D’s attitude of indifference is an indicator of moral fault, and 
perhaps a more reliable guide.   
 
Attention has been drawn to a flaw in relying upon this ground as a replacement for foresight, 
this being the rules of evidence which would usually prevent evidence of previous such 
conduct being relied upon in court.248  The advantage of foresight is that it is confined to the 
occasion in question.249  This is unarguable but it is possible that D’s attitude of indifference 
manifested in this one instance would be sufficient to establish guilt without recourse to 
similar conduct on other occasions.  It is also possible that following changes to the rules of 
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evidence in the Criminal Justice Act 2003,250 evidence of conduct showing an attitude of 
indifference could now be adduced if it arose from previous convictions as evidence of ‘bad 
character’ is admissible if it is ‘relevant’ to the current offence charged.  It is accepted that 
evidence of indifference would raise a hypothetical question for a jury to determine: what 
would D have done if he had perceived the risk?  The jury are charged with determining what 
the state of mind of the accused actually was at the time of the act and it is questionable 
whether it would be any more difficult to determine whether the accused would have acted 
differently if he had foreseen the risk. 
 
3.3.3.7 The Misinterpretation of Parliament’s Intention 
 
Another issue from Caldwell is that Lord Diplock, representing the majority, apparently 
misinterpreted Parliament’s intention when passing the Criminal Damage Act 1971 as there 
was little evidence before the court on which to base his claim that Parliament’s intention was 
to give “recklessness” its less restrictive meaning.251  On the contrary, as Lord Edmund-
Davies in his strongly dissenting judgment observed, the Law Commission had intended the 
definition applied in Cunningham252 to be maintained.  However, Lord Diplock had 
apparently not referred to any extrinsic aids to interpretation, but instead attached importance 
to the fact that the Act was described as a ‘revising’ statute in its long title. 
 
                                            
250 Section 101. 
251 J.C. Smith, ‘Commentary on Caldwell' (n 129) at 394 cites the discussion of the meaning of the word 
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Perhaps Lord Diplock was influenced by the fact that the Law Commission had highlighted 
that most crimes of criminal damage were committed by juvenile offenders.253  It may have 
been perceived that to hold such defendants reckless would not be possible where there was a 
subjective test, because it is less likely that a juvenile would foresee the risk and be perceived 
by a jury as having done so.  There was no evidence on which to base a claim that the law as 
it then stood resulted in ‘unjustified acquittals’.254 
 
3.3.3.8 The Capacity to Foresee Risk 
 
Possibly the most crucial point is that, throughout his judgment in Caldwell, Lord Diplock 
only appeared to address his mind to the class of D who would usually have had the capacity 
to foresee the risk255 and this narrow focus is the crux of the problems that subsequently 
arose.  Lord Diplock did not consider certain classes of D who would be incapable of 
foreseeing any risk, even if they had been asked to think about it.256  There was no need to do 
so on the facts of the case before him.257  But it is also possible that it would have made no 
difference even if Lord Diplock had had such D’s in mind.  Lord Bingham in R v G & R,258 
suggested that the majority in Caldwell were set on their course and such considerations may 
not have had any impact; instead they remained focused on the moral and social case for 
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departing from the subjective definition.  This approach has been contrasted with the 
narrower focus in G & R, with the need for the House to consider the liability of children.259  
This begs the question of whether the Model Direction would have still been followed had 
the D’s in G & R not been minors.   
 
If it was not for the failure to exempt those without the capacity to foresee risk from the 
Model Direction it is possible that Caldwell recklessness would not only still be applicable to 
criminal damage offences, but may also have been a more generally accepted definition under 
statute and under the common law, providing consistency throughout the criminal law.260  
Although Lord Diplock accepted in Caldwell that certain offences would fall outside his 
extended definition of recklessness so that only foresight could ground criminal liability, he 
was referring to crimes which required ‘malice’ and it is not possible to ‘maliciously’ do 
something without awareness. 
 
Elliott v C (A Minor)261 epitomises the potential for injustice that lies within the Model 
Direction.  The court had an ideal opportunity to develop a capacity based test from 
Caldwell/Lawrence but failed to do so.  As will be recalled, D was a minor with learning 
difficulties and yet as her actions would have been perceived by the reasonably prudent 
person as creating a risk, the prosecution’s appeal against her acquittal before magistrates was 
upheld by the Divisional Court.  The proposal that ‘obvious’ in the Direction meant obvious 
to the particular D262 was not adopted as on a literal interpretation of the wording of the 
Direction, D’s foresight was not required.  Some263 were undeniably outraged at this result 
                                            
259 N.P. Metcalfe and A.J. Ashworth, ‘Arson: Mens Rea- Recklessness Whether Property is Destroyed or 
Damaged’ (n 255). 
260 D. Kimel, ‘Inadvertent Recklessness in Criminal Law’ (2004) 120 Law Quarterly Review 548. 
261 Elliott v C (A Minor) [1983] 1 WLR 939. 
262 G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ (n 119). 
263 G. Williams, ‘The Unresolved Problem of Recklessness’ (n 104). 
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and yet all may not be quite as straightforward as it seems.  Although it is justifiable to be 
outraged at the conviction of a defendant who lacked the cognitive capacity to foresee the 
risk of harm, that may not be the situation in this case; there was evidence of similar conduct 
in her past that could not be brought before the court because of the rules of evidence.264  The 
girl was judged to have learning difficulties because she was in a remedial class at school but 
attention has been drawn to the fact that children can be put into such classes for a variety of 
reasons and it cannot be assumed that it is through mental impairment.265  She was also cold 
and tired but this was the result of a conscious decision to stay out all night rather than go 
home.  
 
There is perhaps a more significant factor at play in this decision.  The question the court was 
asked to consider was not whether a defendant who lacked the cognitive capacity to foresee 
risk could be Caldwell reckless but whether D was to be judged by the standard of the 
ordinary prudent man and this was answered in the affirmative.266  Despite the furore this 
decision caused, as the Model Direction was claimed to be ‘universally deplored’ for its 
application here,267 it must be pointed out that the girl would also have been caught even if 
the Cunningham subjective test had been operative.  After all, this test simply required that 
she could foresee some harm of the particular kind arising from her actions, in this instance 
criminal damage.  When she poured the white spirit onto the carpet in the shed and lit it she 
would have a least appreciated that she would damage the carpet, even if she did not foresee 
that the fire would burn down the shed.  That is all that the subjective test needs for a 
conviction. 
                                            
264 D.J. Birch, ‘The Foresight Saga: The Biggest Mistake of All?’ (n 133) at 9. 
265 F. Field and M. Lynn, ‘The capacity for recklessness’ (n 173). 
266 Given the evidence of similar conduct in her past that could not be brought before the court because of the 
rules of evidence, this may have influenced the framing of the question, whereas the Court of Appeal in the 
subsequent case of G & R (discussed below) framed their question in terms of incapacity to foresee the risk.  
267 G. Williams, ‘The Unresolved Problem of Recklessness’ (n 104). 
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In R v Bell,268 another case cited in support of Caldwell producing a purely objective test of 
recklessness, D believed he was compelled by God to act the way he did and he intentionally 
caused damage.  This was a clear case of intention and not recklessness and there was no 
explicit reference to incapacity to foresee risk, nor the relevance of incapacity or inability.269  
This suggests that both Elliott and Bell should not be used to justify the assertion that 
capacity was an irrelevant factor when applying the Model Direction. 
  
In R v Stephen Malcolm R,270 D was a 15 year old boy who threw petrol bombs close to a 
girl’s bedroom window.  He was convicted of arson, but claimed that he was not reckless as 
to endangering life as he did not realise that if a bomb had gone through the bedroom 
window, the girl might have been killed.  The issue of D’s capacity was not raised by his 
counsel, rather his defence were seeking a ruling that recklessness should be judged by 
reference to someone of D’s ‘age and with such of his characteristics as would affect his 
appreciation of the risk.’271  Consequently, it has been contended that this is also a case that 
cannot be seen as authority for the proposition that capacity is irrelevant.272 There are two 
cases to support the proposition that capacity could be relevant: ‘Hardie273 was explicitly 
reasoned and decided on the basis that incapacity to foresee a relevant risk will excuse on a 
charge of Caldwell recklessness.  Dickie274  rests implicitly on a similar assumption.’275  
 
In R v Hardie, the Court of Appeal quashed D’s conviction for arson because the jury should 
have been directed that if they concluded that D was unable to appreciate the risk because of 
                                            
268 [1984] 3 All ER 842. 
269 F. Field and M. Lynn, ‘The capacity for recklessness’ (n 173) at 82. 
270 (1984) 79 Cr App R.334. 
271 Ibid. at 337. 
272 F. Field and M. Lynn, ‘The capacity for recklessness’ (n 173) at 82. 
273 [1984] 3 All ER 848. 
274 [1984] 3 All ER 173. 
275 F. Field and M. Lynn, ‘The capacity for recklessness’ (n 173) at 83. 
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the valium he had taken, they should then consider whether the taking of the valium was 
itself reckless.  The appellate court concluded that D did not know that the quantity of valium 
taken could render him incapable of appreciating the risk. 
 
In R v Dickie, evidence of D’s hypomania was adduced, revealing that this may have made 
him unaware of the risk arising from his conduct.  The trial judge erred in allowing the jury to 
decide whether D was M’Naghten276 insane, but when the Court of Appeal set aside the 
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, they did not substitute it with a verdict of guilty, 
which suggests that the court accepted that D lacked the necessary mens rea. 
 
Finally, in R v Coles,277 a strict application of the Model Direction was applied.  Here D’s 
friends were sleeping on hay in a barn when he set it alight.  He admitted that he had realised 
that they might not have woken up in time and got up.  In this instance, D clearly had the 
capacity to foresee the risk and again, he would have been convicted even if the Cunningham 
test for recklessness had applied.  It has been pointed out that the Court of Appeal were 
influenced by the fact that D was ‘unmeritorious’278 and this leaves the courts to be the 
determinants of merit and whether a particular case was to be judged on the basis of a purely 
objective Model Direction or an adapted version279 as advocated in Reid.280   
 
It could equally be argued that exactly the same concern arises with the subjective test in 
practice; the courts determine the merit of the particular defendant and then decide to what 
extent they will apply the subjective test.  This can be advanced because of the subjectivists’ 
                                            
276 M’Naghten (1843) 4 St Tr NS 847. 
277 [1995] 1 Cr App Rep 157. 
278 Ibid. at 169. 
279 A. Halpin, Definition in the Criminal Law (n 121). 
280 [1992] 1 WLR 793. 
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criticism of the decision in Elliott where no doubt acquittal would have been preferred even 
though foresight of some harm was appreciated, and convictions in Parker and Booth where 
foresight was questionable.  It is worth noting that under German criminal law an objective 
position on recklessness has been adopted but it is capacity based, allowing for D’s mental 
capacity and knowledge at the time to be taken into account.281  The Caldwell test for 
recklessness actually could have worked well in practice, despite the criticisms.  Therefore, a 
more objective test for recklessness is advocated here, not a simple reversion to the 
Caldwell/Lawrence Model Direction, but utilising the Direction as a template before 
enquiring why the particular defendant did not foresee the risk.  This applies Glidewell J’s 
suggestion in Elliott (when applying the Caldwell/Lawrence Direction):   
where no thought is given to the risk any further inquiry necessary for the purpose of 
establishing guilt should prima facie be directed to the question why such thought was 
not given, rather than to the purely hypothetical question of what the particular 
person would have appreciated had he directed his mind to the matter.282 
This will impose an evidential burden on the accused.  Once the reason why no thought was 
given to the risk emerged, it would be relatively straightforward to assess the degree of moral 
blameworthiness and thus any criminal liability.  A synthesis of the subjective/objective 
positions will acknowledge that moral culpability cannot rationally be dependent upon 
advertence or inadvertence.  Where D’s inadvertence to the risk is the result of morally 
blameless factors he should not be held criminally responsible for serious offences.  Before 
consideration of the third main approach to defining recklessness it is important to examine 
how the issue of recklessness has been determined with regard to rape and manslaughter.   
 
                                            
281 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 6th Edn., (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009) 182, citing J.R. 
Spencer and A. Pedain, ‘Strict Liability in Continental Criminal Law’ in A. P. Simester (ed) Appraising Strict 
Liability (2005) 241. 
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3.3.3.9 Recklessness and Rape 
 
Prior to DPP v Morgan,283 the offence of rape caused little difficulty for the courts as all that 
had to be proven was sexual intercourse and that the woman had not consented.  D could only 
escape liability if he could show he had made a mistake with regard to consent that was both 
honest and reasonable.  Morgan introduced a mens rea requirement to the offence so that it 
had to be proved that D either intended to have non-consensual intercourse or intended to 
have intercourse being reckless as to whether there was consent or not.  The case established 
that it was sufficient for a mistake as to consent to be honestly held as this negatived the mens 
rea of intent to have non-consensual intercourse, whilst acknowledging that reasonable 
mistakes would have more credibility with a jury.284   
 
It was observed285 that the decision in Morgan created a gap between moral culpability and 
legal liability.  If D fails to give any thought to whether V consents or not, perhaps because 
he is indifferent, it is not clear that inadvertence to the risk of non-consent would be sufficient 
for conviction if Cunningham recklessness was applied.  Similarly, if D holds an 
unreasonable belief that V is consenting then on Morgan he would be acquitted unless 
Caldwell recklessness extended to rape.   Power suggests that following Caldwell, the Court 
of Appeal decisions286 tried to develop an approach to reckless rape which combined a 
‘subjective capacity to “do better” with objective failure to do so’ based on notions of 
                                            
283 [1976] AC 182. 
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“practical indifference”.’287  This approach allowed for the inclusion of the inadvertent D 
who gave no thought to whether the victim consented or otherwise or was indifferent to 
consent in circumstances where if thought had been given, he could not have genuinely 
believed there was consent.  
 
In 2000, the Home Office Sex Offences Review Team report288 recommended that 
defendants should not be able to rely on a mistaken belief in a victim’s consent unless they 
could show that they had taken reasonable steps to establish it. The report acknowledged the 
criminal law’s reluctance ‘to apply a test of negligence to very serious offences, unless there 
is a clear responsibility or duty of care’289 on D, which is breached.  Whilst wishing to 
preserve intention as to non-consensual intercourse and intention to have intercourse being 
recklessness as to consent, the Review Team were against adoption of a purely subjective 
approach to recklessness, stating that ‘[T]he law needs to state very clearly that the accused is 
liable if they did not give any thought to consent or could not care less about the victim’s 
consent.’290  
 
This resulted in a recommendation that recklessness in sex offences ‘should include lack of 
thought to consent; this can be described as “could not care less about consent”.’291  Not 
giving thought to consent is not necessarily the same as indifference and a distinction should 
be made, if possible, between the callous and the careless.  The latter should be regarded as 
negligent whereas the former are reckless.292  It is accepted that there cannot be a true balance 
                                            
287 H. Power, ‘Towards a Redefinition of the Mens Rea of Rape’ (n 284) at 386-8, noting that the indifference 
element is from Lord Cross in Morgan [1976] AC 184 at 203. 
288 Home Office, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the law on sex offences (2000), vol.1 
289 Ibid at 2.12.1. 
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181 
 
of rights as from the victim’s point of view.  The fact that the rapist was ‘negligent’ is not 
going to make V feel any better about the commission of the offence, i.e. any less raped.  
From D’s viewpoint it may seem harsh to label him a rapist, if he would not have had 
intercourse had he realised V was really not consenting.  The other problem is that 
introducing an offence of negligent rape may lead to defendants pleading guilty to this lesser 
offence where they have raped intentionally or recklessly and, given the low conviction rate 
for such offences, it may be tempting for the prosecution to accept such a plea. 
 
In relation to the defence of honest belief in consent, the Review Team were keen to stress 
that whilst recommending limitation on its availability they were not imposing ‘an external 
and objective requirement of reasonableness on the defendant’293 as D would not be required 
to take all objectively reasonable steps, but just to take all steps that were reasonable in the 
circumstances known to him at the time.294  
 
Unfortunately,295 the Review Team’s proposals were not mirrored in the Sexual Offences Act 
2003 wherein ‘the concept of recklessness, along with knowledge,  will …be banished from 
the law of sexual offences’ in an attempt to provide greater protection for victims, encourage 
reporting of offences and increase conviction rates.  Furthermore, the combined effect of the 
conclusive and rebuttable presumptions as to lack of consent in s.75 and s.76 respectively and 
the guidance for juries on determining whether a belief in consent was reasonably held in 
ss.1(2) and 3(2) will be that a jury will convict if they believe the victim did not consent, 
regardless of D’s actual beliefs.296  In effect, without allowing for consideration of the 
particular defendant and the circumstances known to him at the time, a negligent standard 
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had been introduced for some of the most serious sexual offences without the offences being 
ranked in degrees of moral culpability. 
 
3.3.3.10 Reckless Manslaughter 
 
For years, the court interchangeably used the terms “gross negligence” and “reckless” to 
describe involuntary manslaughter that was not caused by the commission of an unlawful and 
dangerous act.297  It was uncertain whether these terms represented two distinct forms of fault 
or were simply two ways of describing the same fault.298  In one edition of Smith and 
Hogan’s Criminal Law,299 the authors had expressed the view that there were indeed two 
distinct forms of fault: ‘gross negligence manslaughter must be whether death or serious 
injury be caused, and reckless manslaughter where the recklessness might be as to death, 
personal injury, whether serious or slight, and possibly any injury to “health or welfare,”’300 
(following the judgment in Stone and Dobinson).  Following the decisions in Caldwell and 
Lawrence, in R v Seymour301 the House of Lords held that the law applicable to manslaughter 
was the same as that for the offence of reckless driving.  In the Court of Appeal in Seymour, 
Watkins LJ delivering the judgment stated: 
we are of the view that it is no longer necessary or helpful to make reference to 
compensation and negligence.  The Lawrence direction on recklessness is 
comprehensive and of general application to all offences.302   
 
Lord Roskill in the House of Lords opined that Caldwell recklessness applied to all offences 
unless Parliament decided otherwise, but his proposition was not accepted subsequently, as R 
                                            
297 This will be analysed further in the next chapter. 
298 J. C. Smith and B. Hogan, Criminal Law, 7th Edn., (London: Butterworths, 1992) 372. 
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v Savage and Parmenter303 made clear.  Offences against the person maintained the 
Cunningham subjective test but once the offence of reckless driving was abolished, it was 
mainly criminal damage offences and manslaughter that were decided on the basis of 
Caldwell.  At this point, if gross negligence manslaughter still existed as a separate offence it 
should have appeared in Kong Cheuk Kwan v R304 as on its facts it would previously have 
been treated as gross negligence, but this did not occur.   
 
Smith and Hogan remarked that under Caldwell recklessness there was a ‘substantial overlap 
between recklessness and gross negligence’ noting that the number of instances of gross 
negligence which do not amount to Caldwell recklessness will be very small.305  R v Lamb306 
would be one such exception as the boy considered the risk that the gun might fire and after 
checking it and finding no bullets opposite the barrel, wrongly thought it was safe to pull the 
trigger. 
 
It was not until the decision of the House of Lords in R v Adomako307 that recklessness was 
replaced by the restoration of gross negligence as the appropriate test for manslaughter 
offences.308  After this it seemed that reckless manslaughter in the objective sense of 
Caldwell/Lawrence had been abolished, however the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v  
Lidar309suggests it might not be entirely extinct.  Clearly there is no reason why advertent 
reckless manslaughter should not be an option.310  If someone causes death without 
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committing an unlawful act and yet foresees the risk of serious harm it is possible that, 
without foresight of a risk of death, gross negligence manslaughter would not be available as 
a charge.311  However, given the ruling in R v Stone and Dobinson312 and the current 
tendency of the appellate courts to extend the remit of gross negligence in this sphere,313 it is 
possible that gross negligence would indeed be used.   
 
At first instance in Lidar, the trial judge, Scott Baker J, had directed the jury on the basis of 
advertent recklessness as to ‘some physical harm, however slight’ adding ‘mere inadvertence 
is not enough.  The defendant must have been proved to have been indifferent to an obvious 
risk of injury to health or to have actually foreseen the risk’.  The Court of Appeal considered 
that such a direction was subject to criticism because it failed to specify a ‘high probability of 
physical harm’ and that the risk was of ‘serious injury’ rather than lesser physical harm but 
the main point of interest here is the reference in the direction to proof of indifference as an 
alternative to foresight of harm.  This could be viewed as leaving the way open to a more 
objective test for recklessness that would reflect character theory. 
 
3.3.4 Recklessness in G&R and the Draft Criminal Code 
 
As is known, in 2004, the decision of the House of Lords in R v G & R314 overruled 
Caldwell315 or at least departed from it and resulted in the third main approach to 
recklessness.316  In his leading judgment Lord Bingham stated: 
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It is a salutary principle that conviction of serious crime should depend on proof not 
simply that the defendant caused (by act or omission) an injurious result to another 
but that his state of mind when so acting was culpable….The most obviously culpable 
state of mind is no doubt an intention to cause the injurious result, but knowing 
disregard of an appreciated and unacceptable risk of causing an injurious result or a 
deliberate closing of the mind to such a risk would be readily accepted as culpable 
also.  It is clearly blameworthy to take an obvious and significant risk of causing 
injury to another.  But it is not clearly blameworthy to do something involving a risk 
of injury to another if…one genuinely does not perceive the risk.  Such a person may 
fairly be accused of stupidity or lack of imagination but neither of those failings 
should expose him to conviction of a serious crime or the risk of punishment.317  
 
Although it is accepted that no one should be censured for an accidental harm, it does not 
automatically follow that in every circumstance318 a person should be exempt from liability 
when he or she has failed to foresee a risk or acted carelessly or stupidly and as a result has 
harmed others.319  Note from Lord Bingham’s statement above, he is not saying that someone 
who fails to foresee the risk is not blameworthy, just that they are not necessarily so.  It 
would seem obvious that the greater the risk of resulting harm, and the more serious the 
consequences of it, the more care that should be taken, and would be expected by society to 
                                                                                                                                       
316 Lord Rodger states G&R overrules Caldwell; Lords Bingham and Steyn “depart” from it which, as Kimel 
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be taken, to avoid or seek to prevent harm occurring.320  Whether criminal blame should 
result in such circumstances is the subject of much debate.321 
Following this judgment, there was a warning322 that a ‘blind adherence to subjectivism’ can 
result in a gap between the legal test of mens rea and the community’s sense of moral 
wrongdoing.  This supported earlier submissions that if the criminal law accurately reflects 
the community’s perception of justice they are more likely to defer to its commands, yet if it 
fails in this regard, its authority is undermined.323  The subjective approach clearly produces a 
simple formula which has triumphed over the need for a comprehensive one.324   
 
The judgment in G & R heralded a return to a subjective definition of recklessness for the 
purposes of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.  The new definition was not from Cunningham 
but that in the Draft Criminal Code which states:  
A person acts recklessly with respect to – (i) a circumstance when he is aware of a 
risk that it exists or will exist; (ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will 
occur; and it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take the risk.325 
  
This new version, unlike that in Cunningham,326 makes explicit reference to recklessness in 
relation to circumstances.   This definition is different from the wording used in the Law 
Commission’s Report on the Mental Element in Crime327 (RMEC) which Duff328 criticised as 
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being ‘too wide, in counting every conscious and unreasonable risk-taker as “reckless” and 
too narrow”’ in requiring advertence to the risk.   
 
The new definition has the same faults that Duff identified in the original proposal.  Duff329 
does not rule out inadvertent recklessness as a possibility but in the context of the offences 
against the person, he seeks to limit such an extension of the accepted limits of reckless 
conduct to occasions where there is a close connection between the intended action and the 
fact as to which a person may be held reckless.  Where the fact as to which he may be held 
reckless forms part of his intention, i.e. he intends to take a risk of harming someone, this 
closer connection is established.  The example he uses is rape, where the perpetrator intends 
to have intercourse thinking that he may have the woman’s consent, but aware that she might 
not be consenting.  In such a case, his action ‘makes an essential difference to the moral 
character of the proposed action itself’.330   
 
Duff continues by suggesting that not every conscious and unreasonable risk taker should be 
caught by the definition of recklessness; instead there should be a requirement that the actor 
should ‘realise that it is probable, not just possible, that the relevant fact exists; or that the 
fact is so essentially and significantly connected to his intended action that he could be 
reckless even if he only considered the fact as a possibility.’331 Why recklessness should be 
restricted in this way in the former of the two parts is not at all clear, especially as assessing 
the degree of the probability of a risk can be very difficult. 
 
Duff dismisses the requirement for actual advertence as ‘too narrow’ a definition, stating that 
to hold the view that the ‘presence or absence of advertence results in an important difference 
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to the nature and degree of culpability’ has been ‘convincingly demolished’ by Hart and 
others, because failure to advert may depend upon the attention a defendant pays to what he 
is doing and is therefore within his control.332  He submits that a party can be reckless ‘even 
though, and even partly because, he does not realise the risk’333 because his conduct 
manifests such serious ‘practical indifference’ and ‘lack of concern’, that the possibility of 
there being a risk is unimportant.334  
 
Traditionally, even if we adopt a subjective definition of recklessness it will nevertheless 
have an objective element to it, which is the taking of ‘an unjustified risk’.335  Accordingly, 
whether the particular defendant saw the risk as an unreasonable one is irrelevant, it is 
whether an ordinary and prudent person would have been prepared to take it: ‘To this extent 
defendants cannot be permitted to displace the law and judge what is right for themselves.’336  
It is questionable whether this statement is still apposite following one possible interpretation 
of the Draft Criminal Code.337  Under this new definition, not only must the accused advert to 
the risk, on one interpretation he must also be aware that it is unreasonable for him to go on 
to take it.  This would be a form of ideal subjectivism and restrict culpability further.  
 
It has been noted338 that determining recklessness entails a balancing act ‘focussing on the 
utility or otherwise of the defendant’s actions,…balancing the seriousness of the risk against 
the gravity of the harm.’  Although determining whether running a risk is justified will 
depend on the social utility of the act, it is D’s perceptions that are relevant here if choice 
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theory underpins criminal responsibility, not society’s.  The social utility of an act would 
seem to have a more important role to play in determining the degree of foreseeability, rather 
than the reasonableness of taking the risk, in that where there is no social utility it is likely 
that even a remote chance of harm would be sufficient for a finding of recklessness.339  This 
is likely to catch practical jokers who are most unlikely to actually foresee the risk of any 
harm resulting from their actions and such actions will frequently have no social utility 
whatsoever.  
 
It appears that under this new version from the Draft Criminal Code,340 to satisfy (i) D must 
be aware of a risk that it exists or will exist, and for (ii) he must also be certain of there being 
a risk, therefore an awareness of a possibility of a risk existing would not suffice as it would 
have done under the RMEC which only required a person to see that a result might occur.  
Presumably Duff would see this change from the original proposal as a further narrowing of 
culpability.  In each case, the defendant must know that it is unreasonable for him to continue 
to act, and once again it would appear that the negligent mistake-maker would escape 
liability.  It is then a matter for the jury to decide whether the defendant genuinely either 
failed to foresee the risk as definite and/or believed it to be reasonable to take it in the 
circumstances known to the accused at the time.  It is just such a problematic task for the jury 
that Lord Diplock sought to avoid by his Caldwell Direction.  It would actually make the 
jury’s task harder because now it has to determine not only D’s foresight as a fact but perhaps 
also his belief that it was unreasonable for him to take the risk. 
 
  
                                            
339 Ibid. 




3.3.4.1 Should G & R have modified the Caldwell Test? 
 
Why did the House fail to take the opportunity to modify the Caldwell test rather than depart 
from it?  Lord Rodger seemed to have ruled out the possibility of modification because Lord 
Diplock’s:  
speech has proved notoriously difficult to interpret and those difficulties would not 
have ended with any refinements…Indeed those refinements themselves would almost 
inevitably have prompted further questions and appeals.341   
He appears to have been particularly influenced by the desire to ‘set the law back on the track 
that Parliament originally intended it to follow.’342  Whether this is a sufficient justification 
for overruling Caldwell recklessness is questionable as for more than 20 years Parliament 
could have amended the law had they so wished.343 Lord Bingham of Cornhill had four 
‘compelling’ objections to the suggested modification of the Model Direction to the extent 
that comparison in cases involving children should be a comparison with a normal reasonable 
child of the same age.  The first was that it offends the principle that conviction requires 
proof of a defendant’s culpable state of mind, as he argues would a constructive advertence 
test.  He also followed Lord Rodger’s stance, above,344 not wanting to substitute one 
misinterpretation of s.1 for another.  He further argued that:  
                                            
341 G& R G & R [2004] 4 All ER 765 at 793, para.(c). 
342 Ibid. Note the quote from Mr Mark Carlisle in the House of Commons debates cited by Smith, ‘Commentary 
on Caldwell' (n 128) at 394 in support of his proposition that the state of mind required knowledge of the risk, 
i.e. ‘the word [reckless] covered the offender who “did not necessarily intend to cause the damage but could not 
care less whether he caused it or not.” However, this statement would also be consistent with a requirement of 
indifference, which may suggest that it is the Law Commission’s view we are returning to and not necessarily 
Parliament’s. However, as noted earlier, the Commission referred to knowledge and not foresight. 
343 Lord Rodgers states that ‘if Parliament now thinks it preferable for the 1971 Act to cover culpably 
inadvertent as well as advertent wrongdoers, it can so enact.  The Law Commission recognised that, if codifying 
the law, Parliament might wish to adopt that approach....’ G&R [2003] 4 All ER at 795 para.(d).  
344 Supported by Lord Steyn. 
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if the rule were to be modified in relation to children on the grounds of their 
immaturity it would be anomalous if it were not also modified in relation to the 
mentally handicapped on grounds of their limited understanding.345   
This reasoning has been criticised for being the paramount reason to modify the Direction, 
even indicating the kind of modification needed, namely that recklessness only occurred 
where the risk would have been obvious to the defendant had she thought about it.346  Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill’s concern that such a modification could complicate matters for a jury 
has some merit but juries already face similar tasks, no less complicated, and examples cited 
include the defences of provocation and duress, and “dishonesty” under the Theft Act 
1968.347    
 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill’s final reason against modification was that if the test was 
modified to take into account some of the characteristics of the defendant, how would the 
court determine what qualities and characteristics would be considered in such a comparison?  
Although this would require some consideration it is hardly sufficient reason to avoid 
modification as such difficulties have been addressed elsewhere within the criminal law.   
 
As others have argued,348 there are certain character traits and emotions to which we tend to 
attach blameworthiness, for example, lust, greed, anger and jealousy and it is such 
characteristics that we rightly expect people to control that, uncontrolled, can lead to 
culpability.  Stupidity would not normally attract such censure, unless it is the product of a 
                                            
345 G&R [2003] UKHL 50 at 786 paras.(a-d). 
346 D. Kimel, ‘Inadvertent Recklessness in Criminal Law’ (n 260) at 552. 
347 Ibid. Note s.2 of this Act provides examples of when D will not be deemed dishonest, dishonesty being 
determined by reference to the test laid down in R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053. 
348 G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1978) 513; J. Horder, ‘Cognition, Emotion, 
and Criminal Culpability’ (n 228). 
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failure to give sufficient attention and consideration to what you were doing.349  Where there 
is stupidity in the sense of having the capacity to be aware of a risk, but the lack of awareness 
is due to ‘larking about’, there could justifiably be liability where D’s actions posed an 
obvious risk and caused serious harm.  On this basis, incapacity would not attract culpability 
unless it was self-induced.  A person may have some capacity to foresee a risk and yet not be 
able to identify the choices that are then open to them.  For this reason in such circumstances 
they must not only lack a full capacity but additionally lack a fair opportunity to avoid 
breaking the law before they are deemed culpable. 
 
It is noteworthy that Lord Rodger in G&R did not find a broader concept of recklessness was 
necessarily ‘undesirable’350 in terms of culpable inadvertence,351 recognising that there was 
scope for an objective approach and referred to the Model Direction as ‘a legitimate choice 
between two legal policies’ which ‘may be better suited to some offences than to others.’352  
He stated that historically different views have been adopted by English judges at different 
times over the centuries,353 so it remains to be seen if the decision in G&R will be the last 
word on this area.  Indeed a small survey conducted following this judgment showed that 
69% of the respondents would have found the children criminally responsible, 40% believing 
the boys were mature enough to realise the risks involved and moreover, 38% holding that 
their realisation of risk was irrelevant.354  From this it can be argued that where defendants 
are adults, rather than children, an overwhelming majority would favour a more objective 
approach and public support for subjectivism here is limited. 
                                            
349 F. Field and M. Lynn, ‘The capacity for recklessness’ (n 173) at 86. 
350 Birch described the extension of recklessness in Caldwell as an understandable attempt to bridge the gap 
between foresight and a morally culpable attitude, see ‘The Foresight Saga: The Biggest Mistake of All?’(n 
133). 
351 A constructive advertence/awareness test was also proposed by G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ (n 
119) at 270-271; and M. Davies, ‘Lawmakers, Law Lords and Legal Fault: Two Tales From The (Thames) 
Riverbank: Sexual Offences Act 2003; R v G and Another’ (n 295). 
352 See G & R [2004] 4 All ER 765 at 794-795, per Lord Rodger. 
353A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History (n 56). 
354 H. Keating, Reckless Children? [2007] Criminal Law Review 546 at 552. 
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Following G & R, the Court of Appeal has stated that this case laid down general principles 
to be followed and the definition of recklessness employed should not be restricted to cases 
of criminal damage, as Lord Bingham had specified.355  It seems odd, given the view that 
Caldwell recklessness was very ambiguous and potentially caused injustice, that Lord 
Bingham limited its overruling to criminal damage offences.356  The new definition was 
applied in Booth,357 where D was appealing against his conviction for the criminal damage 
caused to a car.  His counsel argued that if D had indeed thought of any risk before running 
across a road to meet a friend, it would have been in relation to personal injury to himself, but 
the court upheld the conviction, finding that there was enough evidence on which the 
magistrates could base their decision that he must have closed his mind to the risk.  As in 
Parker earlier, an objective approach to foresight is being applied. 
 
3.3.5 A Fourth Approach. 
 
Under suggested reforms the Law Commission’s Draft Criminal Law Bill358 slightly modifies 
the definition of recklessness provided by the Draft Code so that a person acts:  
(a) ‘recklessly’ with respect to – 
(i) a circumstance, when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist, and 
  (ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur,  
and it is unreasonable, having regard to the circumstances known to him, to 
take that risk… 
This definition would apply to the non-fatal offences against the person, whereas the Draft 
Code definition would apply to the remaining criminal offences unless statute specified 
                                            
355  Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 2003) [2004] 2 Cr App R 367. 
356 A point made by A. Halpin, Definition in the Criminal Law (n 121) Chapter 3. 
357 Booth v CPS [2006] EWHC 
358 Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code Offences against the Person and General Principles, Law 
Com. No. 218, Cm 2370 (1993) 
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otherwise.  This latest definition seems to be more objective in interpretation than the Draft 
Code, that is, the reasonable person can take into account what D knew/ believed to 
determine whether they think it was reasonable for D to take the risk.  It is questionable 
whether yet another definition is helpful.  It has been argued that if different definitions of 
recklessness are to be applied to different offences we need to be able to justify why this is so 
and yet this has not been attempted.359  Different definitions could cause problems for juries 
when two different offences were being alleged and they would have to consider both 
definitions separately.  Although this could be a concern, there is a lack of evidence from the 
time that Cunningham and Caldwell recklessness co-existed to support this.  Furthermore, the 
capacity based recklessness advocated in this work could not be applicable universally; if it 
was to be it would leave gaps where behaviour should be criminalised, for example the 
offence of stalking.360 
 
3.4 Conclusion to Chapter Three 
 
This chapter began with a critical review of the development of the law on intention, detailing 
how intention had historically been equated with foresight of harm.  This led over time to 
defining the mens rea of intention as being either direct intent or oblique intent, with the 
latter being something that a judge or jury could find in circumstances where D had foreseen 
the particular risk of harm (death or serious bodily injury) as a virtual certainty.  It was noted 
that this occurred in the context of homicide as murder cannot be committed recklessly.  It 
was frequently the language of recklessness that was used in jury directions and in the 
judgments of the appellate courts to convict defendants on the basis that they obliquely 
intended the consequences in the absence of evidence of any direct intent.  The need to 
                                            
359 A. Halpin, Definition in the Criminal Law (n 121). 
360 Section 1 Protection from Harassment Act 1997.  It is sufficient if a reasonable person would realise the 
course of conduct amounted to harassment; R v Colohan [2001] EWCA Crim 1251. 
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distinguish intention from recklessness is seen as important because these mens rea terms 
represent different degrees of moral turpitude, those found to have intentionally harmed 
others being deserving of more censure and punishment than those who behaved recklessly.    
 
This analysis was followed by a thorough critical evaluation of criminal recklessness.  It is 
submitted that the plethora of current definitions for recklessness and the lack of a morally 
substantive interpretation will lead to further developments and debate.  When employing the 
subjective approach in Cunningham and G & R to cases such as Parker and Booth it is argued 
that in reality an objective capacity based test is already in operation.  This is because it is 
recognised that a definition of recklessness that is too subjective can allow those who are 
blameworthy to avoid criminal liability.  If the Draft Criminal Code definition was to be 
interpreted as ideally subjective that would be untenable.  Alternatively, a test that is too 
objective can lead to injustice without being capacity based.  It is submitted that a synthesis 
of the two approaches is required.  This could be achieved by openly developing a capacity 
based test as advocated here, or by introducing a form of practical indifference test, discussed 
earlier.  It is advocated that Glidewell J’s suggestion in Elliott (when applying the 
Caldwell/Lawrence Direction) would be a way of achieving a more appropriate approach to 
inadvertent recklessness:  
where no thought is given to the risk any further inquiry necessary for the purpose of 
establishing guilt should prima facie be directed to the question why such thought was 
not given, rather than to the purely hypothetical question of what the particular 
person would have appreciated had he directed his mind to the matter.361 
This will impose an evidential burden on the accused.  Once the reason why no thought was 
given to the risk emerged, it would be relatively straightforward to assess the degree of moral 
                                            
361 (1983) 77 Cr.App.R. 103 at 119. 
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blameworthiness and thus any criminal liability.  Such an approach would look beyond the 
subjective/objective dichotomy and add another dimension, why the accused acted as he did, 
his motivation or emotion behind the actus reus362 and the context in which the proscribed act 
occurred. Thus, if the reason D did not foresee the risk was because he was angry or set on a 
course of revenge against someone who had offended him he would be morally culpable and 
reckless.  Alternatively, if D did not foresee the risk because he was going to the assistance of 
an innocent third party or because he was distracted because his child had been hurt, he 
would not be deemed morally culpable or reckless.  This position is clearly grounded in 
character theory as evidence of a bad character would give rise to criminal liability but it is 
also a subjectivised version of ‘role’ theory as the inference that D is reckless is determined 
by reference to what a reasonable person performing his role would have foreseen.  It has 
been proposed elsewhere that there needs to be further:  
discussions of the extent to which requirements for criminal liability should have 
subjective or objective elements rather than a crude “subjective or objective” 
characterisation.  The moral and social arguments are not all stacked on one side.363   
The sooner this happens the better as transparency as to what definition is really being 
employed should be an essential requirement.   
 
Where the labels “subjective” and “objective” are employed it must be clear in what precise 
context they are being used.  The subjective test from Cunningham was observed to have an 
objective strand to it, namely the determination of whether the risk was a reasonable one to 
take in the circumstances fell to the judge or jury, not the defendant.  When the Cunningham 
test was held to encompass the deliberate closing of the mind to the risk, an objective test was 
being imposed in reality.  The objective test advanced in Caldwell/Lawrence was not entirely 
                                            
362 See J. Horder’s approach  in ‘Cognition, Emotion, and Criminal Culpability’ (n 228). 
363 N.P. Metcalfe and A.J. Ashworth, ‘Arson: Mens Rea –Recklessness Whether Property is Destroyed or 
Damaged’ (n 255) at 372. 
197 
 
objective as it encompassed the Cunningham test, as well as introducing an inadvertent 
strand.  Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that there is substantial evidence to support the 
contention that the Model Direction espoused by Lord Diplock was intended to be capacity 
dependent.  The latest test from the Draft Criminal Code adopted in G & R could be 
subjective/objective like the Cunningham test but has the potential to be interpreted as 
entirely subjective given its wording.  If this is the case it must be proven that D foresaw the 
relevant risk and that D knew it was an unreasonable one to take.  This would make it 
extremely difficult to secure a conviction. 
 
Having analysed the blurring of the distinction between intention and recklessness in this 
chapter, the following chapter will critically analyse the similar problems with the boundary 
between recklessness and negligence, briefly noted above.364  This will be undertaken in an 
attempt to determine whether there is a distinction and, if so, where the line should be drawn 
between the two forms of mens rea. 
                                            





Distinguishing between recklessness and negligence; the scope for criminal 
negligence 
 
‘There but for the Grace of God, go I’ 
(Attributed to John Bradford (1510-1555)) 
4.1 Introduction to Chapter Four 
 
This chapter will examine in more detail the role and ambit of negligence in the criminal law, 
given that the Caldwell/Lawrence Model Direction encroached on the historical remit of this 
area of mens rea.  As a more objective position on recklessness is being advocated in this 
work, it is necessary to determine the appropriate limits for both fault terms.  Although it is 
accepted that no one should be censured for an accidental harm, it does not automatically 
follow that in every circumstance1 a person should be exempt from liability when they have 
acted with extreme carelessness or stupidity and as a result have harmed others.2  It would 
seem obvious that the greater the risk of resulting harm, and the more serious the 
consequences of it, the more care that should be taken, and would be expected by society to 
be taken, to avoid or seek to prevent harm occurring.3  Where the risk of harm was obvious 
and serious, thoughtless conduct could have been caught by the Caldwell/Lawrence Model 
Direction but this is no longer applicable in the majority of circumstances.  It would not be 
appropriate to advocate that criminal responsibility for serious crimes should follow mere 
carelessness; momentary carelessness is often a common feature of everyday human 
                                            
1 See Lord Rodgers comments in G & R [2004] 4 All ER 765 at 794-5. 
2 In G & R [2004] 4 All ER 765 at 784 Lord Bingham states that ‘it is not clearly blameworthy to do something 
involving a risk of injury to another if … one genuinely does not perceive the risk.  Such a person may fairly be 
accused of stupidity or lack of imagination, but neither of those failings should expose him to conviction of 
serious crime or the risk of punishment’. 
3 J.C. Smith, and B. Hogan, Criminal Law, 9th Edn., (London: Butterworths, 1999) 61: ‘Whether it is reasonable 
to take a risk depends on the social value of the activity involved relative to the probability and the gravity of the 
harm which might be caused’. 
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interaction.  Stupidity, in the sense of a failure to exercise a capacity to behave more 
responsibly, is perhaps another matter when it results in serious harm.  In situation of this 
kind the conduct could fall within the ambit of the recklessness proposed in the previous 
chapter if accompanied by evidence of an indifference or disregard for the interests of others, 
in other words evidence of D’s bad attitude or character.4  This would remove the need to use 
gross negligence as a form of liability for serious offences leaving simple negligence as the 
appropriate fault term for minor crimes. 
 
Those who advocate criminal liability for negligence do so on the basis that ‘it is a standard 
that reflects fault on the part of the defendant.’5    This is because it is not sufficient to only 
hold criminally responsible those who choose to cause harm, or choose to run the risk of 
causing harm; we are under an obligation to others to take care lest we cause harm.6   For 
others, where an agent is unaware of a potential risk of harm, culpability is not easily 
established because failing to select between unknown options is not blameworthy.7  As a 
result of these opposing views, there has been much debate on liability for negligence in 
criminal law and this will be examined in this chapter.  Following this, the focus will be on 
the extent to which liability for negligence can be encompassed by the theories of culpability, 
discussed in Chapter Two, to determine whether the ascription of criminal responsibility can 
be justified, including the extent to which the capacity of the particular defendant is relevant.    
 
First, however, the analysis will embark on a critical inspection of the judicial blurring of the 
mentes reae terms of criminal recklessness and negligence with a view to determining 
                                            
4 Discussed further, below, at 4.6.1. 
5 A.P. Simester and G.R. Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine, 3rd Edn., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2007) 145. 
6 A.P. Simester, ‘Can Negligence be Culpable?’ in J. Horder (ed.,) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 4th Series 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 89. 
7 Ibid.  
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whether these terms should be quite distinct or should remain as practically synonymous.  It 
will be contended that instances of criminal behaviour that are currently deemed to amount to 
gross negligence are more appropriately labelled recklessness.  To implement such a proposal 
calls for a modification of the Caldwell/Lawrence Direction on recklessness8 as this lacked 
clarity and had the potential for unfairness if the inadvertent limb was interpreted as being 
purely objective.  This modification would adopt the changes advanced in Reid9 which would 
allow for the mental capacity of the individual defendant to be taken into account but would 
also require an examination of the reason why D failed to advert to the risk, as advocated in 
the previous chapter.10  The modification would also need to encompass acts of omission as 
well as acts of commission and a proposed direction to accommodate acts of omission is 
advanced.  This proposition, if adopted, would remove criminal liability for negligence in 
relation to serious crimes.  It would also ascribe culpability on retributive Kantian principles 
based upon the character of D’s conduct.   
 
What will be made clear is that much of the debate surrounding liability for recklessness or 
negligence is a consequence of a lack of judicial and academic commitment to clear legal 
definitions.  In 1965, it was alleged that judicial reluctance to arrive at settled definitions 
arises because it allows the courts to warp legal concepts to ‘meet the exigency of the 
moment’ which is a process that would be hindered by rigid definitions.11  It is evident from 
the analysis undertaken in this work that the courts are still prepared to blur the boundaries of 
the mentes reae under examination here.  Given the nature of these terms, some blurring of 
the boundaries is inevitable in the courts’ pursuit of justice; the concepts raise similar issues 
                                            
8 See Chapter 3 at 3.3.3. and 3.3.3.5. 
9 [1992] 1 WLR 793, see chapter 3 at 3.3.3.3. note 147. 
10 Chapter 3 at 3.4. 
11 G. Williams, The Mental Element in Crime (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1965) 9. 
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to trying to define indeterminate dispositions like fairness, discussed in Chapter 2.12  It is 
contended here that this lack of demarcation is because recklessness and negligence are 
context/reason dependent; it is only when the full context in which D’s behaviour arose and 
his reasons for so behaving are analysed that we can determine whether the imposition of 
criminal responsibility in any given instance is appropriate.   
 
4.2 Blurring the Distinction between Recklessness and Negligence 
 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, to a large extent the decision in Caldwell effectively 
abolished the distinction between recklessness and negligence.  Recklessness had historically 
required advertence to risk on its subjective interpretation, leaving negligence to cover the 
inadvertent agent in a limited number of offences as most crimes required mens rea, in the 
traditional sense of intention or at least subjective recklessness.  Even if this extension of 
recklessness required knowledge of a risk rather than actual foresight, as was possible on one 
interpretation of Lord Diplock’s judgment, it would still leave the difficulty that almost all 
negligent actors would generally know of the risks attached to any venture even if they did 
not stop to think about them before or at the time of acting.  In theory this would make them 
all reckless following the Caldwell Direction which would be unreasonable.   
 
As negligence generally only attracts liability for summary offences, unless it is deemed to be 
‘gross’ and causes the death of another, it would indeed seem strange that in one move, the 
House of Lords in Caldwell had managed to make more people criminals for serious offences 
committed inadvertently, without the extra requirement that existed for negligence (that it 
needed to be gross) and where no liability would have been founded previously because the 
                                            
12 At 2.5.1.2. 
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offence was not one that could be committed negligently.13  It was suggested that following 
Caldwell, a person could not be reckless in any sense if he failed to think but would not have 
realised there was a risk even if he had stopped to consider if there was one.14  After all, Lord 
Diplock’s judgment referred to the defendant who would have realised the risk had he 
stopped to think about it, not should have realised it.   Certainly, if D was convinced there 
was no risk he could not be Caldwell reckless and could at most be negligent but this would 
be in circumstances where D had consciously considered potential risks arising from his 
proposed action. 
 
At least for the purposes of objective recklessness it could be argued that the risk had to be 
both ‘obvious’15 and ‘serious’,16 which would have a limiting effect and which would more 
closely reflect the current ambit of criminal negligence with respect to manslaughter.  Even 
this would nevertheless greatly extend the reach of the criminal law.  For example, the Law 
Commission did not propose an offence of negligently causing damage to property when 
drafting the Criminal Damage Bill, now the Criminal Damage Act 1971, and similarly, the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee rejected an offence of negligent injury to the person.17   
 
The obvious difficulty with the concepts of recklessness and negligence is that the terms are 
often used interchangeably, even by the courts, with one being defined by reference to the 
other.  As noted above, this should not happen as most of the serious offences cannot be 
committed negligently.  Yet there is substantial evidence that the courts have found it 
                                            
13 G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd Edn., (London: Stevens, 1983) 113, noting that if the model 
direction is taken in isolation it could be interpreted that any negligence on the part of D is equivalent to 
recklessness. Yet in negligence the probability of risk and the possible degree of injury are inversely related. 
14 Ibid. at 106. This would have left the decision in R v Stephenson intact, as suggested here in Chapter 3. 
15 Caldwell [1982] AC 341. 
16 Lawrence [1982] AC 510. 
17 Working Paper on the Offences Against the Person (HMSO, 1976) cited in G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal 
Law (n 13) 97. 
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difficult to define, not only intention and recklessness as discussed in the previous chapter, 
but also criminal negligence.  As with the discussion on oblique intention and recklessness in 
the previous chapter, the synthesis of the fault terms of recklessness and negligence has 
arisen in cases of homicide.  This demonstrates that at both ends of this spectrum, 
intent/recklessness and recklessness/negligence, the difficulties in definition have emerged 
because of a desire to appropriately label and punish those who cause death.  This is perhaps 
more striking in the realm of negligence given that negligently causing a person serious 
physical injury attracts no criminal liability at all.  Accordingly, gross negligence 
manslaughter is something of an anomaly as it is the only common law crime where this fault 
term will suffice for criminal liability, although negligence liability arises in statutory 
offences regulating commercial and other activities.18  Indeed, it may seem strange that 
criminal responsibility can be attributed where death is caused but not where D, with an equal 
degree of negligence, causes another serious harm or suffering, a matter some other legal 
systems address.19 
 
Historically, there was the view that any lack of care that caused death was sufficient for 
manslaughter, as is noted in the exposition of Lord Atkin in Andrews.20  It was the nineteenth 
century before there was a move to require a higher degree of fault, that of ‘gross’ 
negligence.21  In R v Nicholls,22 when giving guidance on the degree of fault required for a 
charge of gross negligence manslaughter, Brett J. stated that ‘wicked negligence’ was needed: 
‘negligence so great, that you must be of the opinion that the prisoner had a wicked mind, in 
                                            
18 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 6th Edn,;( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 185 
19 Ibid. and see J.R. Spencer and Marie-Aimee Brajeux, ‘Criminal Liability for Negligence – a Lesson From 
Across the Channel?’ [2010] International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1; G. Fletcher ‘The Theory of 
Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis’ (1971) 119 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 401. 
20 Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576 at 582. 
21 An example illustrating this shift is Williamson (1807) 3 C & P 635, Law Commission, Criminal Law 
Involuntary Manslaughter, Consultation Paper No. 135 (London: HMSO, 1994) 6. 
22 (1874) 13 Cox CC 75 D was P’s grandmother and she was held to owe a duty of care to her grandchild which 
arises after undertaking to care for a helpless and infirm relative. 
204 
 
the sense that she was reckless and careless whether the creature died or not’.23  This is not 
helpful as although moral turpitude seems to be essential, which is laudable, adverting to 
recklessness and carelessness is obfuscating matters by combining two mental states.  It has 
been noted that the courts of the day were not as scrupulous in distinguishing between 
subjective and objective mental states,24 and, as this work has shown, judges and academics 
still have some work to do in this regard.   
 
In R v Doherty,25 the level of fault required in such cases was examined by Stephen J. in the 
context of a negligent doctor: 
Supposing a man performed a surgical operation, whether from losing his head, or 
from forgetfulness, or from some other reason, omitted to do something he ought to 
have done, or did something he ought not to have done, in such a case there would be 
negligence.  But if there was only the kind of negligence that was common to 
everybody, or if there was a slight want of skill, any injury which resulted might 
furnish a ground for claiming civil damages, but it would be wrong to proceed 
against a man criminally in respect of such injury. 
 
Stephen J continued with the example of a drunken surgeon who attended a patient and 
through inebriation neglected his duty causing the patient’s death.  This was an example of 
‘culpable negligence of a grave kind.  It is not given to everyone to be a skilful surgeon, but it 
is given to everyone to keep sober when such a duty has to be performed.’26  The example 
would fit well with the approach to recklessness advocated in this work as the drunken 
surgeon would have knowledge of the risk to his patient even if he failed to stop to think 
                                            
23 Ibid. at 76. 
24 J. Horder, ‘Gross Negligence and Criminal Culpability’ (1997) 47 University of Toronto Law Journal 495 at 
497. 




about it.  Any inadvertence would be evidence of an attitude of disregard towards the 
patient’s interests and could only be displaced by evidence that had he not tried to assist the 
patient she would have died anyway.  
                               
Donovan J in McKinnon,27 considered ‘recklessness’ should be left to bear its full meaning 
and would cover the case of a high degree of negligence.  This would suggest that negligence 
could perhaps be evidenced by a little carelessness or alternatively where no serious harm is 
caused.  If evidenced by mere carelessness, criminal liability for serious offences should not 
arise.  Minor harms should fall within the remit of the civil law.  More importantly perhaps, if 
recklessness is evidenced by a high degree of negligence then there is no reason why 
recklessness and extreme negligence should not be considered to be the same concept, one 
being a synonym of the other.  If this is the case, then it follows that ‘gross’ negligence as a 
concept can be dispensed with altogether, as all such agents would be adjudged reckless.   
 
In R v Cato,28 the judge directed the jury that D could be convicted of manslaughter if he 
injected the heroin into his friend ‘with gross negligence, that is to say, recklessly.’29 On 
appeal against conviction the Court of Appeal failed to pick up this conflation of the two 
concepts even though recklessness was still the Cunningham subjective test at the time.  It 
was noted later30 that there was no need to mention recklessness for the purposes of gross 
negligence manslaughter in this case as the court could have relied on Lord Hewart’s 
guidance on gross negligence from R v Bateman,31 which required ‘such disregard for the life 
and safety of others as to amount to a crime.’ 
                                            
27 [1958] 3 WLR 688. 
28 [1976] 1 All ER 260 D and his friend filled syringes of heroin and injected each other several times during the 
course of a night.  His friend died the next morning. 
29 C. Wells, ‘Perfectly Simple English Manslaughter’ (1976) 39 Modern Law Review 474 at 476. 
30 Ibid. at 477. 
31 (1925) Cr App R 11. 
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Further evidence of mixing the two concepts is found in Hyam,32 where Lord Cross used 
“reckless” to cover ‘not having reflected on the probable consequences of her act.’33  As is 
known, this was in the context of indirect intention and Hyam was convicted of murder, yet 
inadvertence to risk had traditionally been deemed negligence.  This approach may have been 
a precursor to the inadvertent strand of recklessness in the Caldwell Direction a few years 
later.  As discussed in Chapter Three, an actual definition of recklessness was not provided in 
Caldwell, the word was to bear its ordinary English meaning, Lord Diplock recognising a 
number of states of mind but not providing a synthesising definition.34   This ordinary 
meaning included being ‘careless, regardless, or heedless’35 of the possible consequences of 
one’s acts.  Each state of mind will be now considered below. 
 
4.2.1. Regardless, Careless, and Heedless 
 
To be regardless could suggest that D was indifferent to the risk he was exposing others to; 
that D would have continued to act even if he had become aware of the risk.  In other words, 
D has no regard for the interests of others.  Alternatively it could equally arise where D was 
regardless of a risk because he did not believe that any such risk existed.  As for carelessness, 
it is submitted that to be careless is quite different from being reckless, but it is also 
acknowledged that it is difficult to formulate any all encompassing definitions to differentiate 
between each of the states of mind.  What is contended here is that recklessness is evidenced 
by the cognitive capacity to have appreciated the risk involved in one’s actions coupled with 
evidence of a bad attitude to the interests and welfare of others.  This view is clearly 
grounded in character theory. 
 
                                            
32 Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55; [1974] 2 WLR 607, discussed above at 3.2.1. 
33 (1974) 50 Cr.App.R 91 at 100; Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55; [1974] 2 WLR 607. 
34 A. Halpin, Definition in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 78-80. 
35 [1982] AC 341 at 351. 
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Negligence is often equated with carelessness and yet one can clearly be careless without 
being negligent. Negligence will cover both the thoughtless and also the incompetent who fall 
below the standard of the reasonable or prudent man.  Even taking ‘carelessness’ as an 
alternative term, this description is not sufficiently accurate to adequately describe negligence 
as it would lead to a determination of what was meant by ‘carelessness’ itself.  Carelessness 
in the legal sense can apply to those who care deeply.36  An honest but negligent mistake will 
not exculpate an agent where negligence suffices as the requisite mental element.  The fact 
that D is incapable of doing any better is also generally irrelevant, but the capacity to do 
better should be relevant to the criminal law.  The incapacitated and the majority of negligent 
mistake makers37 should be dealt with under the civil law.   
 
When considering carelessness it is important to distinguish between those who ‘did not take 
care’ and those who ‘did not care less’ about the welfare of others.  There is a marked moral 
distinction between the two, the latter suggesting an attitude of disregard, of selfishness 
perhaps, of indifference.  If, on the other hand, we are simply stating that in a given 
circumstance D did not take sufficient care, such a reprehensible attitude is not necessarily 
demonstrated.   
 
‘Heedlessness’ has been defined in the Law Commission’s Draft Code38 and is where D 
‘gives no thought to whether there is a risk that it exists or will exist or occur although the 
risk would be obvious to any reasonable person’ but this is strikingly similar to part of the 
Caldwell Direction and has additionally been employed as a definition of negligence.39  For 
                                            
36 G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (n 13) 90. 
37 Unless they are deemed to be reckless on all the evidence. 
38 Law Commission (Law Com No 143), Codification of the Criminal Law, Draft Code, in Law Com No 177, A 
Criminal Code for England and Wales (1989). 
39 G. Williams, ‘The Unresolved Problem of Recklessness’ (1988) 8 Legal Studies 74 at 75. 
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example, Glanville Williams also discusses Caldwell recklessness in terms of D ‘not giving 
thought to the risk he is negligently creating.’40   
 
The Draft Code defined negligence in terms of a very serious deviation from the standard of 
the reasonable person, giving it a more restrictive definition than ‘heedlessness’ and placing it 
at the bottom of the ranking of mentes reae (intention, subjective recklessness, heedlessness, 
and negligence) but although this attempt at definition shows a sign of recognising the need 
for a distinction between Caldwell recklessness, heedlessness and negligence, it has been 
contended that it is not useful and in practice could cause all the same problems of 
interpretation, justice and policy as the Model Direction.41  Whether D’s behaviour is 
considered reckless, negligent, regardless, careless or heedless can only be determined by a 
full examination of the circumstances leading to, and at the time, of causing the prohibited 
consequence.  
 
4.3. Judicial Precedents 
 
In R v Adomako it was acknowledged by the Crown that ‘for centuries gross negligence was 
equivalent to recklessness.’42  The definition of gross negligence had been developed 
primarily in the cases of R v Bateman,43 Andrews v DPP,44 with further guidance being 
provided by the House of Lords in Adomako,45 but the decision in R v Stone, R v Dobinson,46 
will be included as it also illustrates the blurring of the boundaries of recklessness and 
                                            
40 G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (n 13). 
41 G. Williams, ‘The Unresolved Problem of Recklessness’ (n 39) at 75. 
42 [1995] 1 AC 171 at 178. 
43 (1925) 19 Cr App R 8.  
44 Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576. 
45 [1995] AC 171; [1994] 3 WLR 288. 
46 [1977] 2 All ER 341; [1977] QB 354 Stone and his mistress, D, were deemed to have assumed responsibility 
for caring for S’s sister who died from a combination of anorexia nervosa and their incompetent neglect. 
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negligence.  This evolution will now be subject to a critical examination to determine the 




In Bateman, Lord Hewart CJ opined: 
[I]n explaining to juries the test which they should apply to determine whether the 
negligence [is criminal]…whatever epithet be used…in order to establish criminal 
liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the 
accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed 
such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the 
State and conduct deserving punishment.47 
There is no specific reference to whether such ‘disregard’ is founded on inadvertence or 
advertence and it is submitted it could encompass both states.  It is suggested that in some 
cases there will not be much distinction, if any, between disregard and indifference to the 
welfare of others.  Indifference is a term that has often been used in the context of 
recklessness48 so we have a conflation of the two concepts.  Perhaps this could be because 
gross negligence was traditionally viewed as the minimum state of recklessness to cover 
circumstances where there was a lack of foresight of risk.  In this way the lacuna left by a 
subjective definition of recklessness could be addressed where, in the eyes of the court, 
policy and justice demanded that the accused was ‘deserving’ of punishment. 
 
                                            
47 (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 at 11. Here, a doctor attended a patient who was in childbirth and she died.  
48 See above at 3.3.3.6 
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4.3.2 Andrews  
 
Lord Atkin in Andrews49 referred to Lord Hewart’s words but developed matters further 
stating: 
…I do not myself find the connotation of mens rea helpful in distinguishing between 
different degrees of negligence…[A] simple lack of care such as will constitute civil 
liability is not enough: for the purposes of the criminal law there are degrees of 
negligence; and a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the 
felony is established.  Probably of all the epithets that can be applied ‘reckless’ most 
nearly covers the case…but it is probably not all-embracing, for ‘reckless’ suggests 
an indifference to risk, whereas the accused may have appreciated the risk and 
intended to avoid it and yet shown such a high degree of negligence in the means 
adopted to avoid the risk as would justify a conviction.50 
What is clear from this statement is that if the accused appreciates the risk and tries to avoid it 
by taking inadequate measures, then he is not reckless according to Lord Atkin but can only 
be negligent.  So at least here, there appears to be an identifiable difference between the two 
concepts.  Indifference is not a fundamental precondition to a finding of recklessness.  
Although, in general terms, the negligence shown by those who incompetently try to avoid a 
perceived risk may not be deemed reckless, much should depend on the reasons both for 
continuing to act and for their incompetence.  There could be indifference or callousness 
evidenced by the fact that sufficient care was not taken to eliminate the risk foreseen.  
Additionally inadvertence would not necessarily exclude criminal liability if it demonstrated 
                                            
49 Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576. 
50 Ibid. at 583. 
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criminal disregard for others, such as ‘the grossest ignorance or the most criminal 
inattention.’51 
 
4.3.3 Stone and Dobinson 
 
Lord Atkin’s statement of the law was cited with approval by Lane LJ in R v Stone, R v 
Dobinson,52 adding: 
[I]t is clear from that passage that indifference to an obvious risk and appreciation of 
such risk, coupled with a determination to run it, are both examples of 
recklessness…Mere inadvertence is not enough.  The defendant must be proved to 
have been indifferent to an obvious risk of injury to health, or actually to have 
foreseen the risk but to have determined nevertheless to run it.53 
 
Of course, what separates the cases of Andrews and Stone and Dobinson is the decision in 
Cunningham, which used the subjective definition of recklessness, requiring D to have 
foreseen the risk or ‘closed his mind’ to it.  It would seem possible that using the phrase 
‘indifference to an obvious risk and appreciation of such risk’ was opening the door for the 
Caldwell Direction.  It is clear that inadvertence alone is not sufficient but then this is exactly 
the position of Lord Hailsham in Lawrence who stated that the word ‘reckless’ applied ‘to a 
                                            
51 [1937] AC 576 at 582, per Lord Atkin. 
52 [1977] 2 All ER 341; [1977] QB 354 Stone and his mistress, D, were deemed to have assumed responsibility 
for caring for S’s sister who died from a combination of anorexia nervosa and their incompetent neglect. 
53 Ibid. at 364. 
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person or conduct evincing a state of mind stopping short of deliberate intention, and going 
beyond mere inadvertence, or,…mere carelessness.’54 
 
Furthermore, in R v Stone, R v Dobinson,55 the conviction for gross negligence manslaughter 
was based upon ‘gross neglect amounting to reckless disregard’ for the sister’s welfare.  The 
court found culpability could be founded either by indifference to an obvious risk or 
subjective recklessness.  This case, apart from once again failing to distinguish between the 
concepts of recklessness and negligence, is hard to justify given that both defendants were of 
low intelligence.  They were therefore not indifferent to the sister’s wellbeing, doing their 
best to try to help her, and it is unlikely that either of them was subjectively aware of the 
serious risk to her health.56  Plainly the court found that foresight of consequences was 
unnecessary, but it is hard to see how the defendants fell within the guidance from Lord 
Atkin in Andrews upon which the appeal court relied.57 
 
4.3.4 Seymour; Reid 
 
The next relevant milestone was the House of Lords decision in R v Seymour,58 where Lord 
Roskill ruled that recklessness was the most suitable term to signify the level of culpability 
required for what had previously been termed gross negligence manslaughter.59  Given that 
this case was decided after the decisions of the House in Caldwell and Lawrence this is not 
surprising as recklessness now included both the advertent and inadvertent risk taker.  What 
was surprising about this decision was that Lord Roskill, whilst applying Caldwell/Lawrence 
                                            
54 [1981] 1 All ER at 978, cited in G. Syrota, ‘A Radical Change in the Law of Recklessness’ [1982] Criminal 
Law Review 97 at 103. 
55 [1977] 2 All ER 341; [1977] QB 354.  
56 Under the test for recklessness advanced in this work a conviction could not stand. 
57 Above, text to note 50. 
58 [1983] 2 AC 493 a case of causing death by reckless driving. 
59 A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, G. R. Sullivan, and G. J. Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory 
and Doctrine, 4th Edn., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 410. 
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recklessness, contended that recklessness as to ‘the risk of any degree of harm would 
suffice.’60  By way of contrast, gross negligence manslaughter had generally required a risk 
of death or at least serious harm,61 apart from the judgment in Stone and Dobinson (above) 
where Lord Lane suggested that ‘an obvious risk of injury to health’ was necessary.  
Similarly, the Caldwell/Lawrence Direction called for an ‘obvious’ and ‘serious’ risk.  
Therefore the extensive approach to manslaughter adopted in Seymour (the risk of any degree 
of harm was sufficient) would be too broad to sustain without being subject to amelioration 
by consideration of capacity and circumstances.  This leeway was potentially provided by the 
House of Lord in R v Reid62 when holding that Lord Diplock’s Model Direction was not to be 
followed ipsissima verba but should be adapted to the facts of the particular case with 
consideration of any explanation or excuses offered by the defence as to why D should not be 
found reckless. 
 
4.3.5 Prentice and Another, Adomako, and Holloway 
 
The next development came in 1993 with a group of appeals against conviction for 
involuntary manslaughter heard together in the Court of Appeal: R v Prentice and another; R 
v Adomako; and R v Holloway.63  The first two defendants, Prentice and Sullman, were 
doctors who were responsible for administering a drug in the wrong way leading to their 
patient’s death.  Adomako was an anaesthetist whose patient died from hypoxia after a tube 
enabling him to breathe became disconnected during an operation; and Holloway was an 
electrician who had wrongly wired a central heating system with the consequence that a man 
was fatally electrocuted.  Each of the appeals was centred upon the question as to the correct 
                                            
60 [1983] 2 AC 493 at 505. 
61 A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, G.R. Sullivan, and G.J. Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory and 
Doctrine, 4th Edn., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 411. 
62 [1992] 3 All ER 673 at 675. 
63 [1993] 4 All ER 935. 
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approach to be adopted for involuntary manslaughter by breach of duty.  Traditionally such 
cases had fallen to be decided on the basis of gross negligence manslaughter in line with 
Bateman and Andrews (noted above), but Seymour had suggested that recklessness was the 
preferred test and this meant Caldwell/Lawrence recklessness.  
  
The trial judges in the present appeal cases had directed their juries either in terms of the 
Caldwell/Lawrence Model Direction, in terms of gross negligence, or a hybrid of the two, 
hardly a satisfactory situation.  The Law Commission subsequently noted that in cases of 
involuntary manslaughter, where the death was not caused during the commission of another 
crime (which is unlawful act manslaughter), it must be shown that D caused the death of 
another through gross negligence or recklessness, but it was unclear what these fault terms 
meant or even whether they were describing two separate categories of manslaughter or the 
same one.64 
 
The Court of Appeal attempted to resolve this issue by finding that the test for recklessness 
applicable to cases of motor manslaughter was not appropriate to involuntary manslaughter 
by breach of duty, for which the test required was that for determining gross negligence 
manslaughter.  There were four reasons given for adopting this stance, the first being that the 
‘wide definition’ of recklessness from Caldwell/Lawrence had caused difficulty for the 
ordinary lawyer and juror who may have felt that the word ‘reckless’ had stricter 
connotations (presumably accounting for capacity).  Similarly the court believed it had 
caused problems for the courts in cases of involuntary manslaughter that would not have 
happened had gross negligence been the test.65   
 
                                            
64 Law Commission, Criminal Law Involuntary Manslaughter, Consultation Paper No. 135 (London: HMSO, 
1994) 5. 
65 [1993] 4 All ER 935 at 940-941. 
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The second reason centred around the perceived difficulty that the Caldwell/Lawrence 
Direction on recklessness specifically referred to circumstances where the defendant himself 
had created the relevant risk,  Lord Diplock stating that a person would be reckless if ‘(1) he 
does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk … and (2) when he does that act…’66  The 
problem that follows from a literal approach to this wording is that many of the cases of 
involuntary manslaughter, other than motor manslaughter, arise not because of D’s 
commission of an action, but rather because D failed to act to prevent harm when he was 
placed under a legal duty to act.  The Court of Appeal observed that breach of duty cases 
involving doctors are in a different category as the risk to the patient’s health is already 
present and this is what causes the doctor to assume the duty of care with consent, often in an 
emergency situation.67  Accordingly, it seemed that the Caldwell/Lawrence Direction, due to 
its formulation, could only apply to cases of commission, leaving omissions to be dealt with 
utilizing the requirements for establishing gross negligence.  This is a cogent argument but it 
must be said that given the acceptance of their Lordships that Lord Diplock’s Direction was 
not to apply ipsissima verba, this was hardly an insurmountable hurdle. 
 
The third reason was also related to the exact wording of the Model Direction; the ‘obvious’ 
risk referred to in the Direction meant that the risk would be obvious to the ‘ordinary prudent 
individual.’  In cases where a breach of duty arises the defendant is often an expert in his 
field and would therefore appreciate risks, or should appreciate risks, which the ordinary 
prudent person may not.  Again, this is another valid argument, but only if we adhere to the 
exact wording of the Direction; it could easily be modified to take account of this factor.  
Where a defendant has special knowledge or expertise and therefore should identify a risk 
that would not be obvious to the ordinary prudent man, he could still be caught by the 
                                            
66 R v Caldwell [1981] 1All ER 961 at 967. 
67 [1993] 4 All ER 935 at 943, per Lord Taylor. 
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subjective part of the Model Direction, rather it was the objective limb of the test that was 
satisfied by reference to the ordinary prudent person so that the inadvertent risk taker was 
judged by reference to common sense rather than specific expertise.68    
 
It would, therefore, only be necessary to modify the objective limb of the Direction (‘has not 
given any thought’) to make it clear that the capacity, knowledge and skill of the accused is to 
be taken into consideration.  In this way, a doctor could be judged by the standard of a doctor 
with similar training and experience, an electrician with a competent electrician, etc.  
Applying this proposition to Prentice and Sullman, as neither doctor was familiar with 
chemotherapy drug administration and only Sullman had experience of performing lumbar 
punctures, combined with other mitigating factors, neither would be deemed reckless.   
 
In the Court of Appeal, Lord Taylor found that on a literal interpretation of the 
Caldwell/Lawrence Model Direction such factors could not be considered, whereas a jury 
could take them into account when deciding if their negligence was gross.69  This was 
arguably only an accurate statement of the law if Lord Diplock’s Direction in Caldwell had to 
be taken ipsissima verba, yet the House of Lords in Reid70 had already ruled that this was not 
the case, a point already noted by the appellate court in this case.  Also, the version of the 
Direction given in Lawrence71 expressly allowed for such factors to be taken into 
consideration.  It is difficult to see why the court then decided to ignore the guidance from 
Reid after citing it; presumably it was because of the problems the appellate courts had faced 
with the ambiguity in Lord Diplock’s judgments.  It is respectfully submitted that the court 
must have misunderstood the effect of the Lawrence Direction, as the Direction clearly 
                                            
68 As discussed above at 3.3.3.1. 
69 [1993] 4 All ER 935 at 949. 
70 [1992] 3 All ER 673 at 675. 
71 [1981] 1 All ER at 982. 
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allowed evidence to be adduced to show why D should not be deemed reckless.72  Lord 
Diplock’s guidance suggested that when the jury is satisfied that D created ‘an obvious and 
serious risk’ by his conduct, they are: 
entitled to infer that he was in one or other of the states of mind required to constitute 
the offence and will probably do so; but regard must be given to any explanation he 
gives as to his state of mind which may displace the inference.73  
An application of this Direction to the facts of Stone and Dobinson74 would find the limited 
capacity of the defendants to be exculpatory.  Similarly, an explicitly modified objective limb 
of the Direction, as advocated above, or a contextualised version as suggested by their 
Lordships in Reid,75 would have the same effect.  Yet applying the test of gross negligence to 
these defendants resulted in their conviction! 
 
The final reason for choosing gross negligence over recklessness was with regard to the 
situation where D has foreseen a risk and tries to eliminate it in an incompetent manner.  
Technically, a person technically was not covered by the Model Direction unless he realised 
he had not entirely eliminated the risk before acting and he would fall within the perceived 
lacuna.76  If he really thought he had eliminated the risk entirely, D would still be caught by 
the test for gross negligence.  As was noted in Chapter 3, it is doubtful that the lacuna ever 
existed,77 and it is possible under the approach to recklessness advocated in this work that in 
such circumstances D could be deemed reckless in choosing to eliminate or avoid the risk in 
the way that he did, or alternatively he could be simply negligent because he did his 
                                            
72 Discussed in Chapter 3 at 3.3.3.5. 
73 Lawrence [1981] 1 All ER at 982. 
74 [1977] 2 All ER 341; [1977] QB 354. 
75 [1992] 3 All ER 673 at 675. 
76 See discussion of the apparent lacuna in Chapter Three, above, at 3.3.3.1. See also B. Mitchell, ‘Being really 
stupid: the meaning and place of gross negligence in English criminal law’ (2002) Coventry Law Journal 12. 
77 At 3.3.3.1. 
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incompetent best and honestly thought he had done enough to prevent harm.  In the latter 
case liability would not be justified. 
 
Having held that gross negligence was the appropriate test for cases of involuntary 
manslaughter by breach of duty, except for motor manslaughter, Lord Taylor found the 
necessary ingredients of the offence to be (1) the existence of a duty; (2) a breach of this duty 
causing death; and (3) gross negligence.  Preferring not to suggest a standard direction for 
juries as to what would amount to a finding of gross negligence on their part, his Lordship 
propounded the following as a non-exhaustive list: 
(a) indifference to an obvious risk of injury to health; 
(b) actual foresight of the risk coupled with a determination nevertheless to run it; 
(c) an appreciation of the risk coupled with an intention to avoid it but also coupled with 
such a high degree of negligence in the attempted avoidance that the jury consider 
justifies conviction; 
(d) inattention or failure to advert to a serious risk which goes beyond ‘mere 
inadvertence’ in respect of an obvious and important matter which the defendant’s 
duty demanded he should address.78 
What is clear from these categories is that (a), (b) and (d) were potentially covered by the 
Model Direction on recklessness.  Even (c) would have been accommodated where there was 
evidence that D was uncertain that he had eliminated the risk entirely as demonstrated by 
Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset v Shimmen. 79  Where D had sufficient knowledge and 
skill and his efforts to entirely eliminate the risk were abysmal, it is likely that a jury would 
deem him to be reckless anyway.  In practice a judge or jury is unlikely to find D’s version of 
                                            
78 [1993] 4 All ER 935 at 943-944. 
79 (1987) 84 Cr. App. R 145 discussed in Chapter 3, above, at 3.3.3.1. 
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events very convincing in such circumstances.  In Reid, their Lordships were sceptical about 
the existence of any ‘lacuna’ in the Model Direction, Lord Browne-Wilkinson stating:  
[t]here may be cases where, despite the defendant being aware of the risk and 
deciding to take it, he does so because of a reasonable misunderstanding, sudden 
disability or emergency which render it inappropriate to characterise his conduct as 
being reckless.80 
It is therefore a matter of logic that where D unreasonably decides he has eliminated such a 
risk he is deemed reckless,81 unless there is evidence to rebut that presumption. 
 
The appeals against conviction of all the defendants, apart from Adomako, were allowed.82  
Adomako was an experienced anaesthetist monitoring a patient during an eye operation when 
a tube to a ventilator allowing the paralysed patient to breathe became disconnected.  Several 
of the machines the patient was connected to would have registered that the patient was no 
longer breathing but Adomako failed to notice.  There was evidence that he had left the room 
on two different occasions when he should have been at the side of his patient, but the 
defendant denied this.  The prosecution also alleged that the defendant had turned the 
ventilator alarm off with a key when he left the room to get a drink.  The ventilator alarm was 
working when it was later tested leaving no evidence as to why it did not go off.  What was 
evident was that the defendant took no remedial steps to help the patient for at least three 
minutes after the disconnection and after this he made the wrong diagnosis.  Further evidence 
was adduced to the effect that any competent anaesthetist would have recognised the problem 
within 15 seconds.   
 
                                            
80 [1992] 1 WLR 793 at 819. 
81 L.H. Leigh, ‘Liability for Inadvertence: A Lordly Legacy?’ (1995) 58 Modern Law Review 457 at 466. 
82 Holloway’s conviction was quashed because of the misdirection by the trial judge, the Court of Appeal stating 




Lord Taylor, in the Court of Appeal, considered this case to be an example of the problems 
that can arise if Lord Diplock’s Direction is given to the jury.83  If a defendant is reckless 
where he has failed to give any thought to an obvious and serious risk then a jury would 
convict Adomako readily on the facts.   Once the defendant realised there was a serious risk 
his response was grossly negligent, circumstances not within the formulation of Lord 
Diplock’s Direction but covered by Lord Atkin’s dicta in Andrews.84  This is a fair point, 
given the courts’ interpretation of the Direction, but the defendant here must have realised 
that he had not done enough to eliminate the risk and would still technically be caught.  He 
would be convicted under a modified direction on recklessness too providing his conduct 
showed an undesirable attitude towards his patient’s care.  In his defence, he may have 
submitted that he was overtired as he had been on duty till 3am, sleeping at the hospital, and 
had been back on duty at 7am.  This argument was not pursued and would hardly be 
exculpatory as it may have convinced a jury he was reckless to assist with the operation when 
he was exhausted. 
 
With regard to Holloway, the trial judge had directed the jury in terms of the 
Caldwell/Lawrence Direction on recklessness.  As the defendant had never thought there was 
a serious risk to the occupants of the house he clearly fell within its scope.  Although the jury 
were told to take account of the defendant’s explanations as to why he failed to identify the 
risk, as far as the Court of Appeal were concerned, once that state of mind was confirmed (D 
giving no thought to the risk) any explanations were superfluous – the state of mind was 
already made out and could not be altered by the reasons why it occurred.  This was 
important as it justified adopting gross negligence rather than recklessness as the correct 
approach; questioning why there was a lack of awareness of the risk would be central to a 
                                            
83 [1993] 4 All ER 935 at 953. 
84 [1937] AC 576, above, text to note 50. 
221 
 
finding of gross negligence when ‘examining the degree of negligence of a skilled man 
exercising his trade.’85  If D’s reasons as to why he should not be deemed reckless are 
redundant in the Lawrence formulation of the Model Direction, it is not clear why they were 
specifically included in it86 and it is respectfully submitted that the Court of Appeal erred in 
this respect. 
 
Adomako was granted leave to appeal by the House of Lords on the question of whether a 
direction to the jury on gross negligence manslaughter was sufficient without reference to the 
test for recklessness as formulated in Lawrence or as adapted to the circumstances of the 
particular case.  The House of Lords rejected defence counsel’s cogent arguments that a sole 
test of negligence was inapt because it could mislead a jury into thinking it equated with the 
civil test, adding the further point that the term “gross” is unhelpful.  This is because the 
epithet does not provide a mental element and if it is there to signify that a jury must consider 
both the seriousness of the degree of negligence and a bad attitude on the part of the 
defendant, it needs greater elucidation.87  As an alternative, recklessness meets these 
objections and it seems that the most influential factor for the court in rejecting recklessness 
in favour of gross negligence was purely because of the difficulties the Caldwell/Lawrence 
formula had caused since its emergence, rather than for any other reason.  These difficulties 
were not simply attributable to the lack of clarity in Lord Diplock’s judgments but more 
specifically were the result of the poor judicial reasoning and application that followed in 
their wake. 
 
                                            
85 [1993] 4 All ER 957. 
86 In Lawrence, Lord Diplock stated 'If satisfied that an obvious and serious risk was created by the 
defendant…the jury are entitled to infer that he was in one or other of the states of mind required to constitute 
the offence and will probably do so; but regard must be given to any explanation he gives as to his state of mind 
which may displace the inference’. [1981] 1 All ER 974 at 982. 
87 [1995] AC 171 at 175. 
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Counsel for the Crown in Adomako argued that the Model Direction on recklessness is only 
‘really applicable’ where D creates the danger or is present when it arises,88 and the Direction 
was almost impossible to apply to cases of omission, presumably because of the exact 
wording of its formulation, a matter already dealt with above.   Adomako was present when 
the tube enabling his patient to breathe became dislodged so the Direction would be 
applicable to his case.  The danger arose from the disconnection of the endotracheal tube, not 
from any pre-existing life threatening medical condition.  Therefore Adomako was clearly 
present when the danger arose.  
 
The House of Lords agreed with the Court of Appeal’s decisions to reject the Seymour 
objective recklessness approach to manslaughter and with the reinstatement of gross 
negligence as the appropriate fault term for culpability in all such cases of involuntary 
manslaughter.89   For Lord Mackay, once a duty of care and causation were established the 
question for the jury was whether ‘having regard to the risk of death involved’ D’s conduct 
was ‘so bad in all the circumstances’ as to amount to a crime.90  His Lordship recognised that 
there is circularity in the test:  D can be convicted of a crime if the jury find his conduct is 
criminal; but Lord Mackay found this acceptable.91  Elsewhere, a more appropriate 
formulation has been advanced: the real issue for the jury is not whether D’s conduct was so 
bad that it was criminal, but rather ‘whether it is bad enough to be condemned as the very 
grave crime of manslaughter and punished accordingly’.92   
 
                                            
88 Ibid. at 178. 
89 [1995] 1 AC 171. 
90 Ibid. at 187. 
91 Ibid. 




Lord Mackay in Adomako further opined that it is perfectly appropriate to use the epithet 
‘reckless’ in these cases but in the ‘ordinary connotation of that word’93 as used, for example, 
in Stone and Dobinson94 and R v West London Coroner, Ex parte Gray.95  The difficulty with 
this suggestion is that it may well reintroduce uncertainty and confusion, a problem that the 
appellate courts were keen to redress by adopting a single test applicable to all cases of this 
branch of involuntary manslaughter.  Apart from this, ordinary meanings can lack precision 
and clarity as we can all know what a term means, but actually there is the danger that we 
may all be thinking it means something slightly different.  
 
Following Adomako it was clear that an opportunity to simplify the law in this area had been 
bypassed as it had been thought that all criminal liability for inadvertence was subsumed with 
recklessness, as properly understood.96  Instead two separate forms of liability for 
inadvertence coexisted, gross negligence for manslaughter and recklessness for other crimes.  
What then fell to be examined was whether there was any substantial difference in these two 
fault terms.  The Court of Appeal in Adomako had differentiated between motor manslaughter 
where Seymour (and hence Caldwell/Lawrence recklessness) would apply and other 
manslaughters; and further between manslaughters where a duty of care existed to the victim 
and those where a duty was absent.   
 
These distinctions were not approved by the House of Lords who desired a sole test for all 
forms of this type of involuntary manslaughter.   Now the test was to be that for gross 
negligence, it was initially unclear as to the extent of the risk involved, was it a risk of death 
or would a lesser risk suffice?  The House of Lords in Adomako had not dissented from the 
                                            
93 Ibid. 
94 [1977] 2 All ER 341; [1977] QB 354. 
95 [1988] QB 467. 
96 L.H. Leigh, ‘Recklessness after Reid’ (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 208. 
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Court of Appeal’s decision in this case:97 a risk of injury or death.98  This would mean that 
the test was just as broad as that for reckless manslaughter in Seymour (the risk of any degree 
of harm), and not as restrictive as Caldwell/Lawrence (an obvious and serious risk).  
Subsequently, R v Gurphal Singh99and R v Misra100confirmed that a risk of death was 
required. 
 
Lord Mackay’s acknowledgement that a judge may use the term ‘reckless’ in his guidance to 
a jury in this type of case with the meaning used in Stone and Dobinson and R v West London 
Coroner, Ex parte Gray is a further complication.  It has been contended101 that Lord Lane’s 
reference in Stone to indifference to an obvious risk or foresight of the risk is reminiscent of 
the recklessness directions that the House was now seeking to avoid.  In Ex parte Gray the 
judgment is consistent with both Lawrence and Seymour.102   
 
Continuing with reckless manslaughter, based upon the Caldwell/Lawrence Direction as 
modified by Reid, would have been a better option.  This could have eliminated the need to 
establish that D owed his victim a duty of care,103 a requirement for gross negligence; 
although such a requirement would be necessary to maintain limited criminal liability for 
omissions in order to uphold personal autonomy.  Further, maintaining reckless manslaughter 
would have been a more appropriate determination given that the offence, in the Cunningham 
subjective sense, still exists104 where D acts in what would be a lawful way  (were it not 
reckless) knowing that there is a high probability that he will cause serious injury but where 
                                            
97 L.H. Leigh, ‘Liability for Inadvertence: A Lordly Legacy?’ (n 81). 
98 [1994] 3 WLR 288 at 296. 
99 R (on the application of  Gurphal) v Singh [1999] Crim LR 582 a maintenance man owed a duty of care to an 
occupant of a lodging house who died as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning from a defective gas fire. 
100 [2004] EWCA Crim 2375. Two doctors failed to notice a patient had developed toxic shock syndrome.  
101 L.H. Leigh, ‘Liability for Inadvertence: A Lordly Legacy?’ (n 81). 
102 Ibid. at 460.  
103 B. Mitchell, ‘Being really stupid: the meaning and place of gross negligence manslaughter in English 
criminal law’ (2002) Coventry Law Journal 12. 
104 Whether, where reckless is charged, a lesser degree of risk will suffice is not clear. 
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he does not see it as a virtual certainty.105  As the contrary position was adopted, it would 
have been far more sensible for the House to have erred on the side of caution if the test had 
to be one of gross negligence, and to have ruled that the epithet ‘reckless’ should be avoided 
altogether in a judge’s direction in this type of case.   
 
Alternatively, a pragmatic solution to any confusion would have been to hold that 
recklessness required advertence.106  This occurred nearly a decade later, not in R v G & R107 
as subjectivists may have hoped, but in Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 2003).108  It is 
not the solution advocated in this thesis as it is contended here that a capacity based 
modification to the Caldwell/Lawrence Direction would have been a preferable alternative to 
gross negligence.  A broader, capacity based approach to recklessness, taking into 
consideration D’s cognitive capacity and knowledge,109  and why D failed to see the risk or 
continued to act despite his appreciation of it, is advocated.   If such an examination reveals 
that D’s conduct displays a bad character, liability could lie.  As far as the capacity of D is 
concerned, where there is evidence of incapacity exculpation will be dependent upon the 
extent to which such incapacity is manifest in the circumstances and  the extent to which this 
is fault-free.110 
 
The only remaining obstacle to using a version of the Model Direction on recklessness to 
cover all liability for inadvertence, except where statute declared otherwise and required a 
purely objective test, would be adapting it to cover liability for omissions.  It is proposed that 
                                            
105 D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law Cases and Materials (n 92) 659. 
106 L.H. Leigh, ‘Liability for Inadvertence: A Lordly Legacy?’ (n 81) at 460.  
107 [2004] 1 AC 1034. 
108[2004] EWCA Crim 868, a case where the defendants were both police officers who had arrested V after V 
had received hospital treatment.  V was handcuffed and placed face down in the custody suite, developed 
breathing problems and died.  Recklessness now requires advertence unless statute specifies otherwise. 
109 German law has  a broader, capacity based approach to recklessness; J. R. Spencer and A. Pedain, ‘Strict 
Liability in Continental Criminal Law’, in A. P. Simester (ed.) Appraising Strict Liability (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
110 L.H. Leigh, ‘Liability for Inadvertence: A Lordly Legacy?’ (n 81) at 465. 
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a person will be deemed reckless for failing to act if he has a legal duty of care towards 
another and is, or should be, aware of a serious and obvious risk to their welfare and yet fails 
to act to prevent or ameliorate harm.  Therefore a person may be deemed reckless where: 
(1) he fails to act when there is an obvious and serious risk of death or serious harm 
to another when he under a legal duty to that other person, and  
(2) he either has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk 
or he has recognised that there was some risk involved and has ignored it or tried to 
eliminate it in a wholly incompetent manner; and 
(3) if satisfied that an obvious and serious risk in such circumstances has not been 
considered or is dealt with in a wholly inappropriate manner by the defendant, the 
jury are entitled to infer that he has the state of mind required to constitute the offence 
and will probably do so; but regard must be given to any explanation he gives which 
may displace the inference. 
(3)(i) evidence of a general or specific lack of capacity in the circumstances may be 
exculpatory; 
(3)(ii) evidence of a reprehensible attitude or other moral failing will not displace the 
inference. 
On the one hand, such guidance would extend inadvertent liability to causing someone 
serious injury111 making it apparently broader than the test for gross negligence which now 
requires a risk of death.  On the other hand, it is more restrictive in that without evidence of a 
reprehensible attitude criminal liability will not be established.   The extension of liability to 
cover an obvious risk of serious bodily harm will provide some symmetry with the law of 
murder as it is submitted that it is hard to justify liability for death whilst not providing a 
                                            
111 Bringing English law in to line with our Continental neighbours and the USA, see G. Fletcher, ‘The Theory 
of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis’ (1971) 119 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 401; J. 
Spencer and M. Brajeux ‘Criminal Liability for Negligence – a Lesson from Across the Channel?’[2010] 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1. 
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criminal sanction for someone who may cause irreparable harm such as tetraplegia.  It is also 
in line with recommendations made by the Criminal Law Revision Committee112 and the 
draft Code.113   
 
The Law Commission, in its proposed reforms of involuntary manslaughter,114 has opted to 
abolish common law involuntary manslaughter and replace it with the offences of reckless 
killing115 and killing by gross carelessness.116  It is submitted here that the first of these, 
reckless killing, has the same defect as the draft Code’s definition of recklessness; it fails to 
make clear who decides whether the risk is a reasonable one to take.  Lamentably, it also 
departs from the Code’s attempt to restrict the grievous bodily harm rule to circumstances 
where D was aware that his intention to cause serious harm might cause death.117  The 
proposed offence of killing by gross carelessness will be satisfied where a person causes the 
death of another if: 
(a) a risk that his conduct will cause the death or serious injury would be obvious to a 
reasonable person in his position; 
(b) he is capable of appreciating that risk at the material time; and 
(c) either –  
(i) his conduct falls far below what can reasonable be expected of him in the 
circumstances; or 
(ii) he intends by his conduct to cause some injury or is aware of, and 
unreasonably takes, the risk that it may do so.118  
                                            
112 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fourteenth Report, Offences Against the Person (1980) (Cmnd 7844). 
113 Clause 55(c), A Criminal Code for England and Wales (n 38). 
114 Law Commission, Law Com No 237, Involuntary Manslaughter (1996). 
115 Clause 1 - where D is aware of a risk that his conduct will cause death or serious injury. 
116 Clause 2. 
117 This was the approach cogently advocated by Lord Diplock in Hyam, discussed in Chapter 3. 
118 D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law Cases and Materials (n 92) 663. 
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It is clear that this offence not only provides a mixture of both advertent and inadvertent 
conduct, but also encompasses intention, recklessness and negligence.  It is too widely 
drafted and fails to take account of whether D appreciated the risk or why he failed to 
appreciate it. 
 
It has been suggested that the difference between reckless conduct and negligence is that with 
the former there is indifference to the risk of harm whereas the latter is a failure to take 
adequate precautions to ensure a risky act is performed safely,119 but neither indifference to 
risks nor awareness of them are necessarily the deciding factors.  The real difference is that 
the term ‘reckless’ implies condemnation120 and censure in a way that ‘negligence’ does not.  
‘Gross’ negligence is synonymous with recklessness and should be deemed to be 
recklessness, leaving negligence to mean mere inadvertence or everyday carelessness.  Once 
the definition of recklessness is allowed to encompass both the advertent and inadvertent risk 
taker, the problem with terminology disappears.  This change would also bridge the existing 
gap where a negligent act does not result in death, as if inadvertent recklessness is the test 
liability could arise where serious physical injury occurs. 
 
Following Adomako, it seemed that reckless manslaughter in the objective sense of 
Caldwell/Lawrence had been abolished, however the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v 
Lidar121suggested it might not be entirely extinct.  As discussed earlier,122 the trial judge in 
Lidar had directed the jury in terms of advertent recklessness as to ‘some physical harm, 
however slight’, adding that ‘mere inadvertence is not enough.  The defendant must have 
                                            
119 H. Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) 87. 
120 G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (n 13) 96. 
121 [2000] 4 Archbold News 3. D drove over V killing him  There had been a fight, not involving D but his 
companions, and it continued when V was hanging on to the car with his body half inside an open car window 
of D’s car.  When the car gained speed V’s feet caught in the front wheel, he fell, was run over and sustained 
fatal injuries. 
122 At 3.3.3.10. 
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been proved to have been indifferent to an obvious risk of injury to health or to have actually 
foreseen the risk’.123  The main point of interest here is the reference in this direction to proof 
of indifference as an alternative to foresight of harm.  This could be viewed as leaving the 
way open to a more objective test for recklessness that would reflect both character and ‘role’ 
theory.  The appellate court’s judgment in Lidar seems strikingly similar to 
Caldwell/Lawrence recklessness, the only distinction being the reference to indifference 
rather than giving no thought to the risk.124   
 
In R v Kennedy (Simon),125 Lord Bingham in the House of Lords suggested that only two 
forms of manslaughter existed, constructive manslaughter (unlawful act manslaughter) or by 
gross negligence.126  Elsewhere, it is argued that manslaughter by subjective recklessness still 
survives where D kills by a lawful reckless act foreseeing he might cause serious bodily 
harm127 and this seems logical.  Lidar has been cited as the leading case for this type of 
recklessness128 as the Court of Appeal held that recklessness manslaughter required proof that 
D foresaw a serious (significant) risk of serious injury or death.  If this argument is correct, 
then as Lidar did not just cater for advertence but included inadvertence, in the form of 
indifference to an obvious risk, it is possible that an objective form of manslaughter could be 
employed.  
  
                                            
123 [2000] 4 Archbold News 3, my emphasis added. 
124 C. Elliott, ‘What Direction for Gross Negligence Manslaughter?: R v Lidar and Attorney-General’s 
Reference (No.2 of 1999) (2001) 65 Journal of Criminal Law 145 . 
125 [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269. 
126 [2008] 1 AC 269 at 274. 
127 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law 13th Edn.,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 560. This 




4.4 The Imposition of Criminal Liability for Negligence 
 
There has been much debate as to whether there should be criminal liability for negligence, 
and if so, to what extent.  There are some who are totally opposed to any such liability.129  
Understandably, those who support the subjective approach to criminal liability would 
advocate that D is only subject to the sanctions of the criminal law when he has chosen to 
cause or risk a proscribed harm.  As negligent conduct is inadvertent this conscious 
deliberation is absent, and some would suggest no moral blame is present.130   Other 
subjectivists can still find a place for negligence but restrict it mainly to purely regulatory 
offences where a high degree of care needs to be ensured coupled with the proviso that the 
onus should be on the objectivist to demonstrate why, in any given instance, negligent 
liability is warranted.131   
 
Economists view the law as a means of providing incentives for citizens to engage in efficient 
behaviour with no need for further requirements such as mental states.132  However, it has 
been observed that incentives operate in different ways depending on whether an action is 
intentional:  
A law that provides stiff penalties for intentional behaviour gives agents incentives to 
avoid punishment by abandoning the behaviour itself.  A law that provides stiff 
penalties for inadvertent behaviour...gives agents incentives to abandon or take 
                                            
129 J. Hall, ‘Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded From Penal Liability’ (1963) 63 Columbia Law Review 
632; L. Alexander and K. Ferzan, with S. Morse, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
130 M. Jefferson, Criminal Law, 7th Edn., ( Essex, Pearson Education, 2006) 112. 
131 J.C. Smith, ‘Subjective or Objective? Ups and Downs of the Test of Criminal Liability in England’ [1981-
1982] Villanova Law Review 1179 at 1214. 
132 C. Finkelstein, ‘The Inefficiency of Mens Rea’ (2000) 88 California Law Review 895. 
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greater care in performing some other activity...that produces the conduct or result 
the law wants to discourage.133   
Whilst that may well be the case in most circumstances, a general liability for negligence 
would have the effect of greatly restricting the day to day activities of citizens if they chose to 
abandon certain activities and, generally speaking, people do their best to take care but sooner 
or later we all make mistakes.  For the most part we are fortunate that no harm is caused by 
our inadvertent errors.  Where harm does occur it can be compensated by insurance or civil 
liability in most instances.  Generally people do their best to avoid causing harm for its own 
sake, simpliciter, or because they want to avoid financial repercussions, and not because 
causing such harm attracts criminal liability for negligence. 
 
Where D is found negligent it is because his conduct is deemed to fall below, or in some 
cases grossly deviate from, the standard expected of the reasonable man.  This requirement of 
reasonableness is designed to serve as a balance for competing legal interests: those of the 
particular defendant and those of society.134  By focussing on the comparator of this 
hypothetical reasonable man the motives, intentions, attitudes, etc., which underpin the 
defendant’s conduct are largely irrelevant, which has the potential for unfairness.  As a result 
of this objective approach it has been contended that where D is subject to a negligence-based 
conviction, such ‘judgements of blame are not moral judgements of action per se.  Neither 
are they judgements of persons.  Rather, blame combines person with action.’135  The 
alternative view here is that negligent conduct is a moral judgement of blame of both the 
behaviour and the agent, but this does not equate with establishing criminal liability.  This is 
                                            
133 Ibid. at 899. 
134 A.P. Simester, ‘Can Negligence be Culpable?’(n 6) 85. 
135 Ibid. at 87-88. 
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because, where there are negligence-based convictions, it can be very hard to distinguish 
between simple mistakes and accidents for which civil liability might be more appropriate, 
and instances where an agent’s stupidity, disregard for others, lack of expertise or arrogance 
may deservedly attract criminal sanction.  
 
It is accepted that there are two main elements to criminal law, namely harm and culpability.  
The latter is not established just because D caused harm but because that harm was done 
culpably, ‘even a dog distinguishes between being kicked and being stumbled over.’136   
Some people are born feckless, clumsy, thoughtless, inattentive, irresponsible, with a 
bad memory and a slow “reaction time”.  With the best will in the world, we all of us 
at some times in our lives make negligent mistakes.  It is hard to see how justice (as 
distinct from some utilitarian reason) requires mistakes to be punished.137 
 
Similarly, it has been posited that ‘stupidity’ is not an appropriate basis for serious 
offences.138  Obviously these are forceful arguments and it must be said that where an 
isolated incident of accidental harm is caused of a minor nature, punishment would be an 
inappropriate response, as it would be a case of taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut.  Where 
a person has the capacity to avoid causing harm but fails to exercise it and serious harm 
results, or where persistent minor harms are caused by the same person, it raises the question 
of whether the offender has any thought for the welfare of others.  In such circumstances it 
would be wrong to consider that such a person automatically lacks culpability.   
 
                                            
136 A. Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’ (1990) Law Quarterly Review 225 at 228. 
137 G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd Edn., (London: Stevens, 1961). 




An alternative view is that liability for negligence can be justified on utilitarian grounds in 
that it acts as a deterrent in general, even if not on an individual basis.139  Where the harm 
caused is serious and the risk of harm is an obvious one, failure to think about or recognise 
this risk can be as culpable as where D perceives a risk.  Often the fault can lie in an agent’s 
failure to notice a particular consideration is relevant.140  In such circumstances the debate 
could more aptly centre on the issue of whether the degree of negligence demonstrated needs 
to be gross or if any carelessness will suffice.  If account were to be taken of any limiting 
capacities of the defendant this would circumvent the problem with the Caldwell Model 
Direction,141 although it would ‘derogate from any principle of contemporaneity, in the sense 
that the culpable failure to take precautions often pre-dates the causing of the harm,…giving 
precedence to the doctrine of prior fault’.142   
 
Simply allowing for any innate limited capacity of a particular defendant could still leave 
negligence liability too wide however and for this reason what is advocated here is liability 
arising from a more objective capacity-based approach to recklessness where there is a 
serious and obvious risk of harm, which also takes account of why D failed to foresee the risk 
of harm.  This would alert people to the fact that they need to take special precautions in 
certain situations.  The remit of liability for negligence would remain firmly rooted in civil 
law, except where D persistently fails to take due care and causes minor harms.  In these 
latter circumstances it is submitted that D may be subject to criminal sanctions. 
 
When considering criminal liability for negligence, where a person is physically disabled it is 
assumed that the reasonable man comparator has the same disability but allowances are not 
                                            
139 It could only operate at an individual level if D has the capacity to learn from his mistakes and alter his future 
conduct, as to work as a deterrent D must be able to reflect on the possible consequences of his proposed action. 
140 A.P. Simester, ‘Can Negligence be Culpable?’ (n 6) 89. 
141 The Direction was interpreted as excluding such considerations; discussed above, Chapter 3. 
142 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (n 18) 187. 
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generally made143 for those who are cognitively deficient, unless such deficiency would fall 
within the insanity defence.  This is broader than the remit of negligence posited by Hart who 
advocated that liability can lie if we ask whether D could, given his mental and physical 
capacities, have taken the precautions that a reasonable man would have taken.144  
Unfortunately this has been taken to suggest that D has the capacity to overcome his own 
incapacity, and although this can occur, when it does not happen it is said to be not because D 
has suddenly lost his ‘overcoming’ capacity, but rather that he lacked it.145  This may not 
always be the case and in the majority of instances, although D’s conduct may reflect an 
apparent ‘incapacity’, as Hart146 was aware, it would generally be the case of an unexercised 
capacity to take more care.  What should be important in such instances is any explanation as 
to why D did not take the necessary precautions.  This is something that use of a modified 
Caldwell/Lawrence Direction would permit. 
 
Of the most common offences, few can be committed negligently147 other than driving 
offences148 and homicide.  For example, there are no offences of negligently causing criminal 
damage to property or of negligent injury to the person, and this seems an arbitrary 
distinction unless we take the view that negligent harms are less deserving of criminal 
culpability unless they cause death.149  It may seem strange that a conviction for negligent 
homicide is possible but not for negligently causing serious injury, as noted above.150  When 
                                            
143 Although see the discussion of R v Adomako, above. 
144 H.L.A. Hart, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, A.G. Guest (ed.,) (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). 
145 G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (n 13) 93. 
146 H.L.A. Hart, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, (n 144). 
147 Although crimes that can be committed negligently are on the increase, O. Quick, ‘Medicine, mistakes and 
manslaughter: a Criminal Combination?’ [2010] Cambridge Law Journal 186. 
148 Road Traffic Acts 1988 and 1991, Road Safety Act 2006; for a discussion of these controversial offences see 
M. Hirst, ‘Causing Death by Driving and Other Offences: a Question of Balance’ [2008] Criminal Law Review 
339. 
149 Indeed, it has been noted that medical professionals only appear in the dock when their errors are fatal; see 
M. Brazier and A. Alghrani, ‘ Fatal Medical Malpractice and Criminal Liability’ [2009] Professional 
Negligence 51 
150 At 4.2. 
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negligence causes serious bodily harm such a distinction is not logical as the consequences 
for the victim can be a matter of pure luck.  It has been argued that extending negligence 
liability would ‘either strain the overworked resources of the penal system or bring about 
highly selective and indeed capricious enforcement,’151 which is possible given that juries 
views may vary as to what the acceptable standards are that need to be maintained for simple 
negligence, and what amount to ‘gross’ for its more serious counterpart.  If any extension of 
liability required the necessary level of negligence to be tantamount to recklessness, as 
argued in this thesis, it would militate against such objections.   
 
In the context of the prosecution of medical practitioners for gross negligence manslaughter, 
a lack of flexibility has been identified with a ‘one size fits all approach’ that fails to 
adequately distinguish between different medical mistakes, the relevance of moral luck and 
the vagaries of expert witness testimony.152  There is clearly a serious issue to be addressed in 
this regard, especially given that such healthcare professionals are placed under a duty of care 
by virtue of their profession and are trying to help their patients, often in a highly pressurised 
environment.153  There have been suggestions that either new tailor-made offences should be 
enacted to cover medically caused death or injury,154 or, that only reckless doctors should be 
criminally liable.155  These professionals should only be prosecuted where their conduct 
                                            
151 G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (n 13) 97. 
152 O. Quick, ‘Medicine, mistakes and manslaughter: a Criminal Combination?’ (n 147). 
153 M. Brazier and A. Alghrani, ‘ Fatal Medical Malpractice and Criminal Liability’ [2009] Professional 
Negligence 51 
154 Such as an offence of endangerment, D. Griffiths and A. Sanders, ‘The Road to the Dock: Prosecution 
Decision Making in Medical Manslaughter Cases’ in D. Griffiths and A. Sanders (eds.) Bioethics, Medicine and 
the Criminal Law: Medicine, Crime and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 126. 
155 Reckless in the context of advertent recklessness, for example, A. McCall Smith who calls for prosecutions 
to be restricted to those who are subjectively reckless, in ‘Criminal Negligence and the Incompetent Doctor’ 
(2009) 1 Medical Law Review 336; or recklessness that encompasses inadvertence but requires the manifestation 
of a vice, see V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 84. 
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evinces a level of ineptitude that equates to inadvertent recklessness156 coupled with evidence 
of a bad character trait. 
 
When looking at criminal negligence more generally, a broader liability has been adopted in 
other European jurisdictions and under the American Model Penal Code.157  In Germany, 
Switzerland and France, for example, there is negligent liability for homicide, battery and 
arson.158  Many Continental jurisdictions penalise negligence more liberally than is the 
practice in England yet hold strict liability,159 to be a step too far.160   In England, although 
the number of strict liability offences has increased particularly over the last few decades, 161 
liability for negligence (until relatively recently in legal terms) has generally been limited to 
regulatory offences, and for the only serious offence at common law that could be committed 
negligently, manslaughter, the requirement is that the negligence must be ‘gross’.162   
 
In recent years, a plethora of new statutory offences have been created in England in response 
to a perceived public dissatisfaction with the lack of sufficiently harsh criminal sanctions 
                                            
156 This proposal goes further than A. McCall Smith who calls for prosecutions to be restricted to those who are 
subjectively reckless, ‘Criminal Negligence and the Incompetent Doctor’ (2009) 1 Medical Law Review 336. 
157 G. Fletcher, ‘The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis’ (1971) 119 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 401; J. Spencer and M. Brajeux ‘Criminal Liability for Negligence – a Lesson from 
Across the Channel?’[2010] International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1. 
158 G. Fletcher, ‘The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis’ (1971) 119 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 401 at 403. 
159 For such offences  there is no need to establish D was at fault. Fletcher observes that strict liability is viewed 
as negligence conclusively presumed from the occurrence of harm.  This avoids the difficult analytical problems 
courts encounter when determining whether the appropriate level of liability should be gross negligence, 
criminal negligence or ordinary negligence. G. Fletcher, ‘The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative 
Analysis’ (n 158) at 403. 
160 Ibid. 
161 A. Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause’ (n 136). 
162 There are serious statutory offences where negligence, without the requirement that it is gross, will suffice as 
the fault element, including causing or allowing a child to die by an unlawful act under s.5 Domestic Violence 
Crime and Victims Act 2004 and public nuisance.  It has been proposed that the latter offence becomes a crime 
requiring recklessness, D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, (n 127) 150. 
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against those who negligently kill,163 creating a total of nine homicide offences,164  with a 
fault element lower than gross negligence, most involving driving motor vehicles165 whilst 
existing maximum sentences for pre-existing offences have been increased.166  Unlike some 
of our European neighbours and North America, we do not subscribe to criminal negligence 
liability for arson or criminal damage, or for non fatal offences against the person.167  
Although our position may seem lenient in comparison to our European neighbours and the 
United States with regard to negligence liability, they would view us as more draconian as we 
have many strict liability offences.168   
 
4.4.1 Justifying Criminal Liability for Negligence 
 
It is clear that criminal liability for negligence is an issue that divides academic opinion169 
because of the lack of awareness in D’s state of mind that accompanies such acts.  It has been 
acknowledged in the discussion of mens rea in Chapter 2, that mens rea does not necessarily 
mean a ‘guilty mind’, but rather the mental state required for the offence, the relevant legal 
fault.  For subjectivists, liability requires a conscious awareness of risk as a minimum.  
                                            
163 J.R. Spencer and M. Brajeux, ‘Criminal Liability for Negligence – a Lesson from Across the Channel?’ 
[2010] International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1. 
164 If both types of involuntary manslaughter are counted as separate offences. 
165 Sections 1, 2B, 3A, 3ZB Road Traffic Act 1988; s.12A Theft Act 1968; s.5 DVCVA 2004 and corporate 
manslaughter under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. 
166 M. Hirst, ‘Causing Death by Driving and Other Offences: a Question of Balance’(n 148). 
167 See, for example, Criminal Code (France) articles 121-3. 
168 We also punish more severely for negligence. In France, for example, if defendants are convicted of 
negligent homicide or injury, the accepted judicial response is a fine, the stigma of conviction and a suspended 
custodial sentence; J.R. Spencer and M. Brajeux, ‘Criminal Liability for Negligence – a Lesson from Across the 
Channel?’(n 163) at 23.  Indeed, there is much to be said for increasing criminal liability for inadvertence 
providing this does not extend too far, especially if English courts would adopt a similar method of disposal.  A. 
Leipold suggests that whilst there is nothing immoral  with the  imposition of criminal liability for negligence, 
defendants can be punished disproportionately  to the harm caused and the blameworthiness of the agent 
because of a lack of nuanced grading in criminal statutes; ‘A Case for Criminal Negligence’ (2010) 29 Law and 
Philosophy  455.  Further discussion of penology is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
169 G. Fletcher, ‘The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis’ (n 158).  Fletcher supplies a 
detailed exposition of criminal liability for negligence in Western legal systems including the United States of 
America, Russia, West Germany, Switzerland, France and England. 
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Although intention and recklessness can easily fit into this description, negligence does not 
necessarily involve a mental state170 in terms of an active mind being directed towards 
consideration of risk even though, as noted above in Chapter 3, a blank mind is just as much a 
description of a state of mind as that possessed by someone who intends a consequence or 
foresees it as possible.   
 
The main issue for theorists was the question of whether negligence could truly be classified 
as a form of mens rea.  This was important for subjectivists who want to attribute some 
conscious fault to negligent conduct before they can accept that it falls within the maxim 
actus non facit reus nisi mens sit rea.171  If it is accepted that negligence is imposing a purely 
objective standard, then the oft cited response is that it requires no proof of a subjective 
(conscious) state of mind172 and thus it cannot be a form of mens rea, but this only holds true 
if the traditional meaning of mens rea is still applied.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 2,173 the modern interpretation of mens rea is simply the mental state 
specified for the proscribed act, and if inadvertence suffices as the mental state required, no 
subjective psychological inquiries need to be made.  Furthermore, it appears that the 
subjectivists’ argument is based upon a misunderstanding of earlier writing174 using the mens 
rea maxim.  In one context it was used to argue that a man could not be convicted of larceny 
without the intent to steal, (a narrow interpretation) yet the maxim was also cited in the 
                                            
170 G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (n 13) 88. 
171 G. Fletcher, ‘The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis’ (n 158) at 408-9. 
172 See, for example, the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Attorney-General’s Reference (No.2 of 1999) [2000] 3 
All ER 182, which stated that gross negligence was not a form of mens rea so that D’s state of mind was 
irrelevant, whilst acknowledging that D’s state of mind could be relevant in determining whether or not the 
negligence was “gross”. 
173 At 2.2.1- 2.2.2. 
174 E. Coke, Third Institute 54, 107 (Brooke Ed. 1797) cited in G. Fletcher, ‘The Theory of Criminal 
Negligence: A Comparative Analysis’ (n 158) at 411. 
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context of an analysis of suicide which revealed that an ‘absence of mens rea is the absence 
of responsibility, not the absence of a particular intention or mental state required by law’.175  
This is a broader interpretation of the maxim and these two different perspectives portray the 
essence of the debate about whether the criminal law should be morally neutral and value 
free, or whether it should embrace underlying moral judgments.176  Following from this, it is 
suggested that the maxim should relate to a normative standard of culpability, simply that an 
‘act is not culpable under the law (actus non facit reum) unless the actor is culpable for acting 
as he did (nisi mens sit rea)’.177  Accordingly, inadvertent criminal culpability is no longer 
aberrant as a form of mens rea as a conscious awareness of risk is not required, only the 
moral culpability of the actor needs to be determined. 
 
One of the particularly thorny aspects of criminal liability for negligence is whether it is, or 
should be, entirely objective.  Some continental jurists hold that negligence is a subjective 
standard178 whereas others argue it is an objective, external standard.179  What is clear is that 
whether the standard adopted is a subjective or an objective one, it is purely a matter of 
policy.  In English law, where the fault element is one where simple negligence is sufficient, 
negligence is proved where D’s conduct falls below that expected of a reasonable person, an 
objective standard, and evidence of his personal state of mind is no excuse.180  Where the 
fault required is ‘gross’ negligence the position is not so clear.  In A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 
1999)181 it was stated that on a charge of gross negligence manslaughter it was unnecessary to 
produce evidence of the state of mind of the accused.  This would suggest that the standard is 
                                            
175 Ibid. Fletcher, at 412. 
176 Ibid. at 412. 
177 Ibid. at 414. 
178 Ibid. at 406. 
179 W. Seavey, ‘Negligence – Subjective or Objective?’ (1927) 41 Harvard Law Review 1. 
180 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (n 127) 146. 
181 [2000] QB 796. 
240 
 
purely objective. Yet in Adomako it was found that all evidence was worthy of consideration 
as it is useful in determining whether in all the circumstances the negligence in question 
attains the higher degree of fault categorised as “gross” for this type of involuntary 
manslaughter.  This would suggest that subjectivised elements can be taken into 
consideration.  
 
The extent to which this objective standard can, or should, be subjectivised is open to debate.   
Some would argue that the standard can only be objective, an evaluation of what other people 
would have done in D’s situation.   Yet there is evidence that the standard is both objective 
and subjective: whether the risk was an unjustified one in the circumstances is objective, the 
subjective element is whether D can be excused for taking that risk.  Where an agent has 
special knowledge or expertise, the comparison is with a reasonable person with that 
knowledge or expertise.182  Generally, there is a judicial reluctance to permit general personal 
incapacities to excuse in favour of efficiency and pragmatism.183  Defences would be open to 
abuse but a failure to recognise such instances results in the criminal liability of the non 
culpable.  There has been an instance where youth was taken into account,184 but it has been 
suggested that other characteristics of D should be taken into consideration when they affect 
his ability to behave as the reasonable person would and when they are not D’s fault.185   
 
                                            
182 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (n 127) 148. 
183 G. Fletcher, ‘The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis’ (n 158) at 436. 
184 R (RSPA) v C [2006] EWHC 1069 (Admin) where it was held that in determining whether a 15 year old girl 
was negligent in not seeking veterinary attention for an injured cat, her age should be taken into account. 
185 A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, G.R. Sullivan, and G.J. Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory 
and Doctrine, (n 61)155. 
241 
 
This argument has been advanced before, accompanied by the proposal that liability for 
inadvertence should also be extended to negligent destruction of property and battery at the 
same time.186  These proposals support the position taken in this work for the extension of 
liability to cover inadvertent conduct that causes serious harm.  There are further important 
considerations to be taken into account when assessing D’s culpability for an offence.  It is 
not simply any characteristics that are not his fault that should limit the inquiry, but also why 
he failed to advert to the risk. 
 
The debate about imposing liability for negligence has been said to represent the crux of the 
dispute between subjectivists and objectivists,187 centering on whether conscious or 
inadvertent culpability meet the requirements of morality and justice.    Supporters of the 
imposition of liability suggest that opponents have mistaken notions of culpability or specific 
views on punishment and it has been contended that ‘crimes of negligence consist of conduct 
that is blameless in one aspect but quite blameworthy in another.’188   Where D is ‘merely’ 
negligent due to a momentary lapse in concentration or being momentarily distracted, it is 
easy to see why there is opposition to the imposition of criminal liability as it could happen to 
any of us.  Clearly, there is also no intention to cause harm in such circumstances, nor even 
foresight of harm, but an intention to do harm is not a prerequisite of criminal responsibility.   
 
                                            
186 G. Fletcher, ‘The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis’ ((n 158) at 437. 
187 J. Gardner and H. Jung, ‘Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony Duff’s Account’ (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 559.  However, it could be argued that the debate is more specifically about the tension between 
subjective and objective themes that underpin English criminal law. 
188 H. Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice (n 119) 419. 
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When liability for inadvertence is imposed, this makes it more difficult for citizens to live 
without fear of unexpected criminal charges,189 the reason why most stigmatic offences 
require intentional or subjectively reckless wrongdoing.   Gardner is quoted, in the context of 
what he describes as the mens rea principle, as stating:  
criminal wrongs should be such that one does not commit them unless one intends or 
is aware of at least one wrong-making feature of what one is about to do, such that 
(assuming one knows the law) one is also alerted to the fact that what one is about to 
do will be of interest to the criminal law.190 
It would appear from this that Gardner is opposed to criminal liability for negligence and yet 
when considering his ‘role’ theory of culpability there is a direct conflict.  However, this 
statement was made with regard to offences of strict liability and should be understood to be 
restricted to this context.  His proposal has been criticised as it would deprive victims of 
protection and where the interest of a victim is sufficiently important, as with manslaughter, 
gross negligence can be a defensible mens rea fault term.191  It is difficult to see how this 
argument can bear up to scrutiny, given the offence chosen, as the criminal law cannot 
protect a victim who is now deceased and it is submitted that having an offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter is unlikely to have any impact on the number of victims falling foul 
of it.   
 
Even though negligent harm may result from human frailty and is perhaps something D could 
not have helped and should not therefore be responsible for, it has been suggested that as D 
                                            
189 W. Chan and A.P. Simester, ‘Four Functions of Mens Rea’ [2011] Cambridge Law Journal 381 at 391. 
190 J. Gardner, cited by W. Chan and A.P. Simester, ‘Four Functions of Mens Rea’ [2011] Cambridge Law 
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243 
 
still chose to engage in a particular activity in a certain way he is fully responsible.192  This is 
too harsh a position in a system of justice, yet it falls clearly within the realms of Gardner’s 
‘role’ theory of culpability.  Although Hart193 encompassed liability for negligence within 
choice theory, he restricted its ambit by requiring the capacity of the particular defendant to 
be taken into consideration, a factor not relevant for Gardner.  Pinning responsibility on the 
grounds that D chose to engage in a particular activity is generally too wide a principle to do 
justice without further limiting requirements to allow for D’s due diligence, or incapacity, to 
provide a defence.   
 
Sometimes there can be derogations from this principle where the moral balance is in favour 
of protecting the vulnerable no matter how blameless the offender is.  Derogations can be 
justified in relation to engaging into specific activities such as sexual intercourse but would 
be much harder to justify if extended to cover going about one’s daily business. That is not to 
say that culpability for inadvertence can never be justified.  A system of justice that was 
totally reliant on subjective mens rea to establish criminal culpability would be at odds with 
society’s perception of justice.  We do blame people for failing to appreciate risks and 
causing harm to others; it is establishing an appropriate boundary between advertence and 
inadvertence that has proven difficult.  Indeed, as noted above, it has been posited that one of 
the reasons why mentes reae terms lacked clear definition was to facilitate the ‘desire of the 
judges to achieve particular results in particular cases [which] leads them too often to warp a 
concept in order to meet the exigency of the moment.’194  There has been ample evidence of 
this over the last fifty years. 
                                            
192 H. Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice (n 119) 421. 
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For those who see punishment as linked to the moral desert of the offender, this is achieved 
by an examination of his unlawful act and his choice to cause harm.  This process reveals his 
character flaws and justifies his punishment; whereas intention and subjective recklessness 
easily fit this format, negligence generally does not establish the ‘condition of a man’s heart 
or conscience.’195  If culpability demands a link to morality for justification, it could be 
grounded for negligent acts in moral forfeiture, rather than moral desert.  An agent’s failure 
to exercise his capacity to take more care will result in him losing the moral right to complain 
of state interference with his autonomy.196  
 
The flaw inherent in the subjectivist position is that conduct can entail unforeseen 
consequences and it is our conduct that is central to any criminal liability, rather than pure 
intention or foresight.197  Contrary to the subjectivist view, there are circumstances in which 
it can be morally justified to hold agents responsible for consequences beyond those intended 
or foreseen.198  Furthermore, the foundations of subjectivism have been shown to be based 
upon flawed and selective analysis of developments in the criminal law over the centuries.  In 
reality, the criminal law has developed an increasingly ‘sophisticated blend of subjective and 
objective principles of culpability’199 and with regard to liability for unforeseen consequences 
such principles have neither been purely subjective or objective.200 
   
A different argument used against liability for inadvertent conduct is the criminal law’s 
requirement for voluntariness, for volitional action or inaction, often termed in the 
                                            
195 O. Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 50 cited by Fletcher, ‘The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A 
Comparative Analysis’ (n 158) at 417. 
196 Ibid. Fletcher, at 417. 
197 J. Horder, ‘Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens Rea’ (1997) Law Quarterly Review 95 at 119. 
198 For example, see J. Horder, ‘A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in Criminal Law’ [1995] Criminal 
Law Review 759. 
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requirement of a willed bodily movement.  Such a requirement would seem to exclude 
liability for negligence and indeed any inadvertent action.  Yet this is to misunderstand what 
is meant by voluntariness, it does not require the consequences of conduct to be brought 
about deliberately, rather that the original act itself is deliberate and negligent acts meet this 
criterion.  It is enough, in this context, that the negligent person had the capacity to avoid 
causing harm; voluntariness does not equate to choice.201 
 
Having critically examined the blurring of the distinction between recklessness and 
negligence in judicial decisions, followed by an analysis of the principles of criminal liability 
for negligence and the general academic debate as to whether such liability should be 
permitted, the next issue is to re-examine the theories of culpability to ascertain the extent to 
which each can justify the imposition of criminal liability for inadvertence. 
 
4.5. Negligence and the theories of culpability 
 
As will be recalled from Chapter Two, there are three main theories of culpability,202  
Bentham’s utilitarianism,203 Kant’s retributive theory204 of which choice theory is an 
adaptation, and Hume’s character theory.205  It was the latter two leading theories that were 
put under detailed scrutiny to ascertain their links to mens rea.  Other theories examined were 
Gardner’s ‘role’ theory and Horder’s proposal based upon agency, and it was argued that a 
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synthesis of the character and role theories would provide a theoretical rationale underpinning 
the limits of criminal recklessness and negligence proposed here. 
 
4.5.1. Negligence and utilitarianism 
 
From Bentham’s utilitarian rationale, based on the greatest happiness of the greatest number, 
it would appear that liability for negligence could be justified on the basis that it would 
produce conformity to legal standards necessary for the wellbeing of society.  Yet this theory 
is not actually fully compatible with criminal liability for negligence as utilitariansim is a 
consequentialist theory, grounded on the premise that punishment could only be justified 
where it would act as a deterrent to others and it could be said that inadvertence to risk could 
not be deterred by imposition of criminal sanctions for a failure to think.  This is simply 
because it is only when D considers his proposed action that he recognises that he risks 
breaking legal norms which entail punishment and can be dissuaded from continuing.  This 
argument has been rejected by some206 upon the ground that punishment can act as a general 
deterrence rather than at an individual level.  The financial ‘punishment’ of civil liability 
could equally be sufficient to achieve the same level of deterrence without the imposition of 
criminal sanctions.   
 
4.5.2. Negligence and choice theory 
 
Following Kantian (choice) theory, as people should not be punished if they could not have 
avoided doing a criminal act, it is apparent that this could be difficult to reconcile with 
criminal liability for negligence.  Unlike two of the other forms of mens rea discussed in 
Chapter Three, intention and advertent/subjective recklessness, negligence lacks conscious 
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awareness of risk.  If D is unaware of the risky nature of his conduct and that it is likely to 
breach a proscribed norm, how can he be deterred from his action?  On Kantian principles, a 
person should only be criminally liable for harm that he is responsible and culpable for 
bringing about.  A person can only be responsible for matters over which he has control and it 
is only what he chooses to do or causes to happen that he controls.207  In general terms 
therefore, D will be criminally liable where he has chosen to break the law and has made a 
conscious choice to bring about a certain consequence or as a minimum, to take the risk that a 
certain consequence will happen.   
 
This stance is incorporated in the correspondence principle, which postulates that D should 
only be punished for harm that he knew would happen or where he realised that such 
consequences could arise from his conduct.208  The alternative position allows for 
constructive liability where D has caused harm because it can be deemed appropriate to 
punish for the actual consequences of D’s acts, rather than limiting the attribution of blame to 
results intended or foreseen.  
 
Some choice theorists prefer the term ‘defiance’ to ‘choice’ suggesting that only those who 
consciously choose to act in defiance of legal norms deserve punishment.209  This evidence of 
defiance is perhaps present where an agent intentionally causes harm or where he sees the 
risk of harm occurring but continues to act.  Those who act negligently can hardly be branded 
defiant or even necessarily indifferent to the harm they cause.  The only exception to this 
could be where a competent person was persistently careless without any mitigating factors.   
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It is because of such issues that negligence, for the majority of choice theorists, would not be 
sufficient to ground criminal responsibility.210  For them advertence is the key to criminal 
responsibility.  Subjectivists support this rationale maintaining that a lack of awareness of the 
risk of harm makes it impossible for D to make a ‘rational and voluntary choice’ to act in a 
manner that risks breaking the law.211  The other important principle for choice theorists is 
belief; a person should only be responsible for what they believed they were doing in the 
circumstances they believed to exist at the time rather than for what actually did happen or 
what the actual circumstances turned out to be.212    
 
From the standpoint that only chosen conduct attracts responsibility and culpability, even if 
D’s actions create an obvious risk of harm to others and that harm results, D will not be liable 
unless he was aware of the risk himself.  The advantage of this approach to culpability is that 
it recognises and respects individual autonomy.  The citizen is able to exercise control over 
his own life knowing that he will only be liable to criminal sanctions if he chooses to break 
the law and he has the power to determine for himself whether or not to do so.   Liability for 
inadvertence, (inadvertent recklessness, negligence and crimes of strict liability), is 
problematic for choice theory as relevant offences can be committed without any conscious 
choice to break the law. 
 
On a traditional Kantian view, liability for negligence would only lie where D had an 
opportunity to become aware of the risk.  Hart213 managed to justify including negligence 
within choice theory by arguing that negligent behaviour could be encompassed where D had 
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the capacity to act like a reasonable person.  On this view D would be culpable where he 
possessed both the physical and moral capacity to abide by the law and had a fair opportunity 
to avoid criminal behaviour.214  This position originally had support,  but it has since been 
rejected because ‘it shifts the touchstone of responsibility from choice to capacity’ 
…‘relegating choice to a subsidiary role.’215  This is because giving capacity such 
prominence would mean that there were two ways responsibility could be grounded based 
upon the agent’s capacity: he could choose to do wrong, or be inadvertent.   
 
As an alternative, it has been posited by Moore that ‘what makes the intentional or reckless 
wrongdoer so culpable is not unexercised capacity’ but his choice not to exercise it.216  
Horder challenges Moore’s criticism of Hart’s approach to negligence as an inconsistency in 
Moore’s own argument because ‘the moral capacity to avoid wrongdoing, which ... Moore 
regards as an essential prerequisite for a culpability judgment, is the very basis...’ of liability 
for negligence as Hart realised.217  This criticism is clearly correct, but that is not to say that 
all those who behave negligently would necessarily be regarded as morally blameworthy.  In 
situations where the conduct is negligent it is surreal to suggest that a conscious choice has 
been made not to exercise one’s capacity.  It is the absence of thought that is the hallmark of 
negligence.   
 
It seems strange to suggest that a person can in any real sense ‘choose’ to behave in a 
negligent manner218 as negligence connotes inadvertent action and if no thought is being 
given before acting in a particular way how can the subsequent act be ‘chosen’?219  If 
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criminal liability should only lie where D is both responsible and culpable, for subjectivists 
this arises only where D has control which is limited to those things he chooses to do or 
causes to happen.  This subjective view limits the influence of chance and luck that should be 
irrelevant to criminal liability.220  This is too restrictive however.  A person can in a sense 
‘choose’ to behave negligently in that he can consciously choose not to do a risk assessment 
before he acts, although this will be rare.  Also, he could consciously undertake a risky 
activity in the knowledge that he may lack the relevant skill or expertise to undertake it or 
know that if unforeseen risks materialise he would lack the ability to deal with them.  If this 
was the case, D could be properly deemed to be reckless and not negligent. 
 
It is accepted that there is merit in the argument that usually one does not truly ‘choose’ to be 
inadvertent but if we accept that we can control our actions then we must accept that we can 
and do normally choose to take care to avoid harming others.  This is even more important 
when we are engaging in activities that we know have the potential to cause harm, especially 
when serious harm may occur.  This is not to suggest that on occasions when we do not 
consciously stop to consider possible risks that we are necessarily choosing not to do so but 
the more serious and obvious the risk, the more thought is required.  It is acknowledged that 
the instances where the majority of negligent actors consciously choose not to undertake a 
risk assessment will be rare unless the circumstances clearly demand careful consideration, 
and where such a choice is made it is possibly an example of wilful blindness.  The essential 
difference between intentional or subjectively reckless conduct and negligent acts is that the 
former are seen as wrongdoing, the latter as simply doing wrong. 
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The basis of choice theory, as enunciated by Hart, is that an agent should not be punished 
unless he had both the capacity and a fair opportunity to abide by the law.221   His proposal 
for including the inadvertent risk taker as criminally culpable would allow individual capacity 
and circumstances to be taken into account.  Accordingly, it would be a precondition of 
culpability that at the time of acting D had ‘the normal capacities, physical and mental, for 
doing what the law requires and abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair opportunity to 
exercise these capacities.’222  Those who were ‘culpably inadvertent’ would be identified by 
asking two questions: (1) Did D fail to take the precautions a reasonable man would have 
taken in the circumstances, and (2) Could D, given his capacities, have taken those 
precautions?223  This is close to the approach to recklessness advocated in the previous 
chapter, but where it differs from Hart’s is that it is contended here that account should also 
be taken of why D failed to exercise his capacities where he possessed them.  
 
Taking Hart’s two questions as a starting point, it needs to be established in what 
circumstances D will be held to have the necessary “capacity” and “fair opportunity”.  It 
would seem fair before attributing blame that an objective standard should only be applied to 
shortcomings for which D may truly be held morally culpable and any other shortcomings 
would be subject to subjective considerations, for example low intelligence.224  It is clear that 
Hart intended that both D’s mental and physical capacity should be taken into account.225  
The first limb of Hart’s test is clearly objective in asking if the reasonable man would have 
taken precautions to avoid the harm, which covers the ‘fair opportunity’ part of his 
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analysis.226  The second question, (2), is the subjective limb considering the specific capacity 
of the particular defendant to assess whether D could and should have behaved better.   
 
Hart’s analysis has been challenged on the ground that it wrongly combines together two 
elements that serve different purposes.  Hart’s second limb is ‘a condition of moral 
responsibility, not of culpability.  As such, it excludes blame and cannot ground it.’227  If D 
lacks the necessary capacity and fails to satisfy the second limb he cannot be criminally liable 
but even where he does satisfy this requirement it will not mean that he is necessarily 
culpable.228 
 
As a consequence, the method of establishing culpability seems to fall on the first (objective) 
limb of Hart’s test which would compare D to a person of reasonable intelligence.  As the test 
only considers whether, on the facts, there existed a fair opportunity for the reasonable man 
to avoid harm, no account is taken of why the defendant missed that chance.229  These 
considerations appear in the second limb but applying them both together does not solve the 
problem.  By way of illustration an example is given.  If D has a low cognitive capacity and 
is just capable of comprehending that a particular risk existed after much deliberation, a risk 
that a reasonable man would have seen immediately, Hart’s test would convict D.  Yet such a 
conviction should only be justified if it was ‘reasonable, and not merely possible’ for a person 
with such limited capacity to comprehend the risk.  The fact that a ‘normal’ person would 
have avoided the harm says nothing about whether the defendant had a fair opportunity to do 
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so.’230  It is only in situations that are exclusively focussed on the second limb of the test that 
work within Hart’s analysis.231 
 
Criminal liability for negligence undoubtedly poses choice theorists some problems.  Kant 
clearly distinguished between criminal and non-criminal conduct: ‘An unintentional 
transgression that can be imputed is called mere neglect (culpa).  An intentional transgression 
(that is, one accompanied by the consciousness that it is a transgression) is called a crime 
(dolus).’232  On this basis, liability for negligence, as an unintentional transgression, would 
seem to be outside the remit of criminal sanctions.   
 
Hampton233 talks in terms of ‘advertent negligence’ which easily fits with her defiance 
version of choice theory - not foresight of a risk but D knew of the risk involved; and 
inadvertent negligence - ‘someone who did not know that she could have done otherwise, and 
yet (we think) could and should have known better.’234  On an Aristotelian view D’s 
ignorance shows a faulty character formation and the ‘defiant act’ takes place during the 
character formation process.235  Hampton disapproves of conviction for those who are 
‘genuinely and reasonably unaware of the criminal nature’ of their actions to deter harm.  She 
acknowledges that the State might be able to justify conviction for criminal negligence in 
such circumstances because of its duty to protect its citizens through deterrence of certain 
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behaviour even though it may offend our sense of justice as defiance is absent.  The 
difficulties with this proposition, that D is culpable for developing a faulty character, are 
twofold.  First it is ingenuous to suggest that those who have developed bad character traits 
have deliberately chosen to do so.  Secondly, in order to justify any culpability for later 
negligence ‘D’s failure to rectify her character would have to be chosen in the knowledge that 
the very negligence that she later exhibits is the sort of consequence that might occur’.236 
 
Problematically, as noted above in addressing utilitarianism, it is difficult to see how such 
behaviour is deterred.  If the negligent acts were not done consciously how can we be 
encouraged not to be careless?  Certainly, if a person is habitually careless due to a lack of 
concern for others, that would demonstrate a bad disposition and such an individual could be 
deterred by the imposition of criminal liability and start to behave more responsibly as a 
result.  If, on the other hand, we want to encourage people not to be momentarily distracted 
we could be attempting the impossible.  It is not a question of using the law to prevent 
dangerous behaviour or of removing those who pose a danger to others from society as both 
the criminal and the law abiding citizen will be negligent.  Any theory of culpability that 
justified laws requiring citizens ‘to be careful in all aspects of our daily lives on pain of 
punishment would seem totalitarian…and an extreme assertion of the right to punish in order 
to uphold social values.’237  In certain situations and environments there can be an obvious 
perception of danger and here punishment for inadvertence could be justified but only if the 
reason for the inadvertence was itself blameworthy.238 
 
                                            
236 A.P. Simester, ‘Can Negligence be Culpable?’ (n 6) 89. 
237 L.H. Leigh, ‘Liability for Inadvertence: A Lordly Legacy?’ (n 81) at 467. 
238 Ibid. at 468. 
255 
 
It has been argued that negligence should be included within the criminal law because it 
makes the law more effective.  This is because it is the role of the criminal law to prevent 
harm and it is ‘socially desirable’ for actions to be carried out safely ‘if they are dangerous or 
may become so.’239  For negligence:  
it is no more difficult to conform one’s conduct to the law than it is when a more 
serious crime is put on the books, for in general it is just as easy to do something in 
the right way as it is to do only what is right.240   
This proposition requires closer consideration to ascertain the merit of its claim.  As a general 
statement, it is submitted, it would only be true in relation to advertent conduct.  It is only 
when one is consciously aware that it can be said to be as easy to conform to the law’s 
requirements, it becomes a straightforward matter of informed choice whether or not to 
comply.  It is only easy to do something the right way if one is aware of/has knowledge of 
what the right way is, or why the particular way chosen is not the right way to do it in the 
current circumstances.  It is also a matter of whether someone possesses the necessary skills 
to be able to perform a particular activity in the right way and has a fair opportunity to do so. 
 
4.5.3. Negligence and character theory 
 
Criminal liability for character theorists is properly grounded where D’s action manifests an 
undesirable character trait, an enduring mental quality241 that requires correction.  Hume is 
clear that the role for punishment is only where its intended use is to alter a person’s 
conduct.242  He believed that mental qualities could sometimes be indicated better by how a 
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person did something rather than by what he did and even if acts are manifestations of mental 
qualities, ‘it is only classes of actions which are so, not particular ones.’243  This is because an 
action can be the result of differing motives which shows that there is not necessarily a direct 
link between possession of a certain character trait and actions of a certain type.244   
 
As noted in Chapter Two above, there is no accepted analysis of which traits and dispositions 
to act are included within the conception of moral character and those which are not.245  One 
accepted view is that relevant character traits are those which produce acts which are subject 
to D’s voluntary control, the exercise of his free will.246  In each case it will be a matter of 
assessing the ‘degree to which their manifestation is subject to voluntary control.’247  If then, 
with regard to a particular character flaw, a person cannot behave in any other way their flaw 
is not a character trait.  An obvious example is that of stupidity in the sense of a lack of 
intelligence.  This proposition was questioned on the basis that the level of control we 
generally exhibit surely forms part of our character,248 and a person’s level of self control is 
not an unfluctuating standard.  Whether this latter point is correct may be open to question as 
external factors may cause changes to a person’s capacity for control, but if indeed the level 
is fixed, as a consequence, the theory may work with flaws like low intellectual capacity but 
not with others.   
 
It has been argued that character theory can embrace negligent behaviour either because D 
was ‘careless and inattentive’ as a person or because D failed to ‘exercise their character 
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strengths because of a momentary distraction.’249  Whilst it may seem appropriate to hold 
someone criminally liable for harm caused in circumstances where an individual is ‘careless 
and inattentive’ displaying an indifference to the welfare of those around them,250 it is hard as 
a general principle to justify criminal responsibility where someone has been momentarily 
distracted, simply because it can happen to us all. 
 
Even though we may punish one negligent act such an isolated action does not signify that we 
are often careless, persistent carelessness signifying a bad character trait.  To suggest that a 
consistently negligent actor demonstrates an attitude of indifference251 may appear correct but 
this is not necessarily the case for all those who would fit this description, which could 
equally be attributable to ‘awkwardness and stupidity.’252   
 
4.5.4. Negligence and Gardner’s ‘role’ theory 
 
Gardner’s253 proposal is that culpability is determined in light of a person’s ability to fulfil 
their particular role in the way a reasonable person in that role should. On this model,254  
responsibility only lies where we are fulfilling a role, for example a specific role like doctor, 
police officer, teacher, parent; or a non-specific role i.e. a human being, and we fall below an 
idealised standard of a reasonable person in the role we are fulfilling.  All roles have 
standards of character, skills and knowledge attached to them and D should only be excused 
if his conduct fell within the boundaries of reasonableness for someone in that role.  It is 
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irrelevant whether we have the capacity to achieve this idealised standard; a person’s capacity 
to do better is immaterial.   
 
Gardner’s model fits well with liability for negligence as well as for non-advertent 
recklessness (as per Caldwell recklessness which covered both subjective and objective tests 
within its scope)255 advocating a stricter, more Aristotelian view of character theory.256  Yet 
currently the criminal law does acknowledge either a lack of responsibility or alternatively, 
for exculpation on capacity grounds.  These are acknowledged, for example, in some 
defences in relation to status as in infancy, and in cases where the mens rea of the offence 
specified a specific cognitive mental element like ‘wilful neglect’ which becomes impossible 
to prove where D lacks the mental capacity to realise the harm being incurred.257  Following 
Adomako, it would appear that evidence regarding the capacity of D could be relevant in 
assessing whether, in the circumstances, D’s negligence was ‘gross’ to allow a conviction for 
gross negligence manslaughter to stand. 
 
Gardner’s theory makes no allowance for the fact that some part of our character is dependent 
on the reasons that motivate us and the reasons we are indifferent to, and this could affect D’s 
ability to practically reason, to control himself, or ‘an alteration in his motivations ...the 
reasons that motivate his actions.’258  In the Aristotelian tradition, Gardner259 would state that 
if D is courageous he would see life through the courageous person’s eyes, viewing danger as 
a challenge and not as the threat that more cowardly people would perceive it to be.  In 
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consequence D cannot have the virtue of courage if he does not act courageously or if he has 
to overcome the inclination to act as a coward.   
 
Presumably, in a similar vein, the careful and considerate individual would always think of 
the interests of others, would always be attentive to what they were doing and to others that 
would be affected by his acts or omissions.  It is contended here that such a paradigm of 
virtue simply does not exist, even if it is something to which we may all aspire for the 
majority of the time.  Whether we attain such heights on any particular day depends upon 
both internal and external factors and whether the reasons to act or refrain from acting are 
sufficiently strong in a given instance.  It is for these reasons that Gardner’s theory spreads 
the net of culpability too widely. 
 
4.5.5. Negligence and Vice 
 
Although those who negligently cause harm may well warrant moral criticism, this does not 
necessarily mean that they also deserve the full force of the criminal law to be brought to 
bear.  Not all harm doers should be punished in a criminal justice system worthy of respect.  
Although it has been suggested that the criminal law is simply concerned with our fitness for 
a particular role260 this is not the sole determinant of liability as the law targets punishment at 
those whose behaviour has shown possession of particular vices.  The relevant manifested 
vices are those that cause D to be ‘insufficiently motivated to act or not to act by the interests 
of others.’261  It is clear that the criminal law does not concern itself with all character traits 
or flaws, it is:  
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centrally concerned with vices such as cruelty, wickedness, dishonesty, indifference 
and the like.  Some vices, such as carelessness, may be sufficiently similar to this 
narrow range of vices to be appropriate targets for criminal liability.  Other vices, 
such as cowardice, stupidity, obliviousness and clumsiness, whilst being 
reprehensible character traits in themselves, are not rightly the target of criminal 
liability.262 
Accordingly, this requirement of a manifestation of one or more of these core vices is 
necessary for criminal responsibility; where they are absent civil liability is more 
appropriate.263  Whilst this view has its appeal and is grounded in character theory, it is 
difficult to see how ‘carelessness’ fits in with the vices named above, unless it demonstrates, 
as a minimum, a lack of concern for the welfare of others, which might apply particularly in 
circumstances where D is engaging in a risky activity.   
 
If carelessness is the same as negligence, negligence generally ‘does not reliably track the 
moral vice of insufficient concern that all the other legitimate forms of criminal culpability 
display.’264  Carelessness should only be included where D demonstrates a wanton disregard 
for the risk that his activity might cause to others to take proper care, particularly where the 
activity is a risky one.  Any vices which do not show a total lack of regard for the interests of 
others should not be the concern of the criminal law.265  This is because criminal liability 
represents the State’s condemnation which is only appropriate where D’s vices cause harm 
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and demonstrate a lack of concern for the interests of others.266  Many of those who are 
negligent do not portray such a lack of concern for the welfare of others, and although a mere 
lack of skill can be blameworthy, it does not follow that demonstrating a lack of skill 
automatically deserves criminal liability.267 The only acknowledged problem with this 
proposition is that it may be difficult to prove beyond doubt that D showed such disregard or 
was merely forgetful, preoccupied or distracted. 
 
Following this view, there is a case for arguing that Adomako268 did not deserve criminal 
punishment as once he realised his patient was in serious trouble, he did everything he could 
think of to remedy the situation, showing appropriate concern rather than disregard or 
indifference.269  He clearly lacked the skill of a competent anaesthetist, but he may not have 
appreciated his limitations and those who trained and employed him must accept some 
responsibility for this.270  The contrary position is illustrated by the subsequent cases of R v 
Misra and R v Srivastava,271 where two senior house officers ignored advice from other 
hospital staff in regard to a post-operative patient who was showing clear signs of infection, 
failed to order blood cultures as suggested by the ward sister, failed to check a blood test 
already ordered earlier by another doctor and misread the amount of urine passed by the 
patient.  The patient died, but the inaction by the doctors in this instance showed a total lack 
of regard for the patient’s welfare.272  In such circumstances criminal liability is clearly 
appropriate and no difficulty arises in establishing the lack of concern required, so perhaps 
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differentiating between the callous and the forgetful, preoccupied or distracted may not be 
such a problem in practice. 
  
4.5.5.1. The Vices of Stupidity and Obliviousness 
 
If the argument that carelessness may be sufficiently similar to the other vices is correct, then 
it is not at all clear why ‘stupidity’ and ‘obliviousness’ should be automatically excluded.273  
Much will depend, again, on what is meant by the use of these terms, as ‘stupidity’ could be 
demonstrated by an intelligent person’s practical joke that results in serious harm; 
obliviousness could be the result of indifference to the needs of others, or wilful blindness.  
Both could alternatively be caused by a lack of cognitive capacity and where D has no power 
of control at all, as with clumsiness, such a trait is perhaps more aptly labelled unfortunate, 
rather than reprehensible, and it is contended here that such capacity traits would properly be 
excluded from the ambit of the criminal law.  Possession of this second category of ‘vices’ 
may amount to unfitness for a particular role, but not an unfitness that stems from an 
insufficient concern for the welfare of others.  It has been postulated that ‘we ought not to 
convict doctors merely for being bad doctors, we ought to convict them only if they are cruel 
or indifferent doctors, or at least insufficiently motivated [by] the interests of their patients.  
Merely having a vice, or displaying a lack of skill, does not show this in itself.’274 
[O]nce in a while, our lack of information, failure to notice, or forgetfulness results in 
our underestimating the riskiness of our conduct and causing harm....An injunction to 
notice, remember, and be fully informed about anything that bears on risks to others 
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is an injunction that no human being can comply with, so violating this injunction 
reflects no moral defect.275   
 
In the main, this view is laudable, but it must be said that where the activity creates an 
obvious risk of causing serious harm it cannot be said universally that ‘it reflects no moral 
defect’ even though as a general rule it should apply in everyday matters.  This issue may 
well help to differentiate between the incompetent medical professional and an incompetent 
driver.  So, for example, if a surgeon performing a high risk operation forgot to acquaint 
himself with the relevant patient notes or failed to notice he had ruptured an artery, in the 
absence of mitigating factors, we would surely find his conduct reflected a moral defect.  On 
the other hand, a momentary lapse while driving is probably responsible for the majority of 
road traffic incidents.  If such a driver unluckily causes another to swerve and a fatal injury is 
caused, this does not reflect the same moral defect even though it may attract a custodial 
sentence.276  
 
It has been suggested that negligence can arise through D’s earlier reckless act, for example, 
if he knows he is forgetful and fails to write himself a reminder to get his brakes fixed, or D 
knows he is easily distracted whilst driving and yet enters into a heated argument with his 
passenger and fails to advert to a risk as a result.277  Even on this view, culpability would only 
apply to the earlier recklessness rather than the negligent act that has resulted in the harm.278  
Certainly, inadvertence to risk can be the result of a character defect, but it could be difficult 
to show that D would have adverted to the risk had he not possessed that particular defect, 
since both those with good characters and bad can be negligent. 
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4.5.6. Negligence and Agency Theory 
 
‘Agency’ theory,279  judges not ‘character’, but ‘conduct… by reference to its relative  
(lack of) success.’280  This theory has better links with degrees of mens rea as it allows us to 
rank harms.  Starting with the paradigm of successful agency, i.e. when harm is intentionally 
caused in the way intended, an evaluation of D’s conduct depends on how close it comes to 
hitting this target directly, like the target in archery.  Concentric circles further away from the 
centre would include endangerment and the ‘lower the risk of harm posed by the particular 
conduct, the further distance’ away it would be.281  This would leave negligence in the 
outermost ring.  In this manner ‘the way in which the victim is harmed, or subjected to the 
risk of harm, shapes culpability.’282  The theory relies on the presumption that ‘agency’ 
means ‘sane, mature agency’ and is thus dependent on capacity or character theory to justify 
the exculpation of the young and the insane.283  With its focus on the way harm is brought 
about it, disregards D’s reasons for acting, which can be important and which would be 
relevant in determining culpability if the proposal advanced in this work was adopted. 
  
4.6. Categories of negligence 
 
It is not possible to have degrees of inadvertence, but obviously there can be degrees of fault 
in failing to perceive a particular risk.  This is why enquiry into the reason why D was 
inadvertent is important.  One person may depart slightly from the standard expected of a 
reasonable person, whereas another might fall far below what is expected.  It is contended 
that the level of departure will be deemed ‘gross’ if the harm could have been avoided by 
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taking simple precautions, ‘such as persons who are but poorly endowed with physical and 
mental capacities can easily take’.284  It has already been observed from earlier analysis of 
case law that other considerations can be relevant before a determination of gross negligence 
is made.  It has been said that gross negligence285 cannot be reduced to a distinction between 
advertent and inadvertent conduct, it encompasses all conduct that displays a ‘wanton and 
reckless disregard’286 for others.  Accordingly, it has been argued that gross negligence can 
be demonstrated either by indifference to the health and safety of others287 or by a gross 
departure from an expected standard where a positive duty of care is owed,288 rather than the 
‘negative duty not to cause harm’.289  On this view, as the defendant in Adomako290 owed a 
positive duty of care, one between an anaesthetist and patient, his conviction was justified.  It 
is said to be justified on the grounds that those who owe a positive duty of care have 
professional rules or codes of conduct to provide guidance on the standards expected.291  It 
would be preferable for both of these distinct categories to require a manifestation of 
indifference to the victim before conviction for a serious offence.292  
 
It was suggested in R v Markuss, 293 that two forms of gross negligence exist: one arising 
through neglect of a positive duty to care, and the other when acting out of ignorant rashness.  
This proposition has been criticised on the basis that ignorant rashness is not a separate 
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category, just a form of gross negligence.294  It has been further argued that where there is a 
great departure from the standard expected of the reasonable person in circumstances where 
there is a positive duty to act, gross negligence can be manifested in different ways: a lack of 
attentiveness, or skill, or knowledge, and a deficiency in virtue.295  These manifestations have 
given rise to criminal liability in the past, but it is only where there is a deficiency in virtue, 
such as ignorant rashness, indifference or some other moral failing demonstrated that future 
liability for serious offences should lie. 
 
Professor Glanville Williams296 distinguished between ‘advertent’ and ‘inadvertent’ 
negligence; the former he equated with subjective recklessness and the latter with the more 
familiar objective form of negligence discussed here.  This is an inappropriate distinction to 
make because although the ‘advertently negligent’ (subjectively reckless) agent clearly 
foresees the risk of harm he does not always underestimate the risk or unsuccessfully try to 
eliminate it.  Only in such circumstances should he be deemed to be ‘advertently’ negligent 
and even then, it could be said that where D incompetently attempts to eliminate a risk or 
avoid the harm occurring and thinks he has accomplished this, he is no longer advertently 
negligent but has crossed the line, lapsing into inadvertence.   
 
Simester contends: 
[a] reasonable person, being a rational moral agent, can be expected to recognize 
reasons for behaving in various ways, to evaluate possible behaviour in the light of 
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those reasons, and to behave according to that evaluation.  The negligent defendant 
will have failed to do one or more of those things.297 
What is important is why, in the particular circumstances, D failed to act in an appropriate 
manner.  He identifies three different factors which could result in D’s negligence.  These are 
a failure: 
(i) To pay attention to available information.  In particular, to perceive that which 
one’s physical senses register, and to recall that which one remembers; 
(ii) To remember that which one perceives or infers; and 
(iii) To apply intelligence to that which one perceives and recalls.298  
From (iii) it would seem that where D is of low intelligence or lacks experience then these 
factors should be taken into consideration.  The majority of instances of negligent conduct are 
likely to fall within the first group, a lack of attention or forgetfulness.   Simester posits that a 
failure to pay sufficient attention ‘reflects an insufficient concern in our duty to avoid harm’ 
whereas a ‘failure to notice something is generally not deliberate.’  In response to the 
suggestion that a failure to notice is just something that happens to D, he submits that the real 
question is not whether D ‘chose’ not to attend but whether D could have avoided this failure.  
Usually the answer would be yes.299  
 
With regard to his first argument, a lack of sufficient attention does not necessarily equate to 
a conscious or subconscious demonstration of insufficient concern.  Without knowing the full 
circumstances, it is impossible to judge whether the lack of attention is blameworthy.  The 
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same can be said where D fails to notice something, especially where what he fails to 
perceive would have been blindingly obvious to anyone else.  The more obvious the risk of 
harm was, the more likely it is that D will be deemed negligent if not subjectively reckless. 
 
It is always possible that D could alter his behaviour and learn to become more attentive and 
caring, but whether criminal punishment for past errors is an appropriate means for 
incentivising D to change his ways seems unlikely.  Where the lack of attention is due to 
momentary impulsiveness, preoccupation or distraction, it may be that the attribution of 
blame is warranted, especially where an agent is exhibiting a lack of self-control or acting in 
anger.  Generally, if this is not the case it would be hard to justify imposing the full weight of 
the criminal law.  Simester singles out ‘forgetfulness due to some distraction’300 as an 
exception to liability but this example is given in the context of an ill relative so, as argued 
here above, the context in which negligent action arises is all important.  
 
As the standard against which D’s conduct is measured is that of the reasonable man, it has 
been propounded301 that this is an inappropriate standard with regard to memory.  This is 
because we cannot always choose what we remember and what we forget, often forgetting 
things that we hold important to remember whilst remembering things that we would prefer 
to forget.302  To some extent this is clearly correct, but again it must be context dependent as 
we can usually take precautions lest we forget if something is clearly important, and the more 
important it is, the more care we should take.  Forgetfulness could be a sign that something is 
not important enough to us unless there is some reason why blame would be unjustified.  
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Again, the inherent problem would be the difficulty in differentiating between the defendant 
who was paying insufficient attention because he did not care enough and the defendant who 
claims he forgot.303  This could clearly be an issue, but without some justification as to why 
D forgot something that he should have remembered, given his cognitive capacity and 
experience, such a claim is likely to be treated with the same scepticism as the subjectively 
reckless defendant with the requisite capacity who claims not to have foreseen an obvious 
risk. 
 
It has been claimed that when present hazards are ignored there is a greater degree of 
culpability than when dangers are prospective and arise during the course of the activity.  
This is due to ‘the greater threat of harm that dangers already present represent.’304  Perhaps 
this could be because present hazards may be more avoidable and arise before any action 
commences on D’s part, but it may not be a question of them being ‘ignored,’ rather that they 
were missed.  Within these two particular categories of negligence there are finer culpability 
distinctions to be made dependent on: how manifest the danger is, the imminency of the 
harm, its seriousness, the utility of the action and the feasibility of taking adequate 
precautions to prevent the harm occurring.305  Even taking such distinctions into account this 
cannot provide a full account of culpability.  Without also considering the reasons for failing 
to notice an obvious risk, differentiating between the merely negligent and the reckless actor 
cannot be achieved.306    
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Other distinctions between recklessness and negligence have been said to include a form of 
wilful blindness,307 where D is so intent on doing something that he excludes everything else 
from his mind.308  This may seem close to traditional Cunningham recklessness where D has 
deliberately closed his mind to the risk, but actually it is restricted to where D wilfully brings 
about his own unawareness.  Clearly, to wilfully fail to consider risks involves, however 
briefly, consciously registering that there may be a risk involved, in which case subjective 
recklessness in the Cunningham sense is established.  Recklessness is also said to be manifest 
where there are ‘kinds of excitement which …involve an “evil intent.”’  These are 
‘reprehensible conditions, which ‘people ought not to allow themselves to get into,’ and in 
which they ‘must not only stop to think but sober up and calm down in order to think’.’309   
 
The ‘kind of excitement’ demonstrated by the defendant in Caldwell might be the focus of 
these views, but it is difficult to describe many of the actions of a truly reckless agent in 
terms of an “evil intent.”  The defendants in Parker, Brady and in CPS v Booth were all 
deemed reckless, but if the jury had been directed that recklessness required evidence of an 
“evil intent” it would be lacking.  Yet, although it is submitted that Parker and Booth should 
have been acquitted on a subjective test, the defendant in Brady was overexcited and should 
be deemed reckless even though an ‘evil intent’ was absent.  What is not seen as recklessness 
is the normal kind of inattention that we all display because it would be unreasonable to 
require that we take such thorough care to notice every risk our actions may involve.310   
 
                                            
307 Ibid. at 277. 
308 G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (London: Stevens, 1978) 78. 
309 R.A. Duff, ‘Professor Williams and Conditional Subjectivism’ [1982] 41 Cambridge Law Journal 273 at 
277, citing G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ Cambridge Law Journal 252 at 260 and 270. 
310 G. Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ Cambridge Law Journal 252 at 270-271. 
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What does seem to be clear from Caldwell/Lawrence is that the difference between the two 
mental states is that recklessness requires moral turpitude, whereas mere negligence does not.   
An innate capacity to have appreciated an unseen risk would be essential for both fault 
states,311 although, as discussed above,312 there is some evidence to suggest that this is 
relevant only to recklessness.  Where the fault element is simple negligence, D is compared 
to the standard of the reasonable man, an ideal unvarying standard that does not take into 
account the individual characteristics of the accused.  It is a matter then of what D ‘should’ 
have been aware of rather than what he normally ‘would’ have been aware of.   This is a 
position that is regarded as insufficient for both deterrence and retributive purposes.313  
Morally, it may still comply with our everyday ascription of blame but that is not necessarily 
advocating that criminal sanctions are appropriate in such circumstances.  
4.6.1. Negligence - Liability for Stupidity or Incompetence? 
 
As argued in Chapter Three, if a person has sufficient cognitive capacity, but acts stupidly or 
incompetently on a particular occasion he should be held culpable for any serious harm that 
results, but only if his behaviour demonstrates a bad attitude towards others.314  Stupidity in 
this context should not be taken to mean intellectually ‘stupid’, but would certainly 
encompass the practical joker who caused serious harm whilst acting in a way that had no 
social utility whatsoever.  It would apply, for example, to the defendant in Brady315 who had 
to be deemed subjectively reckless, even though it is highly unlikely that he consciously 
appreciated the risk involved of balancing on the rail of a balcony above a dance floor.  The 
Court of Appeal believed that by climbing on to the railings he had realised that he had taken 
                                            
311 L.H. Leigh and J. Temkin, Notes of Cases, Recklessness Revisited’ [1982] 45 Modern Law Review 198 at 
202.  
312 At 4.4.1. 
313 M. Moore and H. Hurd, ‘Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of 
Negligence’ (2011) 5 Criminal Law and Philosophy 147 at 148. 
314 See also Tadros above at 4.5.5. 
315 [2007] EWCA Crim 2413. 
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a risk that he could fall and hurt someone so that even if his fall was entirely accidental it was 
sufficient to find him reckless.316 Note that Brady was, perhaps fortunately for the court, 
intoxicated at the time.  Had he not been voluntarily intoxicated and foresight of risk, 
subjective recklessness, was not found he would have escaped criminal responsibility as the 
Offences against the Person Act 1861 offences do not encompass negligence, even where the 
harm caused is serious.  Had the victim died of her injuries, a charge of gross negligence 
manslaughter would have been apt under the current law.   
 
This kind of action poses problems for choice theorists if they want to establish culpability as 
it may be difficult to argue that D made a conscious choice.317    Certainly, Gardner sees 
stupidity as a vice and not as an excuse.318   A lack of intelligence is a different matter as it is 
something that D has no power to control, a low cognitive capacity is neither reflective of an 
agent’s character or his values.  In consequence, a distinction can be drawn between a 
mistake made by a person with low intelligence, which is understandable, and a mistake 
‘stupidly made by one not stupid,’319 especially when the latter is engaging in a risky activity 
that has no social utility and potentially serious consequences.  He can be held accountable 
because he could and should have avoided causing harm.  Thus, where an agent has acted 
stupidly, the stupidity itself is a moral failing.  No manifestation of any other character flaw 
such as indifference is necessary to ground culpability as long as the agent had the innate 
intellectual capacity to appreciate the risk, there is no social utility in the act and no moral 
justification can be advanced as to why he should not be deemed reckless. 
                                            
316 J. Herring, Criminal Law Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd Edn.,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 156. 
317 See the reference to stupidity in R v G & R, Chapter 3 above. 
318 J. Gardner Offences and Defences Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 26. 
319 A.P. Simester, ‘Can Negligence be Culpable?’ (n 6) 103. 
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Where D’s negligence arises from an arrogant, overconfident attitude which distorts his 
perception of the risk he is clearly culpable.320  Again this would be evidence of an 
undesirable character trait and would cover the example of the ‘Greek Adonis’ who honestly 
believed he was so irresistible that no woman could possibly not consent to having sex with 
him.  These cases would be accommodated again through recklessness, as would the case of 
Shimmen.321  This is because where the conduct is either highly risky as in the first example, 
or taking the risk is unjustified because it is done frivolously, it will be rare that D does not 
advert to the risk, or at least he will be deemed to have adverted to it by judge and jury. 
 
For those who follow the subjectivist position that conscious awareness of risk is a minimum 
threshold requirement for criminal culpability,322 it would seem that the clueless and heedless 
should be insulated from criminal responsibility.  Yet there is evidence to suggest that much 
of our thinking and decision-making takes place on a subconscious rather than conscious 
level.323  It has been argued that: ‘the boundaries between our conscious and subconscious are 
permeable, dynamic and interactive, and there is no valid scientific support for a sharp 
dichotomy’.324  Proof of all mental states employed by the criminal law are often external and 
approximate, fathomed by an examination of evidence of the agent’s conduct and all the 
circumstances.  Sometimes the conscious mind cannot recall reliably what D did/did not 
perceive before acting, a point made by Lord Diplock in Caldwell, as well as by others.325   
 
                                            
320 L. Alexander, ‘Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability’ (n 264) at 951, citing 
James Montmarquet, ‘Culpable Ignorance and Excuses’ (1995) 80 Phil. Stud. 41. 
321 Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Shimmen (1986) 84 Cr App Rep 7; [1986] Criminal 
Law Review 800. 
322 For example, L. Alexander and K. Ferzan, with S. J. Morse, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal 
Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
323 S.A. Bandes, ‘Is it Immoral to Punish the Heedless and Clueless? A Comment on Alexander, Ferzan, and 
Morse: Crime and Culpability’ (2010) 29 Law and Philosophy 433 at 440. 
324 Ibid. citing D. Denno, ‘Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts’ (2002) 87 Minnesota Law 
Review 269 at 307. 
325 S.A. Bandes, ‘Is it Immoral to Punish the Heedless and Clueless? A Comment on Alexander, Ferzan, and 
Morse: Crime and Culpability’ (n 323) at 445. 
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Furthermore, it has been argued that ‘what we think we are doing while consciously 
deliberating in actuality has no effect on the outcome of the judgment, as it has already been 
made through relatively immediate, automatic means’.326  If this is correct, there is no logical 
reason for insisting that advertence to risk is a prerequisite for criminal liability.  What the 
criminal law should not do is automatically offer protection to those who are inadvertent as 
this sends out the wrong message to society and offers no incentive to take care.  
 
What should be a prerequisite for inadvertent criminal culpability is not simply a general 
innate capacity that the particular agent possessed to advert to the given risk, but a specific 
capacity in the circumstances to have been conscious of the risk and a lack of any morally 
justifiable explanation of why he did not recognize the risk in this instance.  This is because 
to truly distinguish between the criminally responsible and the excusable defendant, we need 
to make the distinction between an ability to do something in the abstract from an ability to 
do the same thing on a particular occasion.327  
 
4.6.2. Accidental Harm or Negligence 
 
It is not possible to clearly distinguish where accidental harm ends and negligent harm arises, 
which is another argument for removing liability for inadvertent minor harms.  There is no 
clear cut boundary between the two.  It has been observed328 that in our everyday lives our 
moral judgments and blaming practices are selective and could not survive if all harm-doers 
are blamed.  This is clearly right and the civil law has an important role to play where 
                                            
326 J.A. Bargh and T.L. Chartrand, ‘The Unbearable Automaticity of Being’ (1999) 54 American Psychologist 
462 at 475, cited in  S.A. Bandes, ‘Is it Immoral to Punish the Heedless and Clueless? A Comment on 
Alexander, Ferzan, and Morse: Crime and Culpability’ (n 323) at 445. 
327 For further discussion on “capacity” see M. Moore and H. Hurd, ‘Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the 
Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence’ (n 313) at 157; T. Honore´ Can and Can’t in 
Responsibility and Fault (Oxford: Hart, 1999) 143-160. 
328 S. Kadish ‘Excusing Crime’ (1987) California Law Review 257. 
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blameworthiness is established as it is used to compensate victims and used where criminal 
liability and the stigma of a conviction are deemed inappropriate. 
 
Where the criminal law excuses because of a lack of knowledge/cognitive deficiency, it is 
generally because the lack of knowledge itself is excusable in the sense that a reasonable 
person in D’s situation would not have known.  In these circumstances the outcome would be 
seen as accidental.  If a lack of cognitive capacity is an individual characteristic of the agent, 
however, it can mitigate in sentencing but in general terms can only be raised as an excuse in 
terms of insanity or infancy, unless sufficient mental capacity forms part of the specified 
mens rea of an offence.  
 
Criminal liability for negligence is clearly an area where the individual deficiencies of an 
agent should be taken into account.  Although Hart accommodated liability for negligence 
within choice theory it was on the basis that D could have been aware of the risk and could 
have taken all precautions necessary to prevent harm occurring.  A failure to allow for 
cognitive deficiency could result in injustice for ‘unfortunate individuals who, through lack 
of intelligence, powers of concentration or memory, or through clumsiness’ are criminally 
liable.329 
 
The problem with such a proposition is that it would need to clearly distinguish between 
incapacities of cognition and incapacities of volition otherwise those who intentionally cause 
harm when they get very angry because they are naturally aggressive would argue that they 
could not have helped breaking the law's standards either.   It could still leave difficulty in 
determining on a case by case basis which defendants were cognitively challenged and to 
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what degree.330  When drafting the American Model Penal Code and Commentaries it was 
concluded that ‘the heredity, intelligence or temperament of the actor would not be held 
material in judging negligence.’331  The practical difficulties ‘reveal that the moral distinction 
between ability to know and ability to will is not entirely clear’ and is the rationale for the 
absence of an ‘incapacity to know better’ excuse.332  This position is harsh and it is submitted 
that for serious crimes the intelligence of the accused should always be a relevant factor. 
 
4.7. Conclusion to Chapter Four 
 
This chapter has demonstrated the way the courts have often used the terms ‘negligence’ and 
recklessness’ as though they were interchangeable and yet this should not be the case, given 
that there is general agreement that recklessness is a more serious fault element, and because 
most mala in se offences cannot be committed negligently.  Following the analysis of 
Adomako, it was contended here that a capacity based modification to Caldwell/Lawrence 
would have been a preferable alternative to the finding that gross negligence was the 
preferred fault element in such cases of involuntary manslaughter.  This would take the form 
of a broader, capacity based approach to recklessness which takes into consideration D’s 
cognitive capacity and knowledge. The proposed modification would also give consideration 
to D’s attitude at the time of acting and where a bad attitude was demonstrated, liability could 
lie.  As far as the capacity of D is concerned, where there is evidence of incapacity 
exculpation will be dependent upon the extent to which it is manifest in the circumstances 
and  the extent to which it is fault-free. 
 
                                            
330 S. Kadish ‘Excusing Crime’ (n 328) at 277. 
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To this end, a revised version of the Caldwell/Lawrence Model Direction on recklessness was 
advanced that would also encompass liability for inadvertent omission.  It is proposed that a 
person will be deemed reckless for failing to act if he has a legal duty of care towards 
another333 and is, or should be, aware of a serious and obvious risk to the welfare of that other 
and yet fails to act to prevent or ameliorate harm.  Therefore a person may be deemed 
reckless where: 
(1) he fails to act when there is an obvious and serious risk of death or serious harm 
to another when he is under a legal duty to that other person, and  
(2) he either has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk 
or he has recognised that there was some risk involved and has ignored it or tried to 
eliminate it in a wholly incompetent manner; and 
(3) if satisfied that an obvious and serious risk in such circumstances has not been 
considered or is dealt with in a wholly inappropriate manner by the defendant, the 
jury are entitled to infer that he has the state of mind required to constitute the offence 
and will probably do so; but regard must be given to any explanation he gives which 
may displace the inference.  
(3)(i) evidence of a general or specific lack of capacity in the circumstances may be 
exculpatory; 
(3)(ii) evidence of a reprehensible attitude or other moral failing will not displace the 
inference. 
This proposal would extend inadvertent liability to causing someone serious injury making it 
apparently broader than the test for gross negligence which now requires a risk of death, but 
it is also more restrictive in that without evidence of a reprehensible attitude or moral failing, 
criminal liability will not be established.   The extension of liability to cover an obvious risk 
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of serious bodily harm will provide some symmetry with the law of murder as it is submitted 
that it is hard to justify liability for death whilst not providing a criminal sanction for 
someone who may cause irreparable serious harm.  It also brings English law in to line with 
other western jurisdictions. 
 
It was shown in the analysis above that ‘gross’ negligence is synonymous with recklessness 
and should be deemed to be recklessness, leaving negligence to mean mere inadvertence or 
everyday carelessness.  Once the definition of recklessness encompasses both the advertent 
and inadvertent risk taker the problem with terminology disappears.  Clearly from a 
subjectivist stance, such an argument would be untenable as they insist that by definition 
mens rea requires conscious awareness but this interpretation of the Latin maxim has been 
shown to be built upon insecure foundations.   Further, the use of the ‘objective’ and 
‘subjective’ labels has, once again, be shown to be inconsistent; even negligence can have 
both objective and subjective elements for consideration. 
 
From the discussion of the main theories of culpability, if criminal liability for negligence can 
be justified at all, currently it can only be on weak utilitarian grounds.334  It must be 
acknowledged that the deterrence aspect may be limited in some instances.  Deterrence can 
be effective when an agent deliberates upon taking a conscious risk, allowing him to weigh 
up the benefit of continuing to act against the possibility of harm and subsequent criminal 
punishment and thus be deterred from continuing.  The inadvertent agent does not have these 
thought processes to effect his action.    
 
                                            
334 M. Moore, Placing Blame A Theory of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 591.  
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Inadvertent criminal responsibility cannot be founded upon culpable choice or culpable 
character unless such theories could be universally applied to all negligent actors.  The latter 
theory comes close as it can often identify inferences of bad character where moral excuse 
fails, but unfortunately it cannot do this consistently.  Neither choice nor character theory can 
cope with spontaneous and instinctive reactions where on the one hand there is no choice and 
on the other, there is no evidence of ‘bad’ character.  Accordingly, based upon the main 
theories of culpability alone, the argument against liability for negligence (inadvertence) for 
serious crimes is strong. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that an agent may deserve moral blame when he causes serious harm, 
even when the risk of harm arising from his conduct may never have crossed his mind.  
Indeed, even creating the risk of causing harm may give rise to attributions of blame.  What 
needs to be determined is to what extent such inadvertent conduct is also deserving of 
criminal sanction.  What is submitted here is that the breakpoint between criminal culpability 
and civil liability arises where D’s conduct causes serious harm and demonstrates a 
reprehensible attitude (such as indifference or wanton disregard) towards the welfare of 
others.  This will be evidenced by the possession of an innate general capacity to have 
appreciated the risk coupled with the failure to provide any moral justification for why he 
failed to realise the risk involved in his actions.  In such circumstances, D will be deemed 
reckless rather than negligent.  Where an agent has acted stupidly, the stupidity itself is the 
moral failing.  No manifestation of any other character flaw such as indifference is necessary 
to ground culpability provided D had the innate intellectual capacity to appreciate the risk, 
there was no social utility in the act and no moral justification could be advanced as to why 
he should not be deemed reckless.  This is because without also considering the reasons for 
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failing to notice an obvious risk, differentiating between the merely negligent and the reckless 
actor cannot be achieved.  This is the result of recklessness being context dependent. 
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Chapter 5  
 
5. Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction to Chapter Five 
 
As outlined in Chapter One, the overarching aim of this thesis was to redefine the appropriate 
limits of recklessness and negligence in the criminal law of England and Wales with regard to 
serious crimes.  The boundaries between these two forms of mens rea have lacked clarity and 
have not been successfully correlated with the leading theories of criminal culpability that 
each claim to have universal application in justifying punishment.  The link between mentes 
reae and culpability had not been fully explored and whereas others have focussed 
predominantly on the leading theories of choice and character, and in the context of 
exculpation, here the analysis included the ‘role’ and agency theories, and was undertaken 
with regard to inculpation.  Given the rise in subjective approaches to the mental element in 
criminal law in the previous century, the objective was to examine the extent to which 
subjective/objective labels were useful and whether purely subjective approaches were 
appropriate to ground criminal culpability for most serious crimes.  Given the remit of this 
work in its exposition of recklessness, negligence and moral culpability, it was not possible to 
include any meaningful discussion of strict liability or to general criminal liability for 
omissions.  Neither was it possible to address cases where the mental element relates to 
possible defences rather than the offence itself.1 
 
  
                                            
1 For example, s.160 Criminal Justice Act 1988 which criminalises the possession of an indecent photograph of 
a child, with s.160(2) containing a list of defences, all of which include a mental element. 
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5.2. Mens rea and culpability 
 
Chapter Two verified that there has been a departure from the traditional view that mens rea 
must signify moral blameworthiness.  What remained to be explored was the extent to which 
moral blameworthiness was still required in English criminal law and the relevance of the 
presence of mens rea in determining criminal culpability.  What was established was that 
although the presence of mens rea, when required, can ground potential culpability, it is not 
the sole determinant.2  It was also demonstrated that most of the theories of culpability 
addressed, utilitarianism,3 choice,4 character5 and agency,6 are founded upon the basis of 
moral blameworthiness, Gardner’s ‘role’ theory7 being the exception.  The link between these 
theories and the mentes reae of intention, recklessness and negligence was explored and it 
was found that none of the theories can fully justify all three forms of mens rea.  The main 
theories of culpability, character and choice, are considered to be subjective in nature.  
Choice theory focuses on what the particular agent chose to do, requiring mental states of 
intention, foresight or belief.  Consequently, choice theorists should require all approaches to 
culpability to be purely subjective.8   
 
Character theory, although subjective as it directly judges the character of the individual 
agent, does so by comparison with a society’s view of what it is to possess a good character. 
This external standard results in an ‘objectivised’ subjectivity.  Choice theory cannot 
adequately provide a theoretical rationale for liability arising through inadvertence, but 
                                            
2 Chapter 2 at 2.9.  
3 Ibid. at 2.3. and 2.4.9. 
4 Ibid. at 2.4. 
5 Ibid. at 2.5. 
6 Ibid. at 2.7.4. 
7 Ibid. at 2.7.1. 
8 In relation to the criminal law excuses, choice theory employs the concept of the reasonable man, introducing 
an element of objectivity. 
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character theory can to the limited extent that such inadvertence manifests an indifference to 
the welfare of others.   
 
‘Agency’ theory makes clear moral culpability distinctions between the intentional actor, the 
reckless person and someone who is negligent.  The blameworthiness of such conduct is 
judged by reference to its success and its proximity to intentional harms.  Employing this 
theory, D’s culpability is determined by considering ‘the way in which the victim is harmed, 
or subjected to the risk of harm.’9  This theory relies on the presumption that ‘agency’ means 
‘sane, mature agency’ and thus requires supplementing by choice or character theory to 
justify the exculpation of the young and the insane.10  The theory does not address the 
situation where the resultant harm exceeds that envisaged by the defendant.  These 
circumstances can still be theoretically justified by character theory where a bad character is 
manifested and by ‘role’ theory where D is judged by reference to the reasonable person 
performing the same role as D. 
 
It was recognized that Gardner’s ‘role’ theory11 works well with inadvertence, an objective 
test for recklessness and, potentially, liability for negligence if a purely objective stance was 
taken.  This is because on Gardner’s12 model, responsibility only lies where we are fulfilling 
a role, for example a specific role like doctor, or a non-specific role (a human being), and we 
fall below an idealised standard of a reasonable person in the role we are fulfilling.  All roles 
have standards of character, skills and knowledge attached to them and D should only be 
excused if his conduct fell within the boundaries of reasonableness for someone in that role.  
                                            
9 J. Horder, ‘Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory’ (1993)12 Law and Philosophy 193 at 
213. 
10 Ibid. at 214.  With its focus on the way harm is brought about it disregards D’s reasons for acting, a 
potentially relevant factor for criminal defences, again requiring reliance on other theories to establish moral 
blameworthiness. 
11 Chapter 2 at 2.7.1. 
12 J. Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ (1998) 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 575 at 593-596. 
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It is irrelevant whether we have the capacity to achieve this idealised standard; a person’s 
capacity to do better is immaterial.  Thus Gardner supports a stricter, more Aristotelian view 
of character theory.13  
 
Clearly, none of the theories above have universal application to the forms of mentes reae 
addressed in this work and it was posited that the criminal law’s concern is predominantly 
with the character of our actions, rather than choice, character per se, or the role we are 
assessing.  It was contended that a synthesis of character and ‘role’ theory would be an 
appropriate model of culpability,14 which is reflected in the subsequent proposals for 
reforming the law of recklessness15 and negligence16 advocated in Chapters Three and Four.  
Although such reform would not encompass intentional crimes, given that the focus has been 
on recklessness and negligence, there is no reason why this synthesis of character and ‘role’ 
theory should not be extended to underpin the mens rea of intention17 so that moral 
blameworthiness becomes a prerequisite for conviction for serious crimes.18  Reform would 
potentially assist defendants whose capacities are faultlessly undermined, such as the 
defendant in Kingston. 
 
Objective and subjective approaches to mens rea were subject to critical evaluation, including 
what is understood by these labels, and a consistent interpretation was advocated.19  
Conflicting subjective and objective approaches were analysed and  it was demonstrated that 
                                            
13 J. Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ (1998) 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 575; Offences and Defences 
Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) Chapter 6. 
14 Chapter 2 at 2.7.1. 
15 Chapter 3 at 3.4. 
16 Chapter 4 at 4.3.5. 
17 However, further safeguards would be required to avoid a return to the objective test in DPP v Smith [1961] 
AC 290 which was inherently unjust, discussed above, Chapter 3 at 3.2. 
18 There have been suggestions that the mentes reae terms should be unified but such proposals have been 
rejected as moral culpability distinctions are necessary to the extent that they can be incorporated into the 
criminal law, otherwise the requirements of justice cannot be adequately satisfied, see Chapter 2 at 2.2.  
19 Chapter 2 at 2.2. 
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part of the problem with understanding this labelling lies in determining what is meant by 
‘subjective’ or ‘objective’ when these terms are employed in any given instance.  It is 
contended that more precision is required when the terms are used to explain whether they 
are to be comprehended in the sense of their purest form or whether elements of the both 
approaches are incorporated.  Without synchronicity in their use the labels become 
meaningless.   
 
5.3 Intention and Recklessness 
 
Chapter Three began with a critical review of the development of the law on intention, and 
how intention had historically been equated with foresight of harm.20  This led over time to 
defining the mens rea of intention as requiring either direct intent or oblique intent, with the 
latter being something that a judge or jury could find in circumstances where D had foreseen 
the particular risk of harm (death or serious bodily injury) as a virtually certain consequence 
of their conduct.  This occurred in the context of homicide since murder cannot be committed 
recklessly.  It was frequently the language of recklessness that was used in jury directions and 
in the judgments of the appellate courts to convict defendants on the basis that they obliquely 
intended the consequences in the absence of evidence of any direct intent.  The need to 
distinguish intention from recklessness is important because these mens rea terms represent 
different degrees of moral turpitude, those found to have intentionally harmed others 
generally being deserving of more censure and punishment than those who behaved 
recklessly.  
   
This chapter provided a more detailed critical analysis of the subjective/objective debate with 
regard to determining criminal recklessness.  Once again, the difficulties with the 
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subjective/objective distinction were highlighted,21 supporting the view of Lord Diplock in 
Caldwell that ‘questions of criminal liability are seldom solved by simply asking whether the 
test is subjective or objective.’22  This is especially the case when it is unclear that these terms 
are being interpreted consistently.  Therefore, where the labels ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ 
are employed, it must be clear in what precise context they are being used.  Some have 
rejected this criticism of labelling, arguing that these are straightforward terms that are 
convenient expressions of important legal distinctions.23  It was established in this chapter 
that both in relation to character and choice theories, and with regard to recklessness, the 
labels are not necessarily as straightforward as has been claimed.24  This is because the terms 
are rarely used in the purest sense.   
 
With regard to recklessness, even if we adopt a ‘subjective’ definition such as that established 
in Cunningham,25 it was clear that it would nevertheless have an ‘objective’ element to it, 
which is the taking of an unjustified risk.  The determination of whether the risk was a 
reasonable one to take in the circumstances falls to the judge or jury, not the defendant.  If 
this ‘subjective’ definition was truly subjective, the justifiability of the risk would have to be 
judged by whether D, himself, thought it was reasonable, not by the external objective 
standards of others.  Further, it was contended that when the Cunningham ‘subjective’ test 
was held to encompass the deliberate closing of the mind to the risk, a purely objective test 
was being imposed in reality.  This would only be avoided where D lacked the cognitive 
capacity to appreciate the risk, as in Stephenson.26  Consequently, when applying the 
                                            
21 Chapter 3 at 3.3.3-3.3.4. 
22 [1982] AC 341 at 353 para.(E) and 354 para.(F) 
23 J.C. Smith, ‘Commentary on Caldwell' [1981] Criminal Law Review 392 at 396; and G. Williams,  
‘Recklessness Redefined’ [1981] Cambridge Law Journal 252. 
24 Chapter 3 at 3.3.3-3.3.4.  
25 Chapter 3 at 3.3.2. 
26 Chapter 3 at 3.3.2. 
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subjective approach in Cunningham and G& R to cases such as Parker and Booth, in reality 
an objective capacity based test is already in operation.   
 
The ‘objective’ test advanced in Caldwell/Lawrence27 was not entirely objective as it 
encompassed the Cunningham test (the subjective element of whether D was aware of the 
risk) as well as introducing an inadvertent strand.  Also, it has been demonstrated that there is 
substantial evidence to support the contention that the objective limb of the Model Direction 
espoused by Lord Diplock in Caldwell and Lawrence was intended to be capacity dependent.  
The latest test from the Draft Criminal Code, adopted in G & R,28 has been interpreted to be 
subjective and objective, akin to the Cunningham test, but it has the potential to be 
interpreted as entirely subjective given its wording.  If a purely subjective interpretation was 
taken then it must be proven that D foresaw the relevant risk and that D knew it was an 
unreasonable one to take.  This would make it extremely difficult to secure a conviction. 
 
As noted above, it is argued that in reality an objective capacity based test for recklessness is 
already in operation, the subjective position being undermined to mete out the courts’ notion 
of justice.  This is because it is recognised that a definition of recklessness that is purely 
subjective can allow those who are blameworthy to avoid criminal liability.  Alternatively, a 
test that is purely objective can lead to injustice if it is not limited to a capacity-based 
analysis.  It was advocated in this chapter that a synthesis of the two approaches is required.  
This could be achieved by openly developing a capacity-based test modelled upon the 
Caldwell/Lawrence Direction as advocated here,29 or by introducing a form of practical 
indifference test.  It was submitted that Glidewell J’s suggestion in Elliott would be a way of 
                                            
27 Chapter 3 at 3.3.3. 
28 Chapter 3 at 3.3.4. 
29 Chapter 3 at 3.4. 
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achieving a more appropriate approach to inadvertent recklessness.  When applying the 
Caldwell/Lawrence Direction:  
where no thought is given to the risk any further inquiry necessary for the purpose of 
establishing guilt should prima facie be directed to the question why such thought was 
not given, rather than to the purely hypothetical question of what the particular 
person would have appreciated had he directed his mind to the matter.30 
 
Adopting such an approach will impose an evidential burden on the accused to give reasons 
for his inadvertence.  Once the reasons why no thought was given to the risk are established, 
it would be relatively straightforward to assess the degree of moral blameworthiness and thus 
any criminal liability.31  This would look beyond the subjective/objective dichotomy and add 
another dimension, why the accused acted as he did.   Thus, if the reason D did not foresee 
the risk displayed a reprehensible attitude or moral failing, for example, because he was 
angry or set on a course of revenge against someone who had offended him, he would be 
morally culpable and reckless.  Alternatively if D did not manifest a bad character or other 
moral failing, for example, where he failed to foresee the risk because he was going to the 
assistance of an innocent third party or because he was distracted because his child had been 
hurt, he would not be deemed morally culpable or reckless.  Thus, any determination of 
inadvertent recklessness becomes context dependent.  This position is clearly grounded in 
character theory but it also incorporates a subjectivised form of ‘role’ theory.32   
 
  
                                            
30 (1983) 77 Cr.App.R. 103 at 119 




     5.4 Negligence  
 
Chapter Four undertakes an exhaustive analysis of the boundaries between criminal 
recklessness and negligence in an attempt to determine whether there is a distinction and, if 
so, where the line should be drawn between these two forms of mens rea.  The analysis 
confirmed that the courts have often used the terms ‘negligence’ and ‘reckless’ 
interchangeably.33  This is not appropriate given that there is general agreement that 
recklessness is a more serious fault element, and also because most mala in se offences 
cannot be committed negligently.  Following the analysis of Adomako,34 it was proposed here 
that a capacity based modification to Caldwell/Lawrence would have been a preferable 
alternative to the finding that gross negligence was the preferred fault element in such cases 
of involuntary manslaughter.  This would take the form of a broader, capacity based approach 
to recklessness which takes into consideration D’s cognitive capacity and knowledge.  The 
proposed modification would also give consideration to D’s attitude at the time of acting and 
where a bad attitude was demonstrated, criminal liability could ensue.  As far as the capacity 
of D is concerned, where there is evidence of incapacity, exculpation will be dependent upon 
the extent to which such incapacity is manifest in the circumstances and  the extent to which 
it is fault-free. 
 
To this end, a revised version of the Caldwell/Lawrence Model Direction on recklessness was 
advanced that would also encompass liability for inadvertent omissions.  It was proposed that 
a person will be deemed reckless for failing to act if he has a legal duty of care towards 
another and is, or should be, aware of a serious and obvious risk to the welfare of that other 
                                            
33 Chapter 4 at 4.2. 
34 Chapter 4 at 4.3.5. 
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and yet fails to act to prevent or ameliorate harm.35  Therefore a person may be deemed 
reckless where: 
(1) he fails to act when there is an obvious and serious risk of death or serious harm 
to another when he is under a legal duty to that other person, and  
(2) he either has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk 
or he has recognised that there was some risk involved and has ignored it or tried to 
eliminate it in a wholly incompetent manner; and 
(3) if satisfied that an obvious and serious risk in such circumstances has not been 
considered or is dealt with in a wholly inappropriate manner by the defendant, the 
jury are entitled to infer that he has the state of mind required to constitute the offence 
and will probably do so; but regard must be given to any explanation he gives which 
may displace the inference.  
(3)(i) evidence of a general or specific lack of capacity in the circumstances may be 
exculpatory; 
(3)(ii) evidence of a reprehensible attitude or other moral failing will not displace the 
inference. 
Such guidance would extend negligent/inadvertent liability to causing someone serious 
injury, making it apparently broader than the test for gross negligence which now requires a 
risk of death.  In one respect it is more restrictive, as without evidence of a reprehensible 
attitude or other moral failing criminal liability will not be established.   The extension of 
liability to cover an obvious risk of serious bodily harm will provide some symmetry with the 
law of murder as it is submitted that it is hard to justify liability for death whilst not providing 




a criminal sanction for someone who may cause irreparable serious harm.  It also brings 
English law in to line with other western jurisdictions.36 
 
It was demonstrated in the analysis above that ‘gross’ negligence is synonymous with 
recklessness and it is submitted that no distinction should continue to be drawn between the 
two forms of mens rea, leaving negligence to mean mere inadvertence or everyday 
carelessness.  Once the definition of recklessness is extended to encompass both the advertent 
and inadvertent risk taker, with some additional requirements, the problem with terminology 
disappears.  Clearly, from a subjectivist stance such an argument would be untenable as 
following this theoretical approach by definition mens rea requires conscious awareness: but 
this interpretation of the Latin maxim has been shown to be built upon insecure 
foundations.37   Further, the use of the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ labels has, once again, 
proven inconsistent; even negligence can have both objective and subjective elements for 
consideration.38 
 
From the discussion of the main theories of culpability, it appears from the majority of the 
academic literature that if criminal liability for negligence can be justified at all, it can only 
be on weak utilitarian grounds.  This is because it can serve as deterrence to others.  Yet it 
must be acknowledged that this deterrence aspect may be limited in some instances.  
Deterrence can be effective when an agent deliberates upon taking a conscious risk.  He can 
then weigh up the benefit of continuing to act against the possibility of harm and subsequent 
criminal punishment and potentially be deterred from continuing to act.  The inadvertent 
agent does not have these thought processes to effect his action.    
                                            
36 Chapter 4 at 4.4. 
37 Chapter 4 at 4.4.1. 
38 Chapter 4 at 4.4.1. In some Continental jurisdictions they regard negligence as subjective, whereas others 
insist it is objective as D is compared with the external standard of the reasonable person.   In English law, mere 
negligence appears purely objective whereas there are contrary views with regard to ‘gross’ negligence. 
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Criminal responsibility for inadvertence cannot be founded upon culpable choice or culpable 
character unless such theories could be universally applied to all negligent actors.  The latter 
theory comes close to providing a theoretical explanation, as it can often identify inferences 
of bad character where moral excuse fails, but it cannot do this consistently.  Neither choice 
nor character theory can cope with spontaneous and instinctive reactions where, on the one 
hand there is no choice and, on the other, there is no evidence of ‘bad’ character.  
Accordingly, based upon the leading theories of culpability alone, the argument against the 
imposition of criminal liability for negligence (inadvertence) for serious crimes is strong.  
‘Role’ theory can clearly ground criminal liability for inadvertent conduct, objective 
recklessness or negligence, but without taking individual capacity into account it could cause 
injustice as capacity can be relevant to both fault terms as suggested under the 
Caldwell/Lawrence Model Direction and demonstrated in the analysis of negligence in 
Chapter Four. 
 
It is clear that an agent may deserve moral blame when he causes serious harm, even when 
the risk of harm arising from his conduct may never have crossed his mind.  Indeed, even 
creating the risk of causing serious harm may give rise to attributions of blame.  What needs 
to be determined is to what extent such inadvertent conduct is also deserving of criminal 
sanction.  It is submitted here that the breakpoint between criminal culpability and civil 
liability arises where D’s conduct causes serious harm and demonstrates a reprehensible 
attitude (such as indifference or wanton disregard) towards the welfare of others or other 
moral failing.  This will be evidenced by the possession of an innate general capacity to have 
appreciated the risk coupled with the failure to provide any moral justification for why he 
failed to realise the risk involved in his actions.  In such circumstances, D will be deemed 
reckless rather than negligent.   
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Where an agent has acted stupidly, the stupidity itself is the moral failing.  No manifestation 
of any other character flaw, such as indifference, is necessary to ground culpability provided 
D had the innate intellectual capacity to appreciate the risk, there is no social utility in the act 
and no moral justification can be advanced as to why he should not be deemed reckless.  This 
is because, without also considering the reasons for failing to notice an obvious risk, any 
differentiation between the merely negligent and the reckless actor cannot be achieved.  This 
is the result of recklessness being context dependent.  Following this line of reasoning, this 
work has demonstrated that liability for inadvertence is properly grounded by a synthesis of 
character theory and Gardner’s role theory.  Criminal liability for inadvertence can be 
justified for those who cause serious harm to others in circumstances where the risk of harm 
is both serious and obvious, unless they can show that their action or inaction displays no 
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